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Dreier Is a Great Dad in All Possible Worlds: A Challenge to Moral Contingentism 德雷尔在所有可能的世界里都是个好爸爸：对道德权变论的挑战
IF 1 2区 哲学
AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-08-04 DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2024.2381678
Alexis Morin-Martel
{"title":"Dreier Is a Great Dad in All Possible Worlds: A Challenge to Moral Contingentism","authors":"Alexis Morin-Martel","doi":"10.1080/00048402.2024.2381678","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2024.2381678","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I raise a challenge to Gideon Rosen’s defence of moral contingentism against Jamie Dreier’s moral luck argument. Dreier argues that if moral contingentism is true, acting in a morall...","PeriodicalId":51459,"journal":{"name":"AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141899699","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Competitive Value, Noncompetitive Value, and Life's Meaning 竞争价值、非竞争价值和人生意义
IF 1 2区 哲学
AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-07-30 DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2024.2379254
Iddo Landau
{"title":"Competitive Value, Noncompetitive Value, and Life's Meaning","authors":"Iddo Landau","doi":"10.1080/00048402.2024.2379254","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2024.2379254","url":null,"abstract":"This paper explores the notions of competitive and noncompetitive value and examines how they both affect meaning in life. The paper distinguishes, among other things, between engaging with competi...","PeriodicalId":51459,"journal":{"name":"AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141880128","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Unconscious Pleasure as Dispositional Pleasure 无意识的快感即处置性快感
IF 1 2区 哲学
AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-07-23 DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2024.2379252
James Fanciullo
{"title":"Unconscious Pleasure as Dispositional Pleasure","authors":"James Fanciullo","doi":"10.1080/00048402.2024.2379252","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2024.2379252","url":null,"abstract":": A good deal of recent debate over the nature of pleasure and pain has surrounded the alleged phenomenon of unconscious sensory pleasure and pain, or pleasures and pains whose subjects are entirely unaware of them while experiencing them. According to Ben Bramble, these putative pleasures and pains present a problem for attitudinal theories of pleasure and pain, since these theories claim that what makes something a sensory pleasure or pain is that one has a special sort of pro-or con-attitude toward it at the time one experiences it. In this paper, I look at the two existing defenses of attitudinal theories against this worry and explain (following Bramble) that each is inadequate. I show that this inadequacy is in part a result of existing attitudinal theories failing to recognize an important distinction in pro-and con-attitudes, and I propose and defend an amended attitudinal view that does recognize this distinction. I then offer a more promising response to the objection from unconscious sensory pleasures and pains: that experiences of apparently unconscious pleasure or pain only seem pleasant or unpleasant because their subjects are disposed to experience pleasantness or unpleasantness. In this sense, unconscious pleasures and pains are not really pleasures or pains at all.","PeriodicalId":51459,"journal":{"name":"AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141810431","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Counting Your Chickens 数鸡
IF 1 2区 哲学
AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-07-07 DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2024.2309579
Yoaav Isaacs, Adam Lerner, Jeffrey Sanford Russell
{"title":"Counting Your Chickens","authors":"Yoaav Isaacs, Adam Lerner, Jeffrey Sanford Russell","doi":"10.1080/00048402.2024.2309579","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2024.2309579","url":null,"abstract":"Suppose that, for reasons of animal welfare, it would be better if everyone stopped eating chicken. Does it follow that you should stop eating chicken? Proponents of the ‘inefficacy objection’ argu...","PeriodicalId":51459,"journal":{"name":"AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141602748","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Buddha’s Lucky Throw and Pascal’s Wager 佛祖的幸运一掷和帕斯卡尔的赌注
IF 1 2区 哲学
AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-05-30 DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2023.2289629
Bronwyn Finnigan
{"title":"The Buddha’s Lucky Throw and Pascal’s Wager","authors":"Bronwyn Finnigan","doi":"10.1080/00048402.2023.2289629","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2023.2289629","url":null,"abstract":"The Apaṇṇaka Sutta, one of the early recorded teachings of the Buddha, contains an argument for accepting the doctrines of karma and rebirth that Buddhist scholars claim anticipates Pascal’s wager....","PeriodicalId":51459,"journal":{"name":"AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141320028","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Hermeneutical Sabotage 诠释学破坏
IF 1 2区 哲学
AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-05-20 DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2024.2351210
Han Edgoose
{"title":"Hermeneutical Sabotage","authors":"Han Edgoose","doi":"10.1080/00048402.2024.2351210","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2024.2351210","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper I identify a distinct form of epistemic injustice and oppression which I call ‘hermeneutical sabotage’. Hermeneutical sabotage occurs when dominantly situated knowers actively maintai...","PeriodicalId":51459,"journal":{"name":"AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-05-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141091853","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Hypocrisy and Conditional Requirements 虚伪和有条件的要求
IF 1 2区 哲学
AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-05-14 DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2024.2350702
John Brunero
{"title":"Hypocrisy and Conditional Requirements","authors":"John Brunero","doi":"10.1080/00048402.2024.2350702","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2024.2350702","url":null,"abstract":"This paper considers the formulation of the moral requirement against hypocrisy, paying particular attention to the logical scope of ‘requires’ in that formulation. The paper argues (i) that we should prefer a wide-scope formulation to a narrow-scope formulation, and (ii) this result has some advantages for our normative theorizing about hypocrisy – in particular, it allows us to resist several of Daniela Dover’s (2019) recent arguments against the anti-hypocrisy requirement.","PeriodicalId":51459,"journal":{"name":"AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140980542","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Problem of Blame: Making Sense of Moral AngerMcCormick, Kelly, The Problem of Blame: Making Sense of Moral Anger , Cambridge University Press, 2022, pp. xii + 224, $141.95 (hardback). 责备的问题：麦考密克，凯利，《咎由自取的问题：道德愤怒的意义》，剑桥大学出版社，2022 年，第 xii + 224 页，141.95 美元（精装本）：剑桥大学出版社，2022 年，第 xii + 224 页，141.95 美元（精装本）。
IF 1 2区 哲学
AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-05-09 DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2024.2326452
Adam Piovarchy
{"title":"The Problem of Blame: Making Sense of Moral AngerMcCormick, Kelly,\u0000 The Problem of Blame: Making Sense of Moral Anger\u0000 , Cambridge University Press, 2022, pp. xii + 224, $141.95 (hardback).","authors":"Adam Piovarchy","doi":"10.1080/00048402.2024.2326452","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2024.2326452","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51459,"journal":{"name":"AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-05-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140995558","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Ethical Implications of Panpsychism 泛灵论的伦理意义
IF 1 2区 哲学
AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-05-08 DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2024.2350708
Joseph Gottlieb, B. Fischer
{"title":"The Ethical Implications of Panpsychism","authors":"Joseph Gottlieb, B. Fischer","doi":"10.1080/00048402.2024.2350708","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2024.2350708","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51459,"journal":{"name":"AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-05-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140998322","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Foundations for Knowledge-Based Decision Theories 基于知识的决策理论基础
IF 1 2区 哲学
AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-05-05 DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2024.2328635
Zeev Goldschmidt
{"title":"Foundations for Knowledge-Based Decision Theories","authors":"Zeev Goldschmidt","doi":"10.1080/00048402.2024.2328635","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2024.2328635","url":null,"abstract":"Several philosophers have proposed Knowledge-Based Decision Theories (KDTs)— theories that require agents to maximize expected utility as yielded by utility and probability functions that depend on the agent’s knowledge. Proponents of KDTs argue that such theories are motivated by Knowledge-Reasons norms that require agents to act only on reasons that they know. However, no formal derivation of KDTs from Knowledge-Reasons norms has been suggested, and it is not clear how such norms justify the particular ways in which KDTs relate knowledge and rational action. In this paper, I suggest a new axiomatic method for justifying KDTs and providing them with stronger normative foundations. I argue that such theories may be derived from constraints on the relation between knowledge and preference, and that these constraints may be evaluated relative to intuitions regarding practical reasoning. To demonstrate this, I offer a representation theorem for a KDT proposed by Hawthorne and Stanley (2008) and briefly evaluate it through its underlying axioms.","PeriodicalId":51459,"journal":{"name":"AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-05-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141012073","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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