{"title":"Dominant Smart Contracts Based on Major Bargaining Solutions","authors":"Elmira Mohammadhosseini Fadafan, Rudolf Vetschera","doi":"10.1007/s10726-023-09863-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-023-09863-9","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We consider a situation in which two parties have concluded an efficient contract corresponding to one major bargaining solution. After the parties have agreed on one particular contract, an unanticipated shock may change the contract outcomes in a way that benefits one party but harms the other party. If this happens, they have the option to either stay with the original exchange contract or adjust some contract parameters such as the price. We propose a model to perform such adjustments automatically, to obtain the same bargaining solution as in the initial contract under the restriction that the new contract dominates the outcomes of the original contract. We study several bargaining solutions within this general framework. These bargaining solutions offer various sharing rules to distribute the benefit between the parties. To reflect practical considerations, we only consider adjustments made via one contract parameter (the price), while all other parameters result from the original contract and the random shock. To evaluate the efficiency of the proposed approach, we also compare it to a full re-negotiation scenario, in which all parameters can be modified within the boundaries resulting after the random shock. However, waiting and re-negotiation might be costly compared to the situation when the smart contract executes the adjustment automatically. Therefore, the automatic adjustment might be more efficient compared to the other types of contracts. We present several numerical examples and run large random simulations, which we also check statistically.</p>","PeriodicalId":47553,"journal":{"name":"Group Decision and Negotiation","volume":"98 9","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138514552","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Timm Teubner, David Dann, Florian Hawlitschek, Mareike Möhlmann
{"title":"First vs. Lasting Impressions: How Cognitive and Affective Trust Cues Coordinate Match-Making in Online Sharing Platforms","authors":"Timm Teubner, David Dann, Florian Hawlitschek, Mareike Möhlmann","doi":"10.1007/s10726-023-09860-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-023-09860-y","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Digital platforms facilitate the coordination, match making, and value creation for large groups of individuals. In consumer-to-consumer (C2C) online sharing platforms specifically, trust between these individuals is a central concept in determining which individuals will eventually engage in a transaction. The majority of today’s online platforms draw on various types of cues for group coordination and trust building among users. Current research widely accepts the capacity of such cues but largely ignores their changing effectiveness over the course of a user’s lifetime on the platform. To address this gap, we conduct a laboratory experiment, studying the interplay of cognitive and affective trust cues over the course a multi-period trust experiment for the coordination of groups. We find that the trust-building capacity of affective trust cues is time-dependent and follows an inverted u-shape form, suggesting a dynamic complementarity of cognitive and affective trust cues.</p>","PeriodicalId":47553,"journal":{"name":"Group Decision and Negotiation","volume":"99 10","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138514584","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Game-Theoretic Approach to Two-Person Negotiation Under Multiple Criteria","authors":"Natalia M. Novikova, Irina I. Pospelova","doi":"10.1007/s10726-023-09859-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-023-09859-5","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The most difficult decision problems arise when several parties with several criteria must reach a consensus. This problem can be modelled as a game with vector-valued payoffs. If the players are allowed to use mixed strategies, there can be many Nash equilibria, and therefore many outcomes. The role of negotiation is to choose a specific outcome, or to restrict the set of outcomes to a small subset. One promising approach to negotiation support is scalarization of the vector payoff function. Here we apply Germeier scalarizing function, also known as the Rawlsian function, to mixed-strategy multicriteria games. After developing the mathematical background, we extend to these games the principle of Best Guaranteed Value, the value that a player may count on regardless of the other players’ actions. We suggest that a good outcome for negotiation in a multicriteria game is a Nash equilibrium outcome that provides each player with the payoffs that are better than its Best Guaranteed Value. We describe all such outcomes, thereby defining a new negotiation support mechanism.\u0000</p>","PeriodicalId":47553,"journal":{"name":"Group Decision and Negotiation","volume":"100 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138514583","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Strategic Marketing Information System Planning: An Integrated BWM–ELECTRE Approach","authors":"Nitidetch Koohathongsumrit, Pongchanun Luangpaiboon","doi":"10.1007/s10726-023-09861-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-023-09861-x","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Under competitive business scenarios, project selection is a crucial process for ensuring that projects appropriately align with an organization’s goals, available resources, and relationships. This study proposes a novel hybrid decision support model that integrates the best–worst method (BWM) with the elimination and choice expressing reality (ELECTRE) method to solve project selection problems. The approach can be used to determine the weights of criteria by comparing two vectors and to provide the best result based on concordance and discordance analysis. An empirical study regarding the selection of strategic marketing information system projects is conducted to demonstrate the proposed methodology’s benefits and rationality. The findings show that using the BWM–ELECTRE approach systematically leads to solid decision-making results involving compromise rankings based on quantitative and qualitative data, including decision-makers’ preferences. This study contributes to the literature with a new methodology that consumes less time, provides high consistency, and enables subjectivity reduction in human-based judgments while providing helpful information to decision-makers in choosing the best project and/or outranking results among different relationships, resource constraints, or dynamic environments.</p>","PeriodicalId":47553,"journal":{"name":"Group Decision and Negotiation","volume":"67 10","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138514582","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Heterogeneous Opinion Dynamics Considering Consensus Evolution in Social Network Group Decision-Making","authors":"Tong Wu","doi":"10.1007/s10726-023-09858-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-023-09858-6","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47553,"journal":{"name":"Group Decision and Negotiation","volume":"11 4","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135589638","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Hilla Shinitzky, Dan Avraham, Yizhak Vaisman, Yakir Tsizer, Yaniv Leedon, Yuval Shahar
{"title":"Exploiting Meta-cognitive Features for a Machine-Learning-Based One-Shot Group-Decision Aggregation","authors":"Hilla Shinitzky, Dan Avraham, Yizhak Vaisman, Yakir Tsizer, Yaniv Leedon, Yuval Shahar","doi":"10.1007/s10726-023-09855-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-023-09855-9","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47553,"journal":{"name":"Group Decision and Negotiation","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135510853","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Henner Gimpel, Stefanie Lahmer, Moritz Wöhl, Valerie Graf-Drasch
{"title":"Digital Facilitation of Group Work to Gain Predictable Performance","authors":"Henner Gimpel, Stefanie Lahmer, Moritz Wöhl, Valerie Graf-Drasch","doi":"10.1007/s10726-023-09856-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-023-09856-8","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Group work is a commonly used method of working, and the performance of a group can vary depending on the type and structure of the task at hand. Research suggests that groups can exhibit \"collective intelligence\"—the ability to perform well across tasks—under certain conditions, making group performance somewhat predictable. However, predictability of task performance becomes difficult when a task relies heavily on coordination among group members or is ill-defined. To address this issue, we propose a technical solution in the form of a chatbot providing advice to facilitate group work for more predictable performance. Specifically, we target well-defined, high-coordination tasks. Through experiments with 64 virtual groups performing various tasks and communicating via text-based chat, we found a relationship between the average intelligence of group members and their group performance in such tasks, making performance more predictable. The practical implications of this research are significant, as the assembly of consistently performing groups is an important organizational activity.","PeriodicalId":47553,"journal":{"name":"Group Decision and Negotiation","volume":"15 20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135570140","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Collaborative Dishonesty with Unequal Profits - an Experimental Investigation","authors":"Beatrice Braut, Nives Della Valle, Marco Piovesan","doi":"10.1007/s10726-023-09857-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-023-09857-7","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Our experiment explores the impact of asymmetric incentives on collaboration within a context where participants can coordinate and potentially engage in deceptive practices to secure financial gains. We contrast two scenarios: one in which cooperation results in an equal distribution of gains, and another where the distribution is unequal. Our investigation focuses on the dynamics of collaborative behavior over time and digs into individual strategies employed by participants. We find that corruptive collaboration persists when its gains are unequally divided. Over time, participants acquire experience in collaborative tactics, often utilizing their reports to covert signals. Notably, participants coordinate around compromise distributions that yield smaller payments, suggesting that this context may actually reduce the perceived cost of dishonesty.","PeriodicalId":47553,"journal":{"name":"Group Decision and Negotiation","volume":"76 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135855033","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Do People Care about Others’ Benefits from Public Goods? An Investigation Based on Inequity Aversion Model","authors":"Xiangwen Kong, Chengyan Yue, Yufeng Lai","doi":"10.1007/s10726-023-09854-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-023-09854-w","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47553,"journal":{"name":"Group Decision and Negotiation","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135194573","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"How Team Diversity Influences Online Medical Team Service Performance Through Shared Leadership: An Input-Process-Output Perspective","authors":"Wenchao Du, Wu Liu, Xitong Guo, Doug Vogel","doi":"10.1007/s10726-023-09853-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-023-09853-x","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47553,"journal":{"name":"Group Decision and Negotiation","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135306032","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}