{"title":"Rethinking the Reasonable Response: Safeguarding the Promise of Kingsley for Conditions of Confinement","authors":"Hanna Rutkowski","doi":"10.36644/MLR.119.4.RETHINKING","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36644/MLR.119.4.RETHINKING","url":null,"abstract":"Nearly five million individuals are admitted to America’s jails each year, and at any given time, two-thirds of those held in jail have not been convicted of a crime. Under current Supreme Court doctrine, these pretrial detainees are functionally protected by the same standard as convicted prisoners, despite the fact that they are formally protected by different constitutional amendments. A 2015 decision, Kingsley v. Hendrickson, declared that a different standard would apply to pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners in the context of use of force: consistent with the Constitution’s mandate that they not be punished at all, pretrial detainees would no longer need to demonstrate that officials subjectively intended to harm them, only that the force they applied was objectively unreasonable. Courts of appeals have begun to extend this shift to claims involving conditions of confinement, but the promise of that move is threatened by the availability of a cost defense for officials who respond reasonably to detainees’ needs given the resource constraints they face. This Note argues that pretrial detainees can only be adequately protected from punishment if the reasonable response includes an affirmative duty to notify superiors of those constraints.","PeriodicalId":47790,"journal":{"name":"Michigan Law Review","volume":"2 1","pages":"829-858"},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69681647","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Will Legal Education Change Post-2020?","authors":"H. Gerken","doi":"10.36644/MLR.119.6.WILL","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36644/MLR.119.6.WILL","url":null,"abstract":"The famed book review issue of the Michigan Law Review feels like a reminder of better days. As this issue goes to print, a shocking 554,103 people have died of COVID-19 in the United States alone, the country seems to have begun a long-overdue national reckoning on race, climate change and economic inequality continue to ravage the country, and our Capitol was stormed by insurrectionists with the encouragement of the president of the United States. In the usual year, a scholar would happily pick up this volume and delight in its contents. This year, one marvels at the scholars who managed to finish their reviews on time. The editors have asked me to reflect on how 2020, particularly the pandemic, will change legal education. Like most institutions, law schools have undergone a stress test over the past year. During the early days of the pandemic, every school put a centuries-old teaching tradition online, often within the space of a single week. Most thought that the pace of change would slow down in April. It didn’t. For months, COVID generated crisis after crisis. Schools had to deal with budgetary shortfalls, a stock market crash, job losses, postponements of the bar exam, the loss of virtually all of their international students, and the terrible hardships that COVID caused for students, staff, and faculty. To top it all off, any school that—like Yale—brought its students back in the fall for in-person learning had to invent new forms of teaching for the classroom and an entirely new set of communal rules for campus interactions. Even though the pandemic has not yet lifted, one can already make out the ways in which law schools’ adaptations to the pandemic will eventually be structured into legal education’s gene sequence.","PeriodicalId":47790,"journal":{"name":"Michigan Law Review","volume":"119 1","pages":"1059-1068"},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69682486","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Liar’s Mark: Character and Forfeiture in Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(2)","authors":"Jesse Schupack","doi":"10.36644/MLR.119.5.LIARS","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36644/MLR.119.5.LIARS","url":null,"abstract":"Rule 609(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Evidence is an outlier. The Rule mandates admission of impeaching evidence of a witness’s past convictions for crimes of dishonesty. It is the only place in the Rules where judges are denied their usual discretion to exclude evidence on the grounds that its admission would be more prejudicial than probative. This Note analyzes three assumptions underlying this unusual Rule: (1) that there is a coherently definable category of crimes of dishonesty, (2) that convictions for crimes of dishonesty are uniquely probative of a person’s character, and (3) that an assessment of moral character based on past convictions will be suitably predictive of a person’s reliability as a witness. These assumptions are false and so do not justify the mandatory admission of convictions under the Rule. The final Part of this Note argues that Rule 609(a)(2) is better understood as operating on an implicit principle of forfeiture. Recognizing this and modifying the structure of the Rule accordingly cures some of its current defects. But these revisions still leave something deeply concerning about Rule 609(a)(2). The logic of forfeiture substitutes a normative judgment about a particular class of people in place of an evidentiary judgment about the probative value of a certain kind of information. This Note concludes that this substitution is unprincipled and unjust, and that therefore Rule 609(a)(2) should be eliminated.","PeriodicalId":47790,"journal":{"name":"Michigan Law Review","volume":"1 1","pages":"1031"},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69681866","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Michigan Law ReviewPub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.36644/MLR.119.6.COMPENSATION
Karen M. Tani
{"title":"Compensation, Commodification, and Disablement: How Law Has Dehumanized Laboring Bodies and Excluded Nonlaboring Humans","authors":"Karen M. Tani","doi":"10.36644/MLR.119.6.COMPENSATION","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36644/MLR.119.6.COMPENSATION","url":null,"abstract":"A Review of Injury Impoverished: Workplace Accidents, Capitalism, and Law in the Progressive Era. by Nate Holdren.","PeriodicalId":47790,"journal":{"name":"Michigan Law Review","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69681910","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Market Cannot Be Your Mother","authors":"Meghan M. Boone","doi":"10.36644/MLR.119.6.MARKET","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36644/MLR.119.6.MARKET","url":null,"abstract":"A Review of The Free-Market Family: How the Market Crushed the American Dream (and How It Can Be Restored). by Maxine Eichner.","PeriodicalId":47790,"journal":{"name":"Michigan Law Review","volume":"119 1","pages":"1207-1222"},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69682237","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Suspect Spheres, Not Enumerated Powers: A Guide for Leaving the Lamppost","authors":"Richard A. Primus, R. Hills,","doi":"10.36644/MLR.119.7.SUSPECT","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36644/MLR.119.7.SUSPECT","url":null,"abstract":"Note to Michigan Readers: Weighing in at over 28,000 words, this draft is excessively long. Richard and I are working on cutting it down to a sensible length. In the meantime, if you (quite understandably) do not have time to read the entire paper, I am most interested in your comments on the Introduction and Part I(A) (pages 1-12) and Parts II-III (pages 32 to 50). I should add that Richard has not yet commented on Part III(B)(1) and might not agree with my assessment of NFIB v Sebelius: We will iron out whatever differences we might have on this visit, I hope!","PeriodicalId":47790,"journal":{"name":"Michigan Law Review","volume":"119 1","pages":"1431-1502"},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69683016","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Lost Promise of Disability Rights","authors":"Claire Raj","doi":"10.36644/MLR.119.5.LOST","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36644/MLR.119.5.LOST","url":null,"abstract":"Children with disabilities are among the most vulnerable students in public schools. They are the most likely to be bullied, harassed, restrained, or segregated. For these and other reasons, they also have the poorest academic outcomes. Overcoming these challenges requires full use of the laws enacted to protect these students’ affirmative right to equal access and an environment free from discrimination. Yet, courts routinely deny their access to two such laws—the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (section 504). Courts too often overlook the affirmative obligations contained in these two disability rights laws and instead assume that students with disabilities’ only legal recourse is the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). Regrettably the IDEA is not capable of remedying all the harms students endure. In fact, the IDEA, by its terms, extends to only a subset of students with disabilities. Even so, courts force all students to exhaust the IDEA’s administrative procedures before invoking remedies under the other two disability rights laws. By narrowly construing antidiscrimination principles and ignoring the affirmative obligations contained in disability rights laws, courts unduly restrict students’ protections under these laws. This Article solves that problem by explaining and clarifying the nuance that drives confusion in this area: the difference between the IDEA’s guarantee of a free appropriate public education and the ADA and section 504’s guarantee of equal access to public education. With that distinction clear, this Article disaggregates the types of claims that are most often erroneously obstructed by the IDEA’s exhaustion clause and then creates a framework that would allow courts to analyze and correctly apply the exhaustion clause. In doing so, it hopes to remove these laws from the IDEA’s shadow and renew their promise of equal access to educational opportunity.","PeriodicalId":47790,"journal":{"name":"Michigan Law Review","volume":"119 1","pages":"933-986"},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69681430","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Perfectly Empty Gift","authors":"C. Ponsa-Kraus","doi":"10.36644/MLR.119.6.PERFECTLY","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36644/MLR.119.6.PERFECTLY","url":null,"abstract":"A Review of Almost Citizens: Puerto Rico, the U.S. Constitution, and Empire. by Sam Erman.","PeriodicalId":47790,"journal":{"name":"Michigan Law Review","volume":"119 1","pages":"1223-1246"},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69682250","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Reviving Negotiated Rulemaking for an Accessible Internet","authors":"Julia G Moroney","doi":"10.36644/MLR.119.7.REVIVING","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36644/MLR.119.7.REVIVING","url":null,"abstract":"Web accessibility requires designing and developing websites so that people with disabilities can use them without barriers. While the internet has become central to daily life, websites have overwhelmingly remained inaccessible to the millions of users who have disabilities. Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to combat discrimination against people with disabilities. Passed in 1990, it lacks any specific mention of the internet Courts are split as to whether the ADA applies to websites, and if so, what actions businesses must take to comply with the law. Further complicating matters, the Department of Justice (DOJ) initiated the rulemaking process for web accessibility in 2010, only to terminate it seven years later without issuing a rule—leaving the disability community without meaningful online access and businesses without clear standards. Meanwhile, complaints about the accessibility of websites have flooded federal agencies and the courts. Against that backdrop, this Note calls for the DOJ to use negotiated rulemaking, a regulatory innovation from the 1980s that has since faded in use, to achieve web accessibility. Given that the Supreme Court has declined to resolve whether the ADA’s protections apply to the internet, the business and disability communities should come together through negotiated rulemaking to build consensus on web accessibility.","PeriodicalId":47790,"journal":{"name":"Michigan Law Review","volume":"119 1","pages":"1581-1612"},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69682723","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Missing Algorithm: Safeguarding Brady Against the Rise of Trade Secrecy in Policing","authors":"Deborah Won","doi":"10.36644/mlr.120.3.missing","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36644/mlr.120.3.missing","url":null,"abstract":"Trade secrecy, a form of intellectual property protection, serves the important societal function of promoting innovation. But as police departments across the country increasingly rely on proprietary technologies like facial recognition and predictive policing tools, an uneasy tension between due process and trade secrecy has developed: to fulfill Brady’s constitutional promise of a fair trial, defendants must have access to the technologies accusing them, access that trade secrecy inhibits. Thus far, this tension is being resolved too far in favor of the trade secret holder—and at too great an expense to the defendant. The wrong balance has been struck. This Note offers three contributions. First, it explains the use of algorithms in law enforcement and the intertwined role of trade secrecy protections. Second, it shows how trade secrecy clashes with the Due Process Clause—the Constitution’s mechanism for correcting the power asymmetry between the state and the defendant—and argues that due process should not waver simply because a source of evidence is digital, not human. Third, it proposes a solution that better balances a defendant’s due process rights with intellectual property protections.","PeriodicalId":47790,"journal":{"name":"Michigan Law Review","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69683056","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}