PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW最新文献_第3页

Sharing Knowledge: A Functionalist Account of Assertion 知识共享:断言的功能主义解释

1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW Pub Date : 2023-04-01 DOI: 10.1215/00318108-10317645

John Greco

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引用次数: 0

Epistemic Explanations: A Theory of Telic Normativity, and What it Explains 认识论解释:一种目的性规范理论及其解释

1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW Pub Date : 2023-04-01 DOI: 10.1215/00318108-10317632

Duncan Pritchard

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引用次数: 0

Averroes on Intellect: from Aristotelian Origins to Aquinas’s Critique 阿威罗伊论智力:从亚里士多德的起源到阿奎那的批判

1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW Pub Date : 2023-04-01 DOI: 10.1215/00318108-10294448

Peter Adamson

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引用次数: 0

How Is Perception Tractable? 感知是如何被控制的?

1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW Pub Date : 2023-04-01 DOI: 10.1215/00318108-10294422

Tyler Brooke-Wilson

引用次数: 0

Thomas Aquinas and Contemplation 托马斯·阿奎那与沉思

1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW Pub Date : 2023-04-01 DOI: 10.1215/00318108-10294461

Thomas Williams

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引用次数: 0

The Many and the One: A Philosophical Study of Plural Logic 多与一:多元逻辑的哲学研究

1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW Pub Date : 2023-04-01 DOI: 10.1215/00318108-10317593

J. P. Studd

{"title":"The Many and the One: A Philosophical Study of Plural Logic","authors":"J. P. Studd","doi":"10.1215/00318108-10317593","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-10317593","url":null,"abstract":"Logicians and philosophers have had a good 120 years to get used to the idea that not every condition defines a set. One popular coping strategy is to maintain that each instantiated condition does at least determine a ‘plurality’ (i.e., one or more items). This is to say that friends of traditional plural logic accept—often as a trivial or evident or logical truth—each instance of plural comprehension: Unless nothing is φ, some things include everything that is φ, and nothing else. Set-theoretic paradoxes are avoided by recognizing a type distinction between singular quantifiers (‘something’) and plural ones (‘some things’).This book defends a heterodox version of plural logic. Salvatore Florio and Øystein Linnebo advocate a set theory based on a ‘critical plural logic’ that refutes many instances of plural comprehension. In particular, they deny that there are one or more things that include everything. Instead, they argue, when it comes to resolving the paradoxes, a ‘package deal’ that restricts plural comprehension to ‘extensionally definite’ conditions is more attractive than its competitors that either limit the range of our quantifiers (‘generality relativism’) or constrain ‘singularization.’ Florio and Linnebo’s rejection of traditional plural logic permits them to combine two otherwise incompatible views: (i) ‘the set of’ operation is a universal singularization, so that it injectively maps each plurality to an object (namely, its set), and (ii) the domain of ‘everything’ may contain absolutely everything, so that it cannot be surpassed by singularization.The argument for adopting critical plural logic in preference to traditional plural logic comes in the fourth and final part of the book. The first three parts make the authors’ case for taking plural resources seriously in the first place. Part I reappraises the debate between pluralism, ‘which takes plural resources at face value’ (2), and singularism, which takes the opposite view. Part II compares ‘four different ways to talk about many objects simultaneously’ (119), including second-order quantification, and the use of ‘individual sums’, in addition to sets and pluralities. Part III focuses on philosophical applications of plural logic. Along the way, the book tackles many other topics of interest, including whether plural logic counts as ‘pure logic’ (168), or carries distinctive ontological commitments (chap. 8), how plural resources interact with modality (chap. 10), and whether the pluralization operation can be iterated to obtain superplural terms the denote ‘pluralities of pluralities’ (180) (chap. 9).The Many and the One covers an impressive amount of difficult territory in an admirably clear and engaging way. Florio and Linnebo offer a fresh perspective on the pluralism debate and defend a novel response to the paradoxes. The driving force behind their arguments is usually logic, broadly construed, rather than linguistics or the philosophy of language. But Florio and Linneb","PeriodicalId":48129,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135673477","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The Thirteenth-Century Animal Turn: Medieval and Twenty-First Century Perspectives Thinking about Animals in Thirteenth-Century Paris: Theologians on the Boundary between Humans and Animals 十三世纪的动物转向：中世纪和二十一世纪对动物的思考十三世纪的巴黎：神学家对人与动物边界的思考

IF 3.5 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.1215/00318108-10123800

C. Van Dyke

引用次数: 0

The Right to Sex: Feminism in the Twenty-First Century 《性的权利:二十一世纪的女权主义

IF 3.5 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.1215/00318108-10123839

L. Antony

引用次数: 0

A Minimal Metaphysics for Scientific Practice 科学实践的最小形而上学