ACM Transactions on Information and System Security最新文献_第3页

Off-Path TCP Injection Attacks 旁路TCP注入攻击

ACM Transactions on Information and System Security Pub Date : 2014-04-01 DOI: 10.1145/2597173

Y. Gilad, A. Herzberg

引用次数: 29

An Anti-Phishing System Employing Diffused Information 利用扩散信息的反网络钓鱼系统

ACM Transactions on Information and System Security Pub Date : 2014-04-01 DOI: 10.1145/2584680

Teh-Chung Chen, Torin Stepan, S. Dick, James Miller

引用次数: 54

Sophisticated Access Control via SMT and Logical Frameworks 通过SMT和逻辑框架的复杂访问控制

ACM Transactions on Information and System Security Pub Date : 2014-04-01 DOI: 10.1145/2595222

Konstantine Arkoudas, R. Chadha, C. Chiang

{"title":"Sophisticated Access Control via SMT and Logical Frameworks","authors":"Konstantine Arkoudas, R. Chadha, C. Chiang","doi":"10.1145/2595222","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2595222","url":null,"abstract":"We introduce a new methodology for formulating, analyzing, and applying access-control policies. Policies are expressed as formal theories in the SMT (satisfiability-modulo-theories) subset of typed first-order logic, and represented in a programmable logical framework, with each theory extending a core ontology of access control. We reduce both request evaluation and policy analysis to SMT solving, and provide experimental results demonstrating the practicality of these reductions. We also introduce a class of canonical requests and prove that such requests can be evaluated in linear time. In many application domains, access requests are either naturally canonical or can easily be put into canonical form. The resulting policy framework is more expressive than XACML and languages in the Datalog family, without compromising efficiency. Using the computational logic facilities of the framework, a wide range of sophisticated policy analyses (including consistency, coverage, observational equivalence, and change impact) receive succinct formulations whose correctness can be straightforwardly verified. The use of SMT solving allows us to efficiently analyze policies with complicated numeric (integer and real) constraints, a weak point of previous policy analysis systems. Further, by leveraging the programmability of the underlying logical framework, our system provides exceptionally flexible ways of resolving conflicts and composing policies. Specifically, we show that our system subsumes FIA (Fine-grained Integration Algebra), an algebra recently developed for the purpose of integrating complex policies.","PeriodicalId":50912,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Information and System Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90106169","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 23

Exposure: A Passive DNS Analysis Service to Detect and Report Malicious Domains 暴露:被动的DNS分析服务，用于检测和报告恶意域

ACM Transactions on Information and System Security Pub Date : 2014-04-01 DOI: 10.1145/2584679

Leyla Bilge, Sevil Şen, D. Balzarotti, E. Kirda, Christopher Krügel

{"title":"Exposure: A Passive DNS Analysis Service to Detect and Report Malicious Domains","authors":"Leyla Bilge, Sevil Şen, D. Balzarotti, E. Kirda, Christopher Krügel","doi":"10.1145/2584679","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2584679","url":null,"abstract":"A wide range of malicious activities rely on the domain name service (DNS) to manage their large, distributed networks of infected machines. As a consequence, the monitoring and analysis of DNS queries has recently been proposed as one of the most promising techniques to detect and blacklist domains involved in malicious activities (e.g., phishing, spam, botnets command-and-control, etc.). EXPOSURE is a system we designed to detect such domains in real time, by applying 15 unique features grouped in four categories.\u0000 We conducted a controlled experiment with a large, real-world dataset consisting of billions of DNS requests. The extremely positive results obtained in the tests convinced us to implement our techniques and deploy it as a free, online service. In this article, we present the Exposure system and describe the results and lessons learned from 17 months of its operation. Over this amount of time, the service detected over 100K malicious domains. The statistics about the time of usage, number of queries, and target IP addresses of each domain are also published on a daily basis on the service Web page.","PeriodicalId":50912,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Information and System Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77109486","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 283

Access privacy and correctness on untrusted storage 不可信存储上的访问隐私和正确性

ACM Transactions on Information and System Security Pub Date : 2013-12-06 DOI: 10.1145/2535524

P. Williams, R. Sion

引用次数: 9

An experimental security analysis of two satphone standards 两种卫星电话标准的实验安全性分析

ACM Transactions on Information and System Security Pub Date : 2013-11-01 DOI: 10.1145/2535522

B. Driessen, R. Hund, Carsten Willems, C. Paar, Thorsten Holz

{"title":"An experimental security analysis of two satphone standards","authors":"B. Driessen, R. Hund, Carsten Willems, C. Paar, Thorsten Holz","doi":"10.1145/2535522","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2535522","url":null,"abstract":"General-purpose communication systems such as GSM and UMTS have been in the focus of security researchers for over a decade now. Recently also technologies that are only used under more specific circumstances have come into the spotlight of academic research and the hacker scene alike. A striking example of this is recent work [Driessen et al. 2012] that analyzed the security of the over-the-air encryption in the two existing ETSI satphone standards GMR-1 and GMR-2. The firmware of handheld devices was reverse-engineered and the previously unknown stream ciphers A5-GMR-1 and A5-GMR-2 were recovered. In a second step, both ciphers were cryptanalized, resulting in a ciphertext-only attack on A5-GMR-1 and a known-plaintext attack on A5-GMR-2.\u0000 In this work, we extend the aforementioned results in the following ways: First, we improve the proposed attack on A5-GMR-1 and reduce its average-case complexity from 232 to 221 steps. Second, we implement a practical attack to successfully record communications in the Thuraya network and show that it can be done with moderate effort for approximately $5,000. We describe the implementation of our modified attack and the crucial aspects to make it practical. Using our eavesdropping setup, we recorded 30 seconds of our own satellite-to-satphone communication and show that we are able to recover Thuraya session keys in half an hour (on average). We supplement these results with experiments designed to highlight the feasibility of also eavesdropping on the satphone's emanations.\u0000 The purpose of this article is threefold: Develop and demonstrate more practical attacks on A5-GMR-1, summarize current research results in the field of GMR-1 and GMR-2 security, and shed light on the amount of work and expertise it takes from setting out to analyze a complex system to actually break it in the real world.","PeriodicalId":50912,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Information and System Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76010811","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 9

Bringing java's wild native world under control 将java的原生世界置于控制之下

ACM Transactions on Information and System Security Pub Date : 2013-11-01 DOI: 10.1145/2535505

Mengtao Sun, Gang Tan, Joseph Siefers, Bin Zeng, Greg Morrisett

{"title":"Bringing java's wild native world under control","authors":"Mengtao Sun, Gang Tan, Joseph Siefers, Bin Zeng, Greg Morrisett","doi":"10.1145/2535505","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2535505","url":null,"abstract":"For performance and for incorporating legacy libraries, many Java applications contain native-code components written in unsafe languages such as C and C++. Native-code components interoperate with Java components through the Java Native Interface (JNI). As native code is not regulated by Java's security model, it poses serious security threats to the managed Java world. We introduce a security framework that extends Java's security model and brings native code under control. Leveraging software-based fault isolation, the framework puts native code in a separate sandbox and allows the interaction between the native world and the Java world only through a carefully designed pathway. Two different implementations were built. In one implementation, the security framework is integrated into a Java Virtual Machine (JVM). In the second implementation, the framework is built outside of the JVM and takes advantage of JVM-independent interfaces. The second implementation provides JVM portability, at the expense of some performance degradation. Evaluation of our framework demonstrates that it incurs modest runtime overhead while significantly enhancing the security of Java applications.","PeriodicalId":50912,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Information and System Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90115366","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 17

DriverGuard: Virtualization-Based Fine-Grained Protection on I/O Flows DriverGuard:基于虚拟化的I/O流细粒度保护

ACM Transactions on Information and System Security Pub Date : 2013-09-01 DOI: 10.1145/2505123

Yueqiang Cheng, Xuhua Ding, R. Deng

引用次数: 12

Modelling Access Propagation in Dynamic Systems 动态系统中的访问传播建模

ACM Transactions on Information and System Security Pub Date : 2013-09-01 DOI: 10.1145/2516951.2516952

T. Leonard, M. Hall-May, M. Surridge

{"title":"Modelling Access Propagation in Dynamic Systems","authors":"T. Leonard, M. Hall-May, M. Surridge","doi":"10.1145/2516951.2516952","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2516951.2516952","url":null,"abstract":"Access control is a critical feature of many systems, including networks of services, processes within a computer, and objects within a running process. The security consequences of a particular architecture or access control policy are often difficult to determine, especially where some components are not under our control, where components are created dynamically, or where access policies are updated dynamically.\u0000 The SERSCIS Access Modeller (SAM) takes a model of a system and explores how access can propagate through it. It can both prove defined safety properties and discover unwanted properties. By defining expected behaviours, recording the results as a baseline, and then introducing untrusted actors, SAM can discover a wide variety of design flaws.\u0000 SAM is designed to handle dynamic systems (i.e., at runtime, new objects are created and access policies modified) and systems where some objects are not trusted. It extends previous approaches such as Scollar and Authodox to provide a programmer-friendly syntax for specifying behaviour, and allows modelling of services with mutually suspicious clients.\u0000 Taking the Confused Deputy example from Authodox we show that SAM detects the attack automatically; using a web-based backup service, we show how to model RBAC systems, detecting a missing validation check; and using a proxy certificate system, we show how to extend it to model new access mechanisms. On discovering that a library fails to follow an RFC precisely, we re-evaluate our existing models under the new assumption and discover that the proxy certificate design is not safe with this library.","PeriodicalId":50912,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Information and System Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89574513","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 7

Bridging the Semantic Gap in Virtual Machine Introspection via Online Kernel Data Redirection 通过在线内核数据重定向弥合虚拟机自省中的语义差距

ACM Transactions on Information and System Security Pub Date : 2013-09-01 DOI: 10.1145/2505124

Yangchun Fu, Zhiqiang Lin

{"title":"Bridging the Semantic Gap in Virtual Machine Introspection via Online Kernel Data Redirection","authors":"Yangchun Fu, Zhiqiang Lin","doi":"10.1145/2505124","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2505124","url":null,"abstract":"It is generally believed to be a tedious, time-consuming, and error-prone process to develop a virtual machine introspection (VMI) tool because of the semantic gap. Recent advance shows that the semantic-gap can be largely narrowed by reusing the executed code from a trusted OS kernel. However, the limitation for such an approach is that it only reuses the exercised code through a training process, which suffers the code coverage issues. Thus, in this article, we present Vmst, a new technique that can seamlessly bridge the semantic gap and automatically generate the VMI tools. The key idea is that, through system wide instruction monitoring, Vmst automatically identifies the introspection related data from a secure-VM and online redirects these data accesses to the kernel memory of a product-VM, without any training. Vmst offers a number of new features and capabilities. Particularly, it enables an in-VM inspection program (e.g., ps) to automatically become an out-of-VM introspection program. We have tested Vmst with over 25 commonly used utilities on top of a number of different OS kernels including Linux and Microsoft Windows. The experimental results show that our technique is general (largely OS-independent), and it introduces 9.3X overhead for Linux utilities and 19.6X overhead for Windows utilities on average for the introspected program compared to the native in-VM execution without data redirection.","PeriodicalId":50912,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Information and System Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88179427","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 204