{"title":"Nationalistic Bias among International Experts: Evidence from Professional Ski Jumping","authors":"Alex Krumer, Felix Otto, T. Pawlowski","doi":"10.1111/sjoe.12451","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12451","url":null,"abstract":"Ski jumping competitions involve subjective evaluations by judges from different countries. This may lead to nationalistic bias, according to which judges assign higher scores to their compatriots. To test this claim empirically, we exploit within-performance variation of scores from all World Cup, World Championship, and Olympic Games competitions between the 2010/11 and 2016/17 seasons. Our findings confirm that judges assign significantly higher scores to their compatriots. The magnitude of this nationalistic bias is significantly higher in more corrupt countries. We do not find that judges assign significantly different scores to jumpers whose compatriots are present on the judging panel.","PeriodicalId":47929,"journal":{"name":"Scandinavian Journal of Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2021-06-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/sjoe.12451","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49583084","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Climate Policy and Moral Consumers","authors":"T. Eichner, R. Pethig","doi":"10.1111/SJOE.12450","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/SJOE.12450","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47929,"journal":{"name":"Scandinavian Journal of Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2021-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/SJOE.12450","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45107605","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Is Body Weight Better Distributed among Men than among Women? A Robust Normative Analysis for France, the UK, and the US","authors":"Fatiha Bennia, N. Gravel, B. Magdalou, P. Moyes","doi":"10.1111/SJOE.12443","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/SJOE.12443","url":null,"abstract":"We compare distributions of Body Mass Index (BMI) categories among genders in France, the US and the UK on the basis of effciency and inequality considerations. The new normative criteria that we propose are well-suited to the ordinal nature of this variable. Our empirical results, which are supported by robust statistical inference, are twofolds. First, BMI categories are better distributed in France than in the UK, and in the UK than in the US for the two genders. Second, BMI categories happen to be more equally distributed among men than among women in all three countries.","PeriodicalId":47929,"journal":{"name":"Scandinavian Journal of Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2021-05-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/SJOE.12443","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46855356","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Spending from Regulated Retirement Drawdowns: The Role of Implied Endorsement*","authors":"J. Garcia, J. Bonekamp, H. Bateman, Ralph Stevens","doi":"10.1111/SJOE.12437","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/SJOE.12437","url":null,"abstract":"We fielded an online survey in the Netherlands and Australia to explore the influence of an implied endorsement nudge, conveyed by a government regulated drawdown from pension wealth, on spending patterns in retirement. The implied endorsement nudge was effective. It influenced the preferred retirement spending patterns of around 30% of survey participants, particularly those with fewer financial resources and low pension capability. Australian participants were more likely to follow the nudge where it was framed as implicit government advice while the Dutch were more likely to respond to a suggestion that the nudge was a recommendation from peers. Our results provide support for a regulated drawdown rule as part of a strategy to guide spending patterns in retirement. JEL: D14, D90, J14, J26","PeriodicalId":47929,"journal":{"name":"Scandinavian Journal of Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2021-04-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/SJOE.12437","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49237822","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Role of Budget Constraints in Sequential Elimination Tournaments","authors":"Malin Arve, Olga Chiappinelli","doi":"10.1111/SJOE.12440","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/SJOE.12440","url":null,"abstract":"Motivated by the EU concept of Pre-Commercial Procurement and the massive presence of SMEs in the European economy, we study how budget constraints affect R&D effort in sequential elimination tournaments. We show that introducing budget constraints leads to a non-monotonicity in unconstrained contestants’ effort. Furthermore, we show that if the budget asymmetry is not too large, unconstrained contestants exert higher effort than when faced with unconstrained contestants only.","PeriodicalId":47929,"journal":{"name":"Scandinavian Journal of Economics","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2021-04-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/SJOE.12440","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42071890","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Dynamic Fairness: Mobility, Inequality, and the Distribution of Prospects","authors":"Baochun Peng, Haidong Yuan","doi":"10.1111/SJOE.12438","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/SJOE.12438","url":null,"abstract":"This paper clarifies the relationship between dynamic fairness, inequality, and mobility. Suppose agents assess the degree of fairness in a society based on the distribution of expected future income, conditional on current income. Within Markovian environments characterised by stochastically monotone transition rules, in which a globally stable steady-state income distribution exists, we show that the degree of dynamic fairness is jointly determined by inequality and mobility. When mobility is held constant, inequality harms fairness; on the contrary, when inequality is held constant, mobility enhances fairness. Moreover, any particular degree of fairness can be obtained by one of many combinations of inequality and mobility, and trade-offs always exists between any two such pairs. Our results hold true with both the standard Lorenz curve and the generalised Lorenz curve and extend to multi-period settings.","PeriodicalId":47929,"journal":{"name":"Scandinavian Journal of Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2021-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/SJOE.12438","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47698650","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Fiscal Devaluation with Endogenous Markups: Productivity and Welfare*","authors":"P. Belan, C. Carbonnier, Martine Carré","doi":"10.1111/SJOE.12435","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/SJOE.12435","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47929,"journal":{"name":"Scandinavian Journal of Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2021-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/SJOE.12435","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45215859","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Pension Reform Disabled*","authors":"S. Galaasen","doi":"10.1111/SJOE.12433","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/SJOE.12433","url":null,"abstract":"Old-age pension reform is on the agenda across the OECD, and a key target is to delay retirement. Most of these countries also have a disability insurance (DI) program accounting for a large share of labor force exits. This paper builds a quantitative life-cycle model with endogenous retirement to study how DI and old-age pension (OA-pension) systems interact with health and wages to determine retirement age, with particular focus on the macroeconomic effects of OA-pension reforms. Individuals face uncertain future health status and wages, and if in bad health they are eligible for DI if they choose to retire before reaching the statutory retirement age. I calibrate the model to the Norwegian economy and explore the effects of raising the statutory retirement age and cutting OA-pension on labor supply and public finances. The main contribution of the paper is that I, in contrast to standard macro pension models, include DI as another endogenous margin of retirement. I show that failure to account for this margin might severely bias the analysis of OA-pension reforms.","PeriodicalId":47929,"journal":{"name":"Scandinavian Journal of Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2020-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/SJOE.12433","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48060704","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On the Provision of Insurance against Search‐Induced Wage Fluctuations*","authors":"Jean-Baptiste Michau","doi":"10.1111/SJOE.12401","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/SJOE.12401","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates the provision of insurance to workers against search-induced wage uctuations. I rely on numerical simulations of a model of on-the-job search and precautionary savings. The model is calibrated to low skilled workers in the U.S.. The extent of insurance is determined by the degree of progressivity of a non-linear transfer schedule. The fundamental trade-off is that a more generous provision of insurance reduces incentives to search for better paying jobs, which is detrimental to the production efficiency of the economy. I show that progressivity raises the search intensity of unemployed worker, which reduces the equilibrium rate of unemployment, but lowers the search intensity of employed job seekers, which results in a lower output level. I also solve numerically for the optimal non-linear transfer schedule. The optimal policy is to provide almost no insurance up to a monthly income level of $1450, such as to preserve incentives to move up the wage ladder, and full insurance above $1650. This policy halves the standard deviation of labor incomes, increases output by 2.4% and generates a consumption-equivalent welfare gain of 1.3%. Forbidding private savings does not fundamentally change the shape of the optimal transfer function, but tilts the optimal policy towards more insurance at the expense of production efficiency.","PeriodicalId":47929,"journal":{"name":"Scandinavian Journal of Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2020-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/SJOE.12401","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47649809","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Admissions Constraints and the Decision to Delay University*","authors":"Kelly Foley, F. Groes","doi":"10.1111/sjoe.12405","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12405","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate whether delaying entrance into university is affected by restrictions on admissions into competitive programs. Using Danish administrative data, we estimate a dynamic discrete choice model, in which students choose, if admitted, whether to enter one of 30 programs or delay. We use the model to examine delaying choices under different simulated admissions policies. Our experiments suggest that only 28% of students who delay do so because of admissions restrictions. Furthermore, although students respond to admissions incentives, our results imply that such policies are unlikely to substantially change the overall distribution of delay.","PeriodicalId":47929,"journal":{"name":"Scandinavian Journal of Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2020-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/sjoe.12405","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43346319","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}