University of Pennsylvania Law Review最新文献_第5页

Leading a Constitutional Court: Perspectives From the Federal Republic of Germany 领导宪法法院:来自德意志联邦共和国的视角

IF 2.5 2区社会学

University of Pennsylvania Law Review Pub Date : 2006-06-01 DOI: 10.2307/40041353

Peter E. Quint

引用次数: 2

How Not to Be Chief Justice: The Apprenticeship of William H. Rehnquist 如何不成为首席大法官:威廉·伦奎斯特的学徒生涯

IF 2.5 2区社会学

University of Pennsylvania Law Review Pub Date : 2006-06-01 DOI: 10.2307/40041342

L. Greenhouse

{"title":"How Not to Be Chief Justice: The Apprenticeship of William H. Rehnquist","authors":"L. Greenhouse","doi":"10.2307/40041342","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/40041342","url":null,"abstract":"William H. Rehnquist had an unusually long apprenticeship before he became Chief Justice in 1986. He had already served under two Chief Justices: first under Chief Justice Fred Vinson during his own Supreme Court clerkship for Justice Robert H. Jackson in 1952-1953, and then, of course, during the more than fourteen years that he spent as an Associate Justice on the Burger Court. (You will notice that Rehnquist’s Supreme Court biography happens to skip the Warren Court years—not that exposure to Earl Warren would likely have made much difference, but it is worth noting that Chief Justice Warren does not even appear in the index to Rehnquist’s book on the Supreme Court, a part-memoir and part-history that he published in 1987.) The differences between Chief Justice Burger and Chief Justice Rehnquist were manifest. One did not need to be a Court insider— and I do not present myself as one—to observe some of them. For example, during the Burger years, it was regarded as routine that an argued case or two would not be decided by the end of the Term, and instead would be, without explanation, restored to the calendar for reargument during the next Term. The reason, almost invariably, was that the Chief Justice had simply failed to exercise enough leadership to extract from his colleagues something that could pass for an opinion. Perhaps the most egregious example of this phenomenon was the Court’s failure to decide INS v. Chadha, the legislative veto case, during the 1981 Term. The case was reargued during the 1982 Term and was finally decided on June 23, 1983, by a vote of seven to two, with an opinion for the Court by Chief Justice Burger declaring the legislative veto unconstitutional. The Chadha file was one of the first I looked at when I began my work with the papers of Justice Harry Blackmun at","PeriodicalId":48012,"journal":{"name":"University of Pennsylvania Law Review","volume":"154 1","pages":"1365"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2006-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2307/40041342","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68757982","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 4

Defining the Office: John Marshall as Chief Justice 定义办公室:约翰·马歇尔担任首席大法官

IF 2.5 2区社会学

University of Pennsylvania Law Review Pub Date : 2006-06-01 DOI: 10.2307/40041344

Charles F. Hobson

引用次数: 1

Alternative Career Resolution II: Changing the Tenure of Supreme Court Justices 备选职业决议二:改变最高法院法官的任期

IF 2.5 2区社会学

University of Pennsylvania Law Review Pub Date : 2006-06-01 DOI: 10.2307/40041346

Stephen B. Burbank

引用次数: 3

Assessing Chief Justice William Rehnquist 评估首席大法官威廉·伦奎斯特

IF 2.5 2区社会学

University of Pennsylvania Law Review Pub Date : 2006-06-01 DOI: 10.2307/40041341

Erwin Chemerinsky

引用次数: 5

In the Beginning: The First Three Chief Justices 《开端:最初的三位首席大法官

IF 2.5 2区社会学

University of Pennsylvania Law Review Pub Date : 2006-06-01 DOI: 10.2307/40041343

N. Wexler

引用次数: 1

The Chief Justice's Special Authority and the Norms of Judicial Power 首席大法官的特殊权限与司法权规范

IF 2.5 2区社会学

University of Pennsylvania Law Review Pub Date : 2006-06-01 DOI: 10.2307/40041347

Theodore W. Ruger

{"title":"The Chief Justice's Special Authority and the Norms of Judicial Power","authors":"Theodore W. Ruger","doi":"10.2307/40041347","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/40041347","url":null,"abstract":"This Essay explores an incongruity in the allocation and exercise of two different kinds of judicial discretion held by the Chief Justice of the United States. The paradigmatic type of discretionary authority that Article III judges (including the Chief Justice) possess is expressed through the mode of adjudication, and as such is constrained in important ways by procedural forms that accompany that kind of official action. Judges are constrained, to a greater or lesser extent, by formal “law,” but their discretion is additionally limited by the collective structures of the federal judiciary and also by the normative expectation that judges give express reasons for their decisions. In this sense the appointment of an Article III judge can be regarded as a form of license to exercise bureaucratic discretion for a lifetime, but to do so under certain well-defined rules. We tell judges to follow “the law,” to be sure, but we don’t rest our faith entirely on the law’s uncertain formal constraints. Instead, judges exercise power collectively, are limited to particular cases and controversies, and are obliged to give reasons for each important decision that they make. So it is for most federal judges, including the Chief Justice in his primary role of deciding cases on the United States Supreme Court. Within the Court’s core adjudicative function, the Chief’s status as “prima inter pares”—first among equals—is a well-known and generally apt description of a type of special status that is highly visible, but also limited in important respects. The Chief Justice’s adjudicative power is structured and channeled in ways very much like the other eight Justices on the Court, and, in a more general sense, is much like the authority of any judge on a multimember appellate tribunal. The Chief Justice exercises independent discretion in a formal sense when","PeriodicalId":48012,"journal":{"name":"University of Pennsylvania Law Review","volume":"154 1","pages":"1551"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2006-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2307/40041347","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68758136","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 3

Strategy and Constraints on Supreme Court Opinion Assignment 最高法院意见书分配的策略与制约

IF 2.5 2区社会学

University of Pennsylvania Law Review Pub Date : 2006-06-01 DOI: 10.2307/40041351

Paul J. Wahlbeck

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引用次数: 22

Guardians of the Constitution: Constitutional Court Presidents and the Struggle for the Rule of Law in Post-Soviet Europe 《宪法的守护者:宪法法院院长与后苏联欧洲法治的斗争》

IF 2.5 2区社会学

University of Pennsylvania Law Review Pub Date : 2006-06-01 DOI: 10.2307/40041352

K. Scheppele

引用次数: 55

The Internal Powers of the Chief Justice: The Nineteenth-Century Legacy 首席大法官的内部权力:19世纪的遗产

IF 2.5 2区社会学

University of Pennsylvania Law Review Pub Date : 2006-06-01 DOI: 10.2307/40041345

G. White

引用次数: 8