{"title":"The Attorneys are Bound and the Witnesses are Gagged: State Limits on Post-Conviction Investigation in Criminal Cases","authors":"Kathryn Miller","doi":"10.15779/Z38WW7703F","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38WW7703F","url":null,"abstract":"This Article is the first to take a comprehensive look at the ways in which State actors restrict post-conviction investigations in criminal cases, especially capital cases. By examining these restrictions in the context of interviews with jurors, victims, and State witnesses, this Article reveals that they harm criminal defendants and fail to achieve stated policy goals. The Article then examines why traditional legal arguments against these restrictions have failed, and ultimately makes the case for a constitutional right to investigate state post-conviction proceedings, grounded in the fundamental fairness prong of the Due Process Clause.","PeriodicalId":51452,"journal":{"name":"California Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2018-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48001674","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Reclaiming the Constitutional Text from Originalism: The Case of Executive Power","authors":"V. Nourse","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3103948","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3103948","url":null,"abstract":"There are consequences to theories in a world questioning the power of the President. For decades, some originalists, including Justice Scalia, maintained that the President enjoys “all” executive power. Of course, this is not the Constitution’s actual text (which refers to “the” executive power, not “all” executive power) — but a highly contestable, and potentially dangerous, addition of meaning to the text. As I demonstrate in this Article, adding to the actual text of the Constitution is common in the originalist literature on executive power, whether the precise question is the President’s removal power, the President’s power to refuse to enforce the law, or the President’s obligations under the Emoluments Clause. Using elementary principles from the philosophy of language — principles that apply to all communication — I explain how originalist interpreters in this area “pragmatically enrich” the text, without articulating or justifying those additions and without seeking to test those meanings against the full text of the Constitution. Before one gets to history, the originalist has assumed a unit of textual analysis — a word, a clause, a paragraph — that may effectively enrich the meaning to reflect the interpreter’s preferred policy position. If this is correct, originalists must theorize the “interpretation zone,” a putatively neutral place from which historical inquiries are launched, and explain why interpreters may add meaning by pragmatic enrichment in this zone — particularly if those meanings are falsified by the rest of the Constitution. Perhaps more importantly, originalism’s opponents need to start talking about how to reclaim the actual text of the Constitution.","PeriodicalId":51452,"journal":{"name":"California Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2018-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41644538","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Color as a Batson Class in California","authors":"Emily Margolis","doi":"10.15779/Z38PC2T88P","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38PC2T88P","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51452,"journal":{"name":"California Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67523287","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"All Disputes Must Be Brought Here: Atlantic Marine and the Future of Multidistrict Litigation","authors":"Jordan F. Bock","doi":"10.15779/Z38BG2H979","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38BG2H979","url":null,"abstract":"Multidistrict litigation (“MDL”) is an immensely powerful tool. In an MDL, cases that share a common question of fact are consolidated in a single district for pretrial proceedings. MDLs abide by the general principle that governs all transfers within the federal system: because transfer is no more than a “housekeeping measure,” an action retains the choice-of-law rules of the state in which it was filed. If a case filed in California is transferred to an MDL pending in Iowa, the transferee court in Iowa applies California’s choice-of-law rules. As a result, the cases maintain their identities through the retention of their individual home state’s choice-of-law rules. It is thus a critical feature of MDLs—which have far fewer procedural protections than class actions—that transfer to an MDL does not change the applicable law for any individual action. In non-aggregate litigation, this general transfer rule no longer applies, however, when a case is transferred pursuant to a forum-selection clause. Under the Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in Atlantic Marine Construction Co. v. U.S. District Court, the transferee court applies its own choice-oflaw rules instead. Thus, if a case filed in California is transferred to Iowa in accordance with a forum-selection clause, the transferee court in Iowa applies Iowa’s choice-of-law rules. Although Atlantic Marine involved a non-aggregate proceeding, courts have begun to consider whether this principle should control choice of law in complex litigation governed by a forum-selection clause. This Note argues that it should not. To begin, extending Atlantic Marine to the MDL context might allow the fact of consolidation to change the outcome in a case. Doing so would also expand due process concerns already inherent in aggregate proceedings, and MDL is not an appropriate forum in which to allow parties discretion to craft their own rules of dispute resolution. Accordingly, to preserve the integrity of the MDL process, MDL courts should consistently apply the choice-of-law rules of the transferor court, even when an action is governed by a valid forumselection clause. 1658 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 106:1657 Abstract ................................................................................................. 1657 Introduction ........................................................................................... 1658 I. Prioritization of Vertical Uniformity ................................................. 1661 A. The Accident of Diversity Jurisdiction .............................. 1662 B. Transfer as a “Housekeeping” Measure ............................. 1664................................................................................................ 1657 Introduction ........................................................................................... 1658 I. Prioritization of Vertical Uniformity ................................................. 1661 A. The Accident of Diversity Jurisdiction .","PeriodicalId":51452,"journal":{"name":"California Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67442326","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Case of the Armenian Catholicosate in Sis: Places of Worship and Religious Freedom Claims Before the European Court of Human Rights","authors":"Carla Gharibian","doi":"10.15779/Z38M61BP9Q","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38M61BP9Q","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51452,"journal":{"name":"California Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67503926","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Procedural Experimentation and National Security in the Courts","authors":"S. Sinnar","doi":"10.15779/Z382B8VC0B","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15779/Z382B8VC0B","url":null,"abstract":"In the last fifteen years, individuals have brought hundreds of cases challenging government national security practices for violating human rights or civil liberties. Courts have reviewed relatively few of these cases on the merits, often deferring broadly to the executive branch on the grounds that they lack expertise, political accountability, or the ability to protect national security secrets. Yet in cases where courts have permitted civil suits to proceed far enough to decide legal questions, influence policy, or afford litigants relief, they have often experimented with new methods for managing the secret information implicated in many national security cases. These procedures include centralizing cases through Multidistrict Litigation, conducting in camera review of sensitive documents, pressing the government to provide opposing counsel access to secret evidence, appointing special experts of their own, facilitating","PeriodicalId":51452,"journal":{"name":"California Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67383445","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Pharmaceutical Access Act: An Administrative Eminent Domain Solution to High Drug Prices","authors":"Brittany S. Bruns","doi":"10.15779/Z38V97ZR9S","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38V97ZR9S","url":null,"abstract":"Introduction ........................................................................................... 2024 I. The Economics of Pharmaceutical Pricing in the United States: A Broken Market ........................................................................... 2028 II. Market Failure Examples: Hepatitis C Drugs, EpiPen, and Daraprim ................................................................................................... 2033 A. Gilead Sets High Prices for Patented Hepatitis C Treatments 2034 B. Mylan Gradually Aggressively Marketed EpiPens Before Hiking Prices ..................................................................... 2037 C. Turing Leveraged Regulatory Barriers to Increase Price of Daraprim ............................................................................ 2041 III. Current Regulatory Pressure ........................................................... 2044 A. Congressional Hearings ..................................................... 2044 B. Antitrust Laws ................................................................... 2044 C. Targeted Discount and Rebate Programs .......................... 2046 D. 28 U.S.C. § 1498 ................................................................ 2047 1. Problems with Section 1498: Disperse Decision-Making Leads to a Bystander Effect ......................................... 2050 2. Problems with Section 1498: Potential Misapplication to Optimally Incented Products Discourages Investment in Innovation .................................................................... 2050","PeriodicalId":51452,"journal":{"name":"California Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67565620","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Duty to Appropriate: Why Congress Has a Constitutional Obligation to Fund Criminal Law Enforcement","authors":"Daniel Martin","doi":"10.15779/Z38VM42X44","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38VM42X44","url":null,"abstract":"In the Federalist Papers, James Madison famously called the power of the purse “the most complete and effectual weapon” of the representatives of the people, as part of his defense of the fledgling Constitution. In practical terms, Madison’s claim has proven true time and time again—with Congress using appropriations bills to assert extensive control over the modern administrative state. In legal terms, however, the power of the purse has received remarkably short shrift in both scholarship and case law, especially regarding the relationship between congressional appropriations and the separation of powers doctrine. Specifically, there is no Supreme Court opinion or body of research that systematically defines how appropriations may influence the President’s independent constitutional functions.","PeriodicalId":51452,"journal":{"name":"California Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67567174","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}