International Security最新文献_第4页

Strategic Substitution: China's Search for Coercive Leverage in the Information Age 战略替代:中国在信息时代寻求强制杠杆

IF 5 1区社会学

International Security Pub Date : 2022-07-01 DOI: 10.1162/isec_a_00438

Fiona S. Cunningham

{"title":"Strategic Substitution: China's Search for Coercive Leverage in the Information Age","authors":"Fiona S. Cunningham","doi":"10.1162/isec_a_00438","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00438","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract China's approach to gaining coercive leverage in the limited wars that it has planned to fight against nuclear-armed adversaries differs from the choices of other states. A theory of strategic substitution explains why China relied on threats to use information-age weapons strategically instead of nuclear threats or conventional victories in the post–Cold War era. Information-age weapons (counterspace weapons, large-scale cyberattacks, and precision conventional missiles) promise to provide quick and credible coercive leverage if they are configured to threaten escalation of a conventional conflict using a “brinkmanship” or “calibrated escalation” force posture. China pursued information-age weapons when it faced a leverage deficit, defined as a situation in which a state's capabilities are ill-suited for the type of war and adversary that it is most likely to fight. China's search for coercive leverage to address those defi- cits became a search for substitutes because its leaders doubted the credibility of nuclear threats and were unable to quickly redress a disadvantage in the conventional military balance of power. A review of original Chinese-language written sources and expert interviews shows that China pursued a coercive cyberattack capability to address a leverage deficit after the United States bombed China's embassy in Belgrade in 1999. China's low dependence on information networks shaped its initial choice of a brinkmanship posture for large-scale offensive cyber operations. China switched to a calibrated escalation posture in 2014, following a dramatic increase in its vulnerability to cyberattacks.","PeriodicalId":48667,"journal":{"name":"International Security","volume":"203 1","pages":"46-92"},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84992511","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2

The Nuclear Balance Is What States Make of It 核平衡是由国家决定的

IF 5 1区社会学

International Security Pub Date : 2022-04-01 DOI: 10.1162/isec_a_00434

David C. Logan

{"title":"The Nuclear Balance Is What States Make of It","authors":"David C. Logan","doi":"10.1162/isec_a_00434","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00434","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Does nuclear superiority offer states political or military benefits? And do those benefits accrue beyond acquiring a secure second-strike capability? International relations theory has long held that nuclear superiority does not confer significant advantages, a conclusion supported by much of the qualitative literature on bargaining and crisis interactions between nuclear-armed states. New work by scholars using statistical methods to analyze data on nuclear crises, interstate disputes, and compellent threats has sought to answer these questions, producing conflicting results. Despite the contributions of these recent works, this line of research has assumed that warhead counts are an appropriate measure of nuclear capabilities and that states possess accurate information about the material balance. Instead, states use multiple quantitative and qualitative characteristics to evaluate the nuclear balance, and they often have inaccurate or incomplete information about the size, composition, and configuration of other states' nuclear forces. Using new data, replications of two prominent recent works show that results are sensitive to how the nuclear balance is operationalized. Drawing on archival and interview data from the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, findings show how states and leaders often understand and respond to the nuclear balance in inconsistent, asymmetric, and subjective ways.","PeriodicalId":48667,"journal":{"name":"International Security","volume":"88 1","pages":"172-215"},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2022-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86867393","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2

Why Drones Have Not Revolutionized War: The Enduring Hider-Finder Competition in Air Warfare 为什么无人机没有彻底改变战争:空战中持久的隐藏者-发现者竞争

IF 5 1区社会学

International Security Pub Date : 2022-04-01 DOI: 10.1162/isec_a_00431

A. Calcara, A. Gilli, Mauro Gilli, R. Marchetti, Ivan Zaccagnini

{"title":"Why Drones Have Not Revolutionized War: The Enduring Hider-Finder Competition in Air Warfare","authors":"A. Calcara, A. Gilli, Mauro Gilli, R. Marchetti, Ivan Zaccagnini","doi":"10.1162/isec_a_00431","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00431","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract According to the accepted wisdom in security studies, unmanned aerial vehicles, also known as drones, have revolutionizing effects on war and world politics. Drones allegedly tilt the military balance in favor of the offense, reduce existing asymmetries in military power between major and minor actors, and eliminate close combat from modern battlefields. A new theory about the hider-finder competition between air penetration and air defense shows that drones are vulnerable to air defenses and electronic warfare systems, and that they require support from other force structure assets to be effective. This competition imposes high costs on those who fail to master the set of tactics, techniques, procedures, technologies, and capabilities necessary to limit exposure to enemy fire and to detect enemy targets. Three conflicts that featured extensive employment of drones—the Western Libya military campaign of the second Libyan civil war (2019–2020), the Syrian civil war (2011–2021), and the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh (2020)—probe the mechanisms of the theory. Drones do not by themselves produce the revolutionary effects that many have attributed to them.","PeriodicalId":48667,"journal":{"name":"International Security","volume":"54 1","pages":"130-171"},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2022-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79415397","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 19

Soldiers' Dilemma: Foreign Military Training and Liberal Norm Conflict 士兵困境:外国军事训练与自由规范冲突

IF 5 1区社会学

International Security Pub Date : 2022-04-01 DOI: 10.1162/isec_a_00432

R. Joyce

{"title":"Soldiers' Dilemma: Foreign Military Training and Liberal Norm Conflict","authors":"R. Joyce","doi":"10.1162/isec_a_00432","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00432","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The United States regularly seeks to promote the liberal norms of respect for human rights and deference to civilian authority in the militaries that it trains. Yet norm-abiding behavior often does not follow from liberal foreign military training. Existing explanations ascribe norm violations either to insufficient socialization or to interest misalignment between providers and recipients. One reason violations occur is because liberal training imparts conflicting norms. How do militaries respond when they confront the dilemma of conflict between the liberal norms of respect for human rights and civilian control of the military? The U.S. policy expectation is that trained militaries will prioritize human rights over obedience to civilian authorities. But when liberal norms clash, soldiers fall back on a third norm of cohesion, which refers to the bonds that enable military forces to operate in a unified, group- and missionoriented way. Cohesion functions as both a military norm (particularly at the individual level) and an interest (particularly at the institutional level). If a military prioritizes cohesion, then it will choose the path that best serves its organization, which may entail violating human rights, civilian control, or both. An exploration of the effects of norm conflict on military attitudes among the Armed Forces of Liberia uses an experiment embedded in a survey to probe the theory. Results provide preliminary evidence that norm conflict weakens support for human rights and democracy. Results are strongest among soldiers with more U.S. training.","PeriodicalId":48667,"journal":{"name":"International Security","volume":"28 1","pages":"48-90"},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2022-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85839285","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 6

Pier Competitor: China's Power Position in Global Ports 码头竞争者:中国在全球港口中的权力地位

IF 5 1区社会学

International Security Pub Date : 2022-04-01 DOI: 10.1162/isec_a_00433

Isaac B. Kardon, Wendy Leutert

{"title":"Pier Competitor: China's Power Position in Global Ports","authors":"Isaac B. Kardon, Wendy Leutert","doi":"10.1162/isec_a_00433","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00433","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract China is a leader in the global transportation industry, with an especially significant position in ocean ports. A mapping of every ocean port outside of China reveals that Chinese firms own or operate terminal assets in ninety-six ports in fifty-three countries. An original dataset of Chinese firms' overseas port holdings documents the geographic distribution, ownership, and operational characteristics of these ports. What are the international security implications of China's global port expansion? An investigation of Chinese firms' ties to the Party-state reveals multiple mechanisms by which the Chinese leadership may direct the use of commercial port assets for strategic purposes. International port terminals that Chinese firms own and operate already provide dual-use capabilities to the People's Liberation Army during peacetime, establishing logistics and intelligence networks that materially enable China to project power into critical regions worldwide. But this form of networked state power is limited in wartime because it depends on commercial facilities in non-allied states. By providing evidence that overseas bases are not the sole index of global power projection capabilities, findings advance research on the identification and measurement of sources of national power. China's leveraging of PRC firms' transnational commercial port network constitutes an underappreciated but consequential form of state power projection.","PeriodicalId":48667,"journal":{"name":"International Security","volume":"42 11 1","pages":"9-47"},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2022-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87197853","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 6

Decline and Disintegration: National Status Loss and Domestic Conflict in Post-Disaster Spain 衰落与解体:灾后西班牙的国家地位丧失与国内冲突

IF 5 1区社会学

International Security Pub Date : 2022-04-01 DOI: 10.1162/isec_a_00435

S. Ward

{"title":"Decline and Disintegration: National Status Loss and Domestic Conflict in Post-Disaster Spain","authors":"S. Ward","doi":"10.1162/isec_a_00435","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00435","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Decline has long been a central concern of international relations scholarship, but analysts have only recently begun to investigate whether a change in international status influences a state's domestic politics. A new theoretical framework for understanding the domestic political consequences of relative national decline posits that eroding national status activates two sets of social psychological dynamics that contribute to domestic conflict inside declining states. First, eroding state status prompts some groups to strengthen their commitment to the state's status and dominant national identity, at the same time as it prompts other groups to disidentify from the state. Second, eroding status produces incentives for substate actors to derogate and scapegoat one another. These dynamics are particularly likely to contribute to center-periphery conflict in multinational states after instances of acute status loss. The plausibility of the argument is demonstrated by showing how the erosion of Spain's status (especially because of military failure in the 1898 Spanish-American War and the subsequent loss of its last colonies in the Americas) intensified domestic conflict in Spain during the first decades of the twentieth century. Findings indicate that decline may actually exacerbate domestic conflict, making it more difficult for states to adopt appropriate reforms.","PeriodicalId":48667,"journal":{"name":"International Security","volume":"29 2","pages":"91-129"},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2022-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72392942","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Assessing China-U.S. Inadvertent Nuclear Escalation 评估中美。无意的核升级

IF 5 1区社会学

International Security Pub Date : 2022-02-01 DOI: 10.1162/isec_a_00428

Riqiang Wu

{"title":"Assessing China-U.S. Inadvertent Nuclear Escalation","authors":"Riqiang Wu","doi":"10.1162/isec_a_00428","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00428","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract China-U.S. inadvertent escalation has been a focus of recent international relations literature. The current debate, however, has not paid sufficient attention to two important factors: the survivability of China's nuclear forces under unintentional conventional attacks; and China's nuclear command, control, and communication (NC3) system. Based on detailed analysis of these two variables, three potential mechanisms of China-U.S. inadvertent escalation are examined: use-it-or-lose-it, unauthorized/accidental, and damage-limitation. Although the possibility of a major China-U.S. conventional war inadvertently escalating to a nuclear level cannot be excluded, the risk is extremely low. China's nuclear forces would survive U.S. inadvertent conventional attacks and, thus, are unlikely to be significantly undermined. Even though China's NC3 system might be degraded during a conventional war with the United States, Chinese leadership would likely maintain minimum emergency communications with its nuclear forces. Moreover, China's NC3 system is highly centralized, and it prioritizes “negative control,” which can help to prevent escalation. China's nuclear retaliatory capability, although limited, could impede U.S. damage-limitation strikes to some extent. To keep the risk of inadvertent escalation low, both sides must take appropriate precautions and exercise self-restraint in their planning and operations.","PeriodicalId":48667,"journal":{"name":"International Security","volume":"12 1","pages":"128-162"},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2022-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80066214","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Defending the United States: Revisiting National Missile Defense against North Korea 保卫美国:重新审视针对朝鲜的国家导弹防御系统

IF 5 1区社会学

International Security Pub Date : 2022-02-01 DOI: 10.1162/isec_a_00426

Jaganath Sankaran, S. Fetter

{"title":"Defending the United States: Revisiting National Missile Defense against North Korea","authors":"Jaganath Sankaran, S. Fetter","doi":"10.1162/isec_a_00426","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00426","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract North Korea has made significant strides in its attempt to acquire a strategic nuclear deterrent. In 2017, it tested intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and completed a series of nuclear test explosions. These may provide North Korea with the technical foundation to deploy a nuclear-armed ICBM capable of striking the United States. The Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) missile defense system is intended to deter North Korean nuclear coercion and, if deterrence fails, to defeat a limited North Korean attack. Despite two decades of dedicated and costly efforts, however, the GMD system remains unproven and unreliable. It has not demonstrated an ability to defeat the relatively simple and inexpensive countermeasures that North Korea can field. The GMD system has suffered persistent delays, substantial cost increases, and repeated program failures because of the politically motivated rush to deploy in the 1990s. But GMD and other U.S. missile defense efforts have provoked serious concerns in Russia and China, who fear it may threaten their nuclear deterrents. Diplomacy and deterrence may reassure Russia and China while constraining North Korea's nuclear program. An alternate airborne boost-phase intercept system may offer meaningful defense against North Korean missiles without threatening the Russian or Chinese deterrents.","PeriodicalId":48667,"journal":{"name":"International Security","volume":"104 2 1","pages":"51-86"},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2022-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80606050","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 3

Prediction and Judgment: Why Artificial Intelligence Increases the Importance of Humans in War 预测与判断:为什么人工智能增加了人类在战争中的重要性

IF 5 1区社会学

International Security Pub Date : 2022-02-01 DOI: 10.1162/isec_a_00425

Avi Goldfarb, J. Lindsay

{"title":"Prediction and Judgment: Why Artificial Intelligence Increases the Importance of Humans in War","authors":"Avi Goldfarb, J. Lindsay","doi":"10.1162/isec_a_00425","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00425","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Recent scholarship on artificial intelligence (AI) and international security focuses on the political and ethical consequences of replacing human warriors with machines. Yet AI is not a simple substitute for human decision-making. The advances in commercial machine learning that are reducing the costs of statistical prediction are simultaneously increasing the value of data (which enable prediction) and judgment (which determines why prediction matters). But these key complements—quality data and clear judgment—may not be present, or present to the same degree, in the uncertain and conflictual business of war. This has two important strategic implications. First, military organizations that adopt AI will tend to become more complex to accommodate the challenges of data and judgment across a variety of decision-making tasks. Second, data and judgment will tend to become attractive targets in strategic competition. As a result, conflicts involving AI complements are likely to unfold very differently than visions of AI substitution would suggest. Rather than rapid robotic wars and decisive shifts in military power, AI-enabled conflict will likely involve significant uncertainty, organizational friction, and chronic controversy. Greater military reliance on AI will therefore make the human element in war even more important, not less.","PeriodicalId":48667,"journal":{"name":"International Security","volume":"86 1","pages":"7-50"},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2022-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85173141","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 15

Insurgent Armies: Military Obedience and State Formation after Rebel Victory 起义军:起义军胜利后的军事服从与国家形成

IF 5 1区社会学

International Security Pub Date : 2022-02-01 DOI: 10.1162/isec_a_00427

Philip A. Martin

引用次数: 5