Yale Law JournalPub Date : 2020-04-07DOI: 10.12987/yale/9780300210972.003.0006
Panikos Panayi
{"title":"Racists, Friends and Lovers","authors":"Panikos Panayi","doi":"10.12987/yale/9780300210972.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12987/yale/9780300210972.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter outlines the reality of interaction between different ethnic groups and individuals, from sex and love to violence. On the one hand racism always remains in the background, impacting on virtually every foreigner who has lived in the capital at some stage of their lives, no matter how mild or subtle such an experience may prove. At the other extreme comes the normality of interethnic relationships and marriages, not simply between white Britons and migrants and their descendants but also involving members of different migrant groups. In between come a variety of forms of interaction involving friendships, whether at school, in the workplace, or in the social sphere. Migrants and their descendants form a key part of London society across the social scale, meaning that their experiences simply mirror those of the white majority. Interethnic interaction thus involves both the majority and the minority.","PeriodicalId":48293,"journal":{"name":"Yale Law Journal","volume":"1 1","pages":"139-166"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147909574","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Yale Law JournalPub Date : 2019-11-02DOI: 10.2307/j.ctvrdf1zq.17
{"title":"THE ESCAPE FROM ROME","authors":"","doi":"10.2307/j.ctvrdf1zq.17","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvrdf1zq.17","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48293,"journal":{"name":"Yale Law Journal","volume":"1 1","pages":"166-193"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147883297","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"How to Save the Supreme Court","authors":"Daniel Epps, Ganesh Sitaraman","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3288958","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3288958","url":null,"abstract":"The consequences of Justice Brett Kavanaugh’s Supreme Court confirmation are seismic. Justice Kavanaugh, replacing Justice Anthony Kennedy, completes a new conservative majority and represents a stunning Republican victory after decades of increasingly partisan battles over control of the Court. The result is a Supreme Court whose Justices are likely to vote along party lines more consistently than ever before in American history. That development gravely threatens the Court’s legitimacy. If in the future roughly half of Americans lack confidence in the Supreme Court’s ability to render impartial justice, the Court’s power to settle important questions of law will be in serious jeopardy. Moreover, many Democrats are already calling for changes like court-packing to prevent the new conservative majority from blocking progressive reforms. Even if justified, such moves could provoke further escalation that would leave the Court’s image and the rule of law badly damaged. \u0000 \u0000The coming crisis can be stopped. But saving the Court’s legitimacy as an institution above politics will require a radical rethinking of how the Court has operated for more than two centuries. In this Feature, we outline a new framework for Supreme Court reform. Specifically, we argue for reforms that are plausibly constitutional (and thus implementable by statute) and that are capable of creating a stable equilibrium even if initially implemented using “hardball” tactics. Under this framework, we evaluate existing proposals and offer two of our own: the Supreme Court Lottery and the Balanced Bench. Whether policymakers adopt these precise proposals or not, our framework can guide their much-needed search for reform. We can save what is good about the Court—but only if we are willing to transform the Court.","PeriodicalId":48293,"journal":{"name":"Yale Law Journal","volume":"19 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":6.4,"publicationDate":"2019-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89134272","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Prosecuting Corporate Crime When Firms Are Too Big to Jail: Investigation, Deterrence, and Judicial Review","authors":"Nicholas Werle","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3216152","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3216152","url":null,"abstract":"Some corporations have become so large or so systemically important that when they violate the law, the government cannot credibly threaten “efficient” criminal sanctions. By introducing political economy constraints into a standard microeconomic model of corporate liability, this Note shows how this Too Big to Jail (TBTJ) problem reduces prosecutors’ ability to deter corporate crime by simply fining a defendant corporation without the accompanying prosecution of culpable individuals and mandatory structural reforms. This Note further illustrates how the risk of corporate criminal liability alone cannot incentivize a TBTJ firm to invest in internal controls or cooperate with government investigations. To deter criminality by TBTJ firms, prosecutorial strategy should credibly threaten culpable managers with monetary and nonmonetary penalties, and not unduly rely on corporate defendants’ cooperation.The Note also advances a structural explanation for the dearth of individual prosecutions relative to negotiated criminal settlements with TBTJ companies: prosecutors currently rely on an intrafirm apparatus for investigation that may produce information necessary for corporate settlements but will not reliably produce evidence to charge culpable individuals. In response, this Note proposes enlisting the courts as a bulwark against these structural incentives for prosecutors to agree to large corporate settlements without insisting on comprehensive investigation of underlying individual culpability. Thus, I present a legislative reform that authorizes judicial review of deferred prosecution agreements to ensure prosecutors have collected sufficient evidence prior to finalizing corporate settlements.","PeriodicalId":48293,"journal":{"name":"Yale Law Journal","volume":"15 1","pages":"1366"},"PeriodicalIF":6.4,"publicationDate":"2018-08-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76854403","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Statutory Separation of Powers","authors":"Sharon B. Jacobs","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3229255","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3229255","url":null,"abstract":"The separation of powers forms the backbone of our constitutional democracy. But it is also a guiding principle in sub-constitutional domains. This Article argues that Congress constructs statutory schemes of separation, checks, and balances through its delegations to administrative agencies. This statutory separation of powers may be seen clearly in the simultaneous legislative creation of the independent Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and the executive Department of Energy (DOE). Like its constitutional counterpart, the statutory separation of powers seeks to prevent the dominance of faction and create policy stability. But separating and balancing statutory authority is a delicate business subject to challenges of imprecise allocation, lopsided aggrandizement, and infrequent adjustment. The relationship between FERC and the DOE demonstrates these challenges, which have allowed the DOE to weaponize statutory checks and balances in its pursuit of policy dominance. The article concludes with recommendations for how Congress, the judiciary, and agencies themselves might mitigate these tendencies and preserve the statutory separation of powers as a meaningful safeguard against the perils of concentrated policymaking authority.","PeriodicalId":48293,"journal":{"name":"Yale Law Journal","volume":"84 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":6.4,"publicationDate":"2018-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73428381","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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