RAIRO - Operations Research最新文献

Using the hybrid undesirable network data envelopment analysis model to evaluate the efficiency of Taiwan’s social care system 利用混合不可取网络数据包络分析模型评估台湾社会照顾系统的效率

RAIRO - Operations Research Pub Date : 2024-07-25 DOI: 10.1051/ro/2024156

Chin-wei Huang

引用次数: 0

Reinsurance contracts under Stackelberg game and market equilibrium 斯塔克尔伯格博弈和市场均衡下的再保险合同

RAIRO - Operations Research Pub Date : 2024-07-25 DOI: 10.1051/ro/2024155

Duni Hu, Guomin Yang, Hailong Wang

引用次数: 0

Big data service outsourcing and cost-sharing choices for the manufacturer 大数据服务外包和制造商的成本分摊选择

RAIRO - Operations Research Pub Date : 2024-07-25 DOI: 10.1051/ro/2024154

Han Song, Yuxin Shu, Ying Dai, Lin Zhou, Haiyan Li

{"title":"Big data service outsourcing and cost-sharing choices for the manufacturer","authors":"Han Song, Yuxin Shu, Ying Dai, Lin Zhou, Haiyan Li","doi":"10.1051/ro/2024154","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1051/ro/2024154","url":null,"abstract":"The proliferation of digital technologies has revolutionized various industries, prompting enterprises to prioritize investment in big data analytics. Despite the associated value, enterprises must carefully assess the cost proposition of such investment. This study models a supply chain with a manufacturer and a retailer, investigating big data investment decisions and strategies of manufacturer as leader across varying scenarios. The results show that: if the manufacturer focus only on the big data service level, it will choose not to outsource. In the case of non-outsourcing, the pre-production big data service level, the pre-sale big data service level and the retailer’s profit are higher, however, the manufacturer’s profit depends on fixed cost. Moreover, the manufacturer has three options: it chooses non-outsourcing if the profits of supply chain members are decreased, it chooses outsourcing without coordination mechanism if only considers maximizing own profit, it chooses outsourcing with coordination mechanism if considers the profits of other members. If outsourcing is considered, the manufacturer can decide its cost-sharing rate according to different situations. When consumers need products with high satisfaction, they will improve the big data service level. And, the increased price is also acceptable to consumers. When consumers pay more attention to low price, appropriately reducing the big data service level can also satisfy consumers. In addition, this paper provides some management inspirations for decision-making and operation of supply chain.","PeriodicalId":506995,"journal":{"name":"RAIRO - Operations Research","volume":"101 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141802314","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Spectral sufficient conditions for graph factors containing any edge 包含任意边的图因子的谱充分条件

RAIRO - Operations Research Pub Date : 2024-07-24 DOI: 10.1051/ro/2024153

Jin Cai, Bo Zhou

引用次数: 0

Incentive mechanism for allocating wastewater discharge responsibility based on cooperative game theory 基于合作博弈论的污水排放责任分配激励机制

RAIRO - Operations Research Pub Date : 2024-07-24 DOI: 10.1051/ro/2024151

Yue Li, Xudong Chen, Qiufeng Zhang, Yangxi Lv, Zixuan Zhang, Xue Feng

{"title":"Incentive mechanism for allocating wastewater discharge responsibility based on cooperative game theory","authors":"Yue Li, Xudong Chen, Qiufeng Zhang, Yangxi Lv, Zixuan Zhang, Xue Feng","doi":"10.1051/ro/2024151","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1051/ro/2024151","url":null,"abstract":"Clarifying responsibility for wastewater discharges and enhancing reasonable allocation of wastewater emission permits are critical for controlling wastewater discharge in the context global sustainable development plans. The traditional wastewater allocation approach has several drawbacks, such as sub-regional \"free-riding,\" imbalanced regional development and demand, and unfair allocation mechanism. This study developed a model based on cooperative game theory to allocate responsibility for wastewater discharge in China's Tuojiang River Basin. In this model, the level of impact of a watershed sub-region on the water environment is determined, according to which the wastewater discharge responsibility is assigned. The stronger the impact of upstream sub-regions on downstream wastewater discharge, the greater the responsibility for wastewater discharge. Furthermore, by implementing the wastewater cooperation model, sub-regions can monitor and incentivize each other, through which wastewater discharges can be reduced by 16.38%, compared to the baseline mechanism and overall discharges can be reduced by 5007.99 tons. This study provides recommendations for appropriate management authorities to improve the allocation of wastewater discharge responsibility at the watershed scale.","PeriodicalId":506995,"journal":{"name":"RAIRO - Operations Research","volume":"2 25","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141807473","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The optimal decision of service provider considering extra waiting area value-added services---pooled or dedicated? 考虑额外等候区增值服务的服务提供商的最佳决策--共享还是专用？

RAIRO - Operations Research Pub Date : 2024-07-24 DOI: 10.1051/ro/2024152

Wentao Zhan, Jida Liu, Xuchuan Yuan, Xiaotong Huang, Minghui Jiang

{"title":"The optimal decision of service provider considering extra waiting area value-added services---pooled or dedicated?","authors":"Wentao Zhan, Jida Liu, Xuchuan Yuan, Xiaotong Huang, Minghui Jiang","doi":"10.1051/ro/2024152","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1051/ro/2024152","url":null,"abstract":"Service providers often provide chargeable extra waiting area value-added services (EWS) to enhance customers' waiting experiences, e.g., in VIP and business lounges at airports, train stations, luxury brand stores, etc., to improve profitability. The impact of EWS on customers' value perception is subject to their heterogeneous sensitivities and also depends on the reference effect due to EWS' observable status. This paper investigates the optimal level of EWS and price decisions for a service provider facing heterogeneous customers, namely the EWS-preferring (E-type) customers and ordinary (O-type) customers, considering the observable status (observable vs. unobservable) of EWS using pooled or dedicated capacities in operations through M/M/1 queue models. The optimal price and level are solved and the optimal profit is calculated under each scenario. It is found that customers' heterogeneous sensitivities play an important role in the price and intensity decisions. Offering observable EWS to leverage the reference effect in customers' value perception can lead to a higher profit. Furthermore, using pooled capacity in operations with EWS is more profitable when service costs are higher. These results offer significant managerial implications and provide practical guidelines for service providers regarding the intensity of EWS, service price, and whether EWS should be observable to customers through pooled or dedicated capacities.","PeriodicalId":506995,"journal":{"name":"RAIRO - Operations Research","volume":"53 18","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141806824","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Models for dual-channel remanufacturing supply chain with reference price effect under static and dynamic games 静态和动态博弈下具有参考价格效应的双通道再制造供应链模型

RAIRO - Operations Research Pub Date : 2024-07-23 DOI: 10.1051/ro/2024148

Lili Dai, T. Shu, Yanyan Zheng, Shouyang Wang

{"title":"Models for dual-channel remanufacturing supply chain with reference price effect under static and dynamic games","authors":"Lili Dai, T. Shu, Yanyan Zheng, Shouyang Wang","doi":"10.1051/ro/2024148","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1051/ro/2024148","url":null,"abstract":"With the diversity of shopping styles, reference prices have become a consideration in consumers’ purchasing decisions. It is critical to understand how manufacturers and retailers make optimal decisions based on consumer behavior. To this end, we develop a manufacturer-led Stackelberg (M-Stackelberg) game model to investigate the impact of consumer proportion, reference price effect (RPE), and the channel preference coefficient on the decision of the remanufacturing supply chain (RSC) in dual-channel structures. Through comparing different game scenario models, we find that when the reference price coefficient is relatively small, the optimal decisions for the manufacturer and the retailer are the same regardless of whether the RPE is considered. The manufacturer and E-tailer always benefit from RPE, while the traditional retailer (T-retailer) is uncertain. The numerical analysis revealed that the profits of supply chain members are inversely proportional to the proportion of consumers. The smaller the proportion of primary consumers, the more favorable the supply chain. In particular, the higher the channel preference coefficient, the higher the profits of the manufacturer and E-tailer, while the lower the benefit of the T-retailer. Further, in the dynamic game, the total supply chain profit is highest when the T-retailer prices earlier than the E-tailer.","PeriodicalId":506995,"journal":{"name":"RAIRO - Operations Research","volume":"55 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141813306","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Expand or not? Trade-offs of the remanufacturer on recycling channels 扩大还是不扩大？再制造企业在回收渠道上的取舍

RAIRO - Operations Research Pub Date : 2024-07-23 DOI: 10.1051/ro/2024150

Xin Qi, Tao Zhang

{"title":"Expand or not? Trade-offs of the remanufacturer on recycling channels\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 \u0000 \u0000 \u0000 \u0000 \u0000 \u0000 \u0000 \u0000 \u0000 \u0000 \u0000 \u0000 \u0000 \u0000 \u0000 \u0000 \u0000 \u0000 \u0000 \u0000 \u0000 ","authors":"Xin Qi, Tao Zhang","doi":"10.1051/ro/2024150","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1051/ro/2024150","url":null,"abstract":"The integration of online trading has emerged as a crucial driver of operational efficiency in the reverse supply chain. This study expands the recycling model to include three distinct scenarios: basic-offline recycling (BR), single-platform recycling (SR), and dual-platform recycling (DR). The research delves into the implications of varying platform numbers, profit-sharing contracts, consumer recycling preferences, and recycling price adjustment speeds on supply chain stability within a multi-period decision-making framework. Findings reveal that the SR model is not always yield higher profits for remanufacturers through lower revenue allocation proportions to platforms, in stark contrast to the DR model. Furthermore, rapid decision adjustments do not consistently enhance the stability of the recycling system across multiple decision cycles. Remanufacturers' expansion strategies are significantly impacted by the costs associated with acquiring e-waste from individual recyclers. Importantly, an excess of platforms does not always result in favorable outcomes. Conversely, the SR model proves superior to the DR model in practical contexts that may arise. These insights offer valuable guidance to remanufacturers seeking to develop viable expansion strategies that foster mutually beneficial relationships among individual recyclers, remanufacturers, and platforms.","PeriodicalId":506995,"journal":{"name":"RAIRO - Operations Research","volume":"5 6","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141810167","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Take-away and sit-down service operations under inequity aversion 不公平规避下的外卖和就餐服务业务

RAIRO - Operations Research Pub Date : 2024-07-23 DOI: 10.1051/ro/2024149

Sijia Zeng, Wei Hu, Xiaochen Sun

{"title":"Take-away and sit-down service operations under inequity aversion","authors":"Sijia Zeng, Wei Hu, Xiaochen Sun","doi":"10.1051/ro/2024149","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1051/ro/2024149","url":null,"abstract":"Profit contributed by take-away service has become an increasingly essential element of the restaurant operating revenue. Since take-away service usually relies on the third-party platform and there are many differences between the cost of take-away service and that of sit-down service. We focus on the restaurant which provides both sit-down service and take-away service, the service system is modeled as a two-stage tandem queueing system. We study the restaurant’s optimal capacity level for each stage. Besides, as there exist price difference between the two services, inequity aversion is also investigaed in our model. We study symmetrical and asymmetrical inequity aversion according to consumers’elasity of demand. Through analysis of theoretical model, we get some conclusions: first, the optimal service capacity consists of two parts, base capacity and safety capacity. And the loss resulted from waiting time lag is equal to the waste of resources caused by fluctuations in arrival rate. Second, when customers really long for the restaurant, even if high price will lead to severe inequity aversion, restaurant can always earn more by raising the price in service channel with high revenue. While when customers are indifferent of the restaurant and the others, the price gap is meant to result in revenue decrease. Third, reduction in customers’ susceptibility can help to enhance operation profit in general. Market environment plays a decisive role in choosing the optimal service level.","PeriodicalId":506995,"journal":{"name":"RAIRO - Operations Research","volume":"21 12","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141813745","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

A delay differential equation model on Covid-19 with vaccination strategy 带疫苗接种策略的 Covid-19 延迟微分方程模型

RAIRO - Operations Research Pub Date : 2024-07-19 DOI: 10.1051/ro/2024147

Gaurang Sharma, Amit Sharma

{"title":"A delay differential equation model on Covid-19 with vaccination strategy\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 \u0000 \u0000 \u0000 \u0000 \u0000 \u0000 \u0000 \u0000 \u0000 \u0000 \u0000 \u0000 \u0000 \u0000 \u0000 \u0000 \u0000 \u0000 \u0000 \u0000 \u0000 \u0000 \u0000 \u0000\u0000 ","authors":"Gaurang Sharma, Amit Sharma","doi":"10.1051/ro/2024147","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1051/ro/2024147","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we have extended SEIR model of COVID- 19. The model incorporates two vital aspects in the form of vaccine compartment and constant time delay. The vaccination and time delay provide the information about immune protection and actual existence of the infection among the individuals, respectively. The model is analysed numerically and numerical simulation are executed for three different initial histories and constant time delays which affirm the biological relevance of the system. The analysis includes disease-free equilibrium (DFE), endemic equilibrium, and the basic reproduction number. The stability analysis is performed which reveal the asymptotic stability of the DFE when the basic reproduction number R0 < 1. The study addresses the boundedness and positivity of the solution as the time delay approaches zero. In addition, sensitivity analysis and contour plots for R0 with different parameters offer deeper insights into the model. The impact of vaccination and vaccine inefficacy on the model dynamics is explored.","PeriodicalId":506995,"journal":{"name":"RAIRO - Operations Research","volume":"121 24","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141820909","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0