Journal of Cryptographic Engineering最新文献_第3页

MaskSIMD-lib: on the performance gap of a generic C optimized assembly and wide vector extensions for masked software with an Ascon-p test case MaskSIMD-lib:基于Ascon-p测试用例的屏蔽软件的通用C优化汇编和宽向量扩展的性能差距

IF 1.9 4区计算机科学

Journal of Cryptographic Engineering Pub Date : 2023-05-29 DOI: 10.1007/s13389-023-00322-4

D. Salomon, I. Levi

引用次数: 0

Trojan awakener: detecting dormant malicious hardware using laser logic state imaging (extended version) 木马唤醒器:使用激光逻辑状态成像检测休眠恶意硬件(扩展版)

4区计算机科学

Journal of Cryptographic Engineering Pub Date : 2023-05-29 DOI: 10.1007/s13389-023-00323-3

Thilo Krachenfels, Jean-Pierre Seifert, Shahin Tajik

{"title":"Trojan awakener: detecting dormant malicious hardware using laser logic state imaging (extended version)","authors":"Thilo Krachenfels, Jean-Pierre Seifert, Shahin Tajik","doi":"10.1007/s13389-023-00323-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13389-023-00323-3","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The threat of (HTs) and their detection is a widely studied field. While the effort for inserting a Trojan into an (ASIC) can be considered relatively high, especially when trusting the chip manufacturer, programmable hardware is vulnerable to Trojan insertion even after the product has been shipped or during usage. At the same time, detecting dormant HTs with small or zero-overhead triggers and payloads on these platforms is still a challenging task, as the Trojan might not get activated during the chip verification using logical testing or physical measurements. In this work, we present a novel Trojan detection approach based on a technique known from (IC) failure analysis, capable of detecting virtually all classes of dormant Trojans. Using (LLSI), we show how supply voltage modulations can awaken inactive Trojans, making them detectable using laser voltage imaging techniques. Therefore, our technique does not require triggering the Trojan. To support our claims, we present three case studies on 28 nm and 20 nm SRAM- and flash-based (FPGAs). We demonstrate how to detect with high confidence small changes in sequential and combinatorial logic as well as in the routing configuration of FPGAs in a non-invasive manner. Finally, we discuss the practical applicability of our approach on dormant analog Trojans in ASICs.","PeriodicalId":48508,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Cryptographic Engineering","volume":"77 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135742004","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 9

No (good) loss no gain: systematic evaluation of loss functions in deep learning-based side-channel analysis 无（好）损失无收益：基于深度学习的侧通道分析中损失函数的系统评估

IF 1.9 4区计算机科学

Journal of Cryptographic Engineering Pub Date : 2023-05-28 DOI: 10.1007/s13389-023-00320-6

Maikel Kerkhof, Lichao Wu, Guilherme Perin, S. Picek

引用次数: 8

Spoofing attacks against vehicular FMCW radar 针对车载FMCW雷达的欺骗攻击

4区计算机科学

Journal of Cryptographic Engineering Pub Date : 2023-05-22 DOI: 10.1007/s13389-023-00321-5

Rony Komissarov, Avishai Wool

{"title":"Spoofing attacks against vehicular FMCW radar","authors":"Rony Komissarov, Avishai Wool","doi":"10.1007/s13389-023-00321-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13389-023-00321-5","url":null,"abstract":"The safety and security of the passengers in vehicles in the face of cyber attacks is a key concern in the automotive industry, especially with the emergence of the Advanced driver assistance systems and the vast improvement in autonomous vehicles. Such platforms use various sensors, including cameras, LiDAR and mmWave radar. These sensors themselves may present a potential security hazard if exploited by an attacker. In this paper we propose a system to attack an automotive FMCW mmWave radar, that uses fast chirp modulation. Using a single rogue radar, our attack system is capable of spoofing the distance and velocity measured by the victim vehicle simultaneously, presenting phantom measurements coherent with the laws of physics governing vehicle motion. The attacking radar controls the delay in order to spoof its distance, and uses phase compensation and control in order to spoof its velocity. After developing the attack theory, we demonstrate the spoofing attack by building a proof-of-concept hardware-based system, using a Software Defined Radio. We successfully demonstrate two real-world scenarios in which the victim radar is spoofed to detect either a phantom emergency stop or a phantom acceleration, while measuring coherent range and velocity. We also discuss several countermeasures that can mitigate the described attack.","PeriodicalId":48508,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Cryptographic Engineering","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135287981","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 29

Attribute-based encryption with enforceable obligations 具有可执行义务的基于属性的加密

IF 1.9 4区计算机科学

Journal of Cryptographic Engineering Pub Date : 2023-04-29 DOI: 10.1007/s13389-023-00317-1

Hamed Arshad, Pablo Picazo-Sanchez, Christian Johansen, Gerardo Schneider

引用次数: 0

A side-channel attack on a masked and shuffled software implementation of Saber 对Saber的屏蔽和混洗软件实现的侧通道攻击

IF 1.9 4区计算机科学

Journal of Cryptographic Engineering Pub Date : 2023-04-25 DOI: 10.1007/s13389-023-00315-3

Kalle Ngo, E. Dubrova, T. Johansson

引用次数: 0

StringENT test suite: ENT battery revisited for efficient P value computation 严格的测试套件:重新访问ENT电池以进行有效的P值计算

IF 1.9 4区计算机科学

Journal of Cryptographic Engineering Pub Date : 2023-04-01 DOI: 10.1007/s13389-023-00313-5

Elena Almaraz Luengo, Bittor Alaña Olivares, L. G. García Villalba, J. Hernandez-Castro, D. Hurley-Smith

引用次数: 0

A novel non-profiled side channel attack based on multi-output regression neural network 一种基于多输出回归神经网络的非剖面侧信道攻击方法

IF 1.9 4区计算机科学

Journal of Cryptographic Engineering Pub Date : 2023-03-31 DOI: 10.1007/s13389-023-00314-4

Ngoc-Tuan Do, Van‐Phuc Hoang, Van-Sang Doan

引用次数: 5

Practical aspects on non-profiled deep-learning side-channel attacks against AES software implementation with two types of masking countermeasures including RSM 采用包括RSM在内的两种掩蔽对策实现针对AES软件的非配置深度学习侧信道攻击的实践方面

4区计算机科学

Journal of Cryptographic Engineering Pub Date : 2023-03-27 DOI: 10.1007/s13389-023-00312-6

Kunihiro Kuroda, Yuta Fukuda, Kota Yoshida, Takeshi Fujino

{"title":"Practical aspects on non-profiled deep-learning side-channel attacks against AES software implementation with two types of masking countermeasures including RSM","authors":"Kunihiro Kuroda, Yuta Fukuda, Kota Yoshida, Takeshi Fujino","doi":"10.1007/s13389-023-00312-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13389-023-00312-6","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Deep-learning side-channel attacks, applying deep neural networks to side-channel attacks, are known that can easily attack some existing side-channel attack countermeasures such as masking and random jitter. While there have been many studies on profiled deep-learning side-channel attacks, a new approach that involves applying deep learning to non-profiled attacks was proposed in 2018. In our study, we investigate the structure of multi-layer perceptrons and points of interest for non-profiled deep-learning side-channel attacks using the ANSSI database with a masking countermeasure. The results of investigations indicate that it is better to use a simple network model, apply regularization to prevent over-fitting, and select a wide range of power traces that contain side-channel information as the points of interest. We also implemented AES-128 software implementation protected with the Rotating Sboxes Masking countermeasure, which has never been attacked by non-profiled deep-learning side-channel attacks, on the Xmega128 microcontroller and carried out non-profiled deep-learning side-channel attacks against it. Non-profiled deep-learning side-channel attacks successfully recovered all partial keys while the conventional power analysis could not. The attack results also showed that the least significant bit is the adequate selection for successful non-profiled deep-learning side-channel attacks, but the best labeling method may vary depending on the implementation of the countermeasure algorithm. We conducted two experimental analyses to clarify that deep-learning side-channel attacks learn mask values used in the masking countermeasure. One is the gradient visualization used in previous studies, and the other is a new analysis method using partial removal of power traces.","PeriodicalId":48508,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Cryptographic Engineering","volume":"62 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135823093","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 13

Side-channel analysis against ANSSI’s protected AES implementation on ARM: end-to-end attacks with multi-task learning 针对ARM上ANSSI受保护的AES实现的侧信道分析:多任务学习的端到端攻击

IF 1.9 4区计算机科学

Journal of Cryptographic Engineering Pub Date : 2023-03-10 DOI: 10.1007/s13389-023-00311-7

Loïc Masure, Rémi Strullu

引用次数: 6