{"title":"Is Conceptual Inflation a Problem for a Theory of Institutional Racism?","authors":"César Cabezas","doi":"10.1086/727273","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/727273","url":null,"abstract":"Ethics, Volume 134, Issue 2, Page 179-213, January 2024. <br/>","PeriodicalId":48118,"journal":{"name":"Ethics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":10.8,"publicationDate":"2023-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138658193","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Binding the Self: The Ethics of Ulysses Contracts","authors":"Andrew Franklin-Hall","doi":"10.1086/725806","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/725806","url":null,"abstract":"In a Ulysses contract, A gets B, at t1, to agree (i) to act at t2 in such a way that A is made to abide by her own earlier intentions and (ii) to ignore A’s later attempt to rescind the authorization. But why does A’s will at t2 lack the authority it had at t1? This article makes the case that a person has authority to enter a Ulysses contract only insofar as her expressed will at t1 is a better expression of the values that remain attributable to her at t2 than is her expressed will at t2.","PeriodicalId":48118,"journal":{"name":"Ethics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135275297","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Morality of Gossip: A Kantian Account","authors":"Cécile Fabre","doi":"10.1086/725811","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/725811","url":null,"abstract":"Gossip is pervasive and complex. It lubricates and wrecks social relationships. Many people openly confess to loving “a good gossip” yet acknowledge that gossiping, while often gratifying, is sometimes morally problematic. Surprisingly, gossip has not received much attention in moral philosophy. In this article, I argue that, notwithstanding its valuable relational and social functions, it is wrongful, at least in some of its forms, when and to the extent that it amounts to a particular kind of failure to treat others (be they gossipees or fellow gossipers) with the concern and respect they are owed as persons.","PeriodicalId":48118,"journal":{"name":"Ethics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135275300","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":":<i>Emotion as Feeling towards Value: A Theory of Emotional Experience</i>","authors":"Hichem Naar","doi":"10.1086/725822","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/725822","url":null,"abstract":"Previous articleNext article No AccessBook ReviewsMitchell, Jonathan. Emotion as Feeling towards Value: A Theory of Emotional Experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021. Pp. 224. $80.00 (cloth).Hichem NaarHichem NaarUniversity of Duisburg-Essen Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUSFull Text Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmailPrint SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Ethics Volume 134, Number 1October 2023 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/725822 Views: 1Total views on this site For permission to reuse, please contact [email protected].PDF download Crossref reports no articles citing this article.","PeriodicalId":48118,"journal":{"name":"Ethics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135275302","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"How Does Stalking Wrong the Victim?","authors":"Elizabeth Brake","doi":"10.1086/725815","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/725815","url":null,"abstract":"Much stalking consists in behavior which would normally be permissible; indeed, many stalking behaviors are protected liberties. How, then, does the stalker wrong the victim? I consider and reject different answers as failing to identify the essential wrong of stalking: stalking perpetuates gender oppression; it threatens or coerces, disrespects autonomy, or violates privacy. I argue that the stalker forces a personal relationship on the target and that our interest in being able to refuse such relationships is strong enough to ground a right. It is a benefit if my account changes the standards of which intimacy-seeking behaviors we consider permissible.","PeriodicalId":48118,"journal":{"name":"Ethics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135275296","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"From the Editors","authors":"Julia Driver, Connie Rosati","doi":"10.1086/725799","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/725799","url":null,"abstract":"Previous articleNext article FreeFrom the EditorsJulia Driver and Connie RosatiJulia Driver Search for more articles by this author and Connie Rosati Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUSFull Text Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmailPrint SectionsMoreWe hope that 2022 was a good year for all of our contributors, reviewers, and readers. Once again, we would like to thank our associate editors for their painstaking work for Ethics, as well as our graduate student editorial assistants, Karolina Winiewska (University of Arizona), Matthew Vermaire (University of Texas at Austin), and Sara Purinton (University of Pennsylvania), for their important work. Our outstanding managing editor, Joe Muszynski, continues to keep the editors and the journal on track.In the past year, we have had a number of changes in personnel. Karolina is stepping down from Ethics. Matt has successfully defended his dissertation and will be moving on to a postdoctoral fellowship in epistemology at the University of Glasgow. We wish him great success as he begins his academic career. Four of our associate editors have also stepped down. Our deep thanks to Sally Haslanger, whose presence among our editors encouraged many authors who might not otherwise have considered Ethics to send their work our way and who diligently shepherded many submissions through our review process. Thanks also to Japa Pallikkathayil for her invaluable contributions to the journal and to Serena Olseretti and David Shoemaker for their many years of outstanding service. We are delighted to welcome Jacob Nebel, Daniel Viehoff, and Tom Dougherty as associate editors and look forward to being joined by Fiona Woollard, Gunnar Björnsson, and Elizabeth Brake later in the year.The two of us will also be stepping down once the University of Chicago Press has found new editors for Ethics. We have greatly enjoyed and learned from our time with the journal, first as associate editors for eleven years, and then as editors-in-chief for another five years.In 2022, Ethics received 510 submissions. The initial screening process has continued to take longer than optimal, and we continue to experience some difficulty finding reviewers. But we are working to speed up the screening process and to eliminate the delays we have had over the past year (see tables 1, 2, and 3).Table 1. Time to Decision as of April 27, 2023, on Submissions in the 2021 and 2022 CohortsTotal<1 Mo.1–2 Mos.2–3 Mos.3–4 Mos.4–5 Mos.5–6 Mos.>6 Mos.Stage2021202220212022202120222021202220212022202120222021202220212022AcceptedOriginal manuscript accepted as is or with minor revisions3300000020001003Acceptance of 1st resubmission 5010200000101000Acceptance of 2nd resubmission 6000202010100000Acceptance of 3rd resubmission 1000000010000000Acceptance of 4th resubmission 1000001000000000RejectedOriginal manuscript rejected without invitation to resubmit507463451219466201135331","PeriodicalId":48118,"journal":{"name":"Ethics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135275299","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Intrapersonal Arguments for the Repugnant Conclusion","authors":"Tomi Francis","doi":"10.1086/725809","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/725809","url":null,"abstract":"In “An Intrapersonal Addition Paradox,” Jacob Nebel provides a novel intrapersonal argument for the Repugnant Conclusion. The most controversial premise of Nebel’s argument is the “Probable Addition Principle,” on which it is better for individuals to receive additional chances of existence with a life worth living. I provide an alternative intrapersonal argument for the Repugnant Conclusion which does not assume the Probable Addition Principle. I also show that Pareto principles alone, when conjoined with very minimal principles of prudence, imply a version of the Repugnant Conclusion.","PeriodicalId":48118,"journal":{"name":"Ethics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135275301","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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