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The Virtues of Limits 极限的美德
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY Pub Date : 2023-05-08 DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqad050
B. Ballard
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引用次数: 0
What’s your Opinion? Negation and ‘Weak’ Attitude Verbs 你的意见是什么?否定和“弱”态度动词
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY Pub Date : 2023-05-02 DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqad049
H. Schiller
{"title":"What’s your Opinion? Negation and ‘Weak’ Attitude Verbs","authors":"H. Schiller","doi":"10.1093/pq/pqad049","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad049","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Attitude verbs like ‘believe’ and ‘want’ exhibit neg-raising: an ascription of the form a doesn’t believe that p tends to convey that a disbelieves—i.e., believes the negation of—p. In ‘Belief is Weak’, Hawthore et al. observe that neg-raising does not occur with verbs like ‘know’ or ‘need’. According to them, an ascription of the form a believes that p is true just in case a is in a belief state that makes p more likely than not, and so—excepting cases of complete indifference—a will either believe p or disbelieve p. I expand and revise this explanation: so-called ‘weak’ attitude verbs are used in ascriptions of an opinion about some subject matter S—a kind of selection from among the elements of S—and these ascriptions are themselves responsive to conversational topics that presuppose that the subject of the ascription has an opinion about S. ‘Strong’ attitude verbs denote more direct relationships between subject and world.","PeriodicalId":47749,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-05-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44189340","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Schaffer, Sherlock and Shaddai 谢弗，夏洛克和莎黛
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY Pub Date : 2023-04-19 DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqad044
Hezki Symonds
{"title":"Schaffer, Sherlock and Shaddai","authors":"Hezki Symonds","doi":"10.1093/pq/pqad044","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad044","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 According to Schaffer, most of the controversial entities that ontologists debate exist. Schaffer calls this view permissivism and he defends it by appealing to easy arguments for the existence of the entities in question. Schaffer presents several easy arguments, but his easy argument for fictional characters and his easy argument for God play a crucial role in his defence of permissivism. In this paper, I argue that Schaffer doesn’t have the resources to defend his easy argument for fictional characters or his easy argument for God. So, his defence of permissivism fails.","PeriodicalId":47749,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-04-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42802461","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Pain Linguistics: A Case for Pluralism 疼痛语言学：多元主义的一个案例
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY Pub Date : 2023-04-19 DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqad048
S. Coninx, P. Willemsen, K. Reuter
{"title":"Pain Linguistics: A Case for Pluralism","authors":"S. Coninx, P. Willemsen, K. Reuter","doi":"10.1093/pq/pqad048","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad048","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The most common approach to understanding the semantics of the concept of pain is third-person thought experiments. By contrast, the most frequent and most relevant uses of the folk concept of pain are from a first-person perspective in conversational settings. In this paper, we use a set of linguistic tools to systematically explore the semantics of what people communicate when reporting pain from a first-person perspective. Our results suggest that only a pluralistic view can do justice to the way we talk about pain from a first-person perspective: The semantic content of the folk concept of pain consists of information about both an unpleasant feeling and a disruptive bodily state. Pain linguistics thus provides new insights into ordinary pain language and poses an interesting challenge to the dominant unitary views of pain.","PeriodicalId":47749,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-04-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46146214","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Response to LÖhr: Why We Still Need a New Normativism 对LÖhr的回应：为什么我们仍然需要一种新的规范主义
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY Pub Date : 2023-04-18 DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqad047
Javier Gomez-Lavin, Matthew Rachar
{"title":"Response to LÖhr: Why We Still Need a New Normativism","authors":"Javier Gomez-Lavin, Matthew Rachar","doi":"10.1093/pq/pqad047","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad047","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Guido Löhr's recent article makes several insightful and productive suggestions about how to proceed with the empirical study of collective action. However, their critique of the conclusions drawn in Gomez-Lavin & Rachar (2022) is undermined by some issues with the interpretation of the debate and paper. This discussion article clears up those issues, presents new findings from experiments developed in response to Löhr's critiques, reflects on the role of experimental research in the development and refinement of philosophical theories, and adds to Löhr's suggestions about the path forward.","PeriodicalId":47749,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44314327","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Legislating Taste 立法的味道
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY Pub Date : 2023-04-17 DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqad046
Kenneth Walden
{"title":"Legislating Taste","authors":"Kenneth Walden","doi":"10.1093/pq/pqad046","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad046","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 My aesthetic judgements seem to make claims on you. While some popular accounts of aesthetic normativity say that the force of these claims is third-personal, I argue that it is actually second-personal. This point may sound like a bland technicality, but it points to a novel idea about what aesthetic judgements ultimately are and what they do. It suggests, in particular, that aesthetic judgements are motions in the collective legislation of the nature of aesthetic activity. This conception is recommended by its ability to explain some important but otherwise recondite features of aesthetic practice and, more importantly, by allowing us to ground the normativity of aesthetic judgement in the familiar normativity of practice. It also offers a more systematic way of understanding the rivalry between the ideals of aesthetic universality and diversity.","PeriodicalId":47749,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-04-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49252900","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A Deductive Solution to the Generalisation Problem for Horwich’s Minimalism about Truth Horwich关于真理的极小化问题的演绎解法
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY Pub Date : 2023-04-17 DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqad045
Ralf Busse
{"title":"A Deductive Solution to the Generalisation Problem for Horwich’s Minimalism about Truth","authors":"Ralf Busse","doi":"10.1093/pq/pqad045","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad045","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Minimalism is the view that our concept of truth is constituted by our disposition to accept instances of the truth schema ‘The proposition that p is true if and only if p’. The generalisation problem is the challenge to account for universal generalisations concerning logical truths such as ‘Every proposition of the form 〈if p, then p〉 is true’. This paper argues that such generalisations can be deduced using a single example of the logical truth in question and a single corresponding instance of the truth schema, employing the logical method of reasoning with arbitrary instances of universal and existential generalisations. Suggesting an inferentialist construal of Minimalism, the paper introduces conditional and general acceptance dispositions, distinguishes inferential meaning constitution from implicit definition, highlights the inferential nature of acceptance of instances of the truth schema, sketches a suitable account of structured propositions, compares higher-order with first-order means of quantification, and argues that the conception of truth Minimalism attributes to ordinary speakers is essentially inferential. It finally applies the deductive strategy to generalisations concerning logical validity as well as more complex logical truths.","PeriodicalId":47749,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-04-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42406589","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Cross-Domain Descriptions: The Sensory and the Psychological 跨领域描述:感官与心理
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY Pub Date : 2023-04-14 DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqad043
Michelle Liu
{"title":"Cross-Domain Descriptions: The Sensory and the Psychological","authors":"Michelle Liu","doi":"10.1093/pq/pqad043","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad043","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Cross-domain descriptions are descriptions of features pertaining to one domain in terms of vocabulary primarily associated with another domain. Notably, we routinely describe psychological features in terms of the sensory domain and vice versa. Sorrow is said to be ‘bitter’ and fear ‘cold’. Music can be described as ‘happy’, ‘sad’, ‘mournful’, and so on. Such descriptions are rife in both everyday discourse and literary writings. What is it about psychological features that invites descriptions in sensory terms and what is it about the sensory that invites descriptions in terms of the psychological? Drawing on the literature on polysemy, this paper sheds light on cross-domain descriptions pertaining to the sensory and the psychological domains.","PeriodicalId":47749,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-04-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47255174","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Sidestepping the Frege–Geach Problem 回避Frege-Geach问题
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY Pub Date : 2023-04-12 DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqad039
Graham Bex-Priestley, Will Gamester
{"title":"Sidestepping the Frege–Geach Problem","authors":"Graham Bex-Priestley, Will Gamester","doi":"10.1093/pq/pqad039","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad039","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Hybrid expressivists claim to solve the Frege–Geach problem by offloading the explanation of the logico-semantic properties of moral sentences onto the belief-components of hybrid states they express. We argue that this strategy is undermined by one of hybrid expressivism's own commitments: That the truth of the belief-component is neither necessary nor sufficient for the truth of the hybrid state it composes. We articulate a new approach. Instead of explaining head-on what it is for, say, a pair of moral sentences to be inconsistent, expressivists should ‘sidestep’ and explain what it is to think that a pair of moral sentences is inconsistent. To think so is to think they cannot both be true—a modal notion. Since expressivists have given accounts of such modals, we illustrate how sentences like ‘‘‘lying is wrong’’ and ‘‘lying is not wrong’’ are inconsistent’ express sensible—and rationally compelling—states of mind.","PeriodicalId":47749,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45282971","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Restricted Composition is Information Compression 受限组合是信息压缩
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY Pub Date : 2023-04-10 DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqad034
{"title":"Restricted Composition is Information Compression","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/pq/pqad034","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad034","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This paper proposes and examines an answer to the special composition question—complex objects compress information about their parts. I start by defending fastenation for material objects and then extract from fastenation the idea that the conjoinment of parts establishes correlations among the locations and motions of those parts. I move from this to the proposal that entities are parts of some object when that object allows for the efficient, if lossy, compression of information about those parts.","PeriodicalId":47749,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42123954","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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