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Journal of Institutional Economics最新文献

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Disruptive innovation in the economic organization of China and the West 中国与西方经济组织中的破坏性创新
IF 2.2 2区 经济学
Journal of Institutional Economics Pub Date : 2022-09-21 DOI: 10.1017/s1744137422000224
Hilton L. Root
{"title":"Disruptive innovation in the economic organization of China and the West","authors":"Hilton L. Root","doi":"10.1017/s1744137422000224","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1744137422000224","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We explore how macro and micro networks influence the diffusion of technological innovation and cultural/social behavior. Across the historical regimes in China and Europe, dynastic lordship's macro networks afforded different advantages in technological innovation. A network particular to Europe, the Roman Church, extended deep into local parishes with ethical norms prescribing fairness to strangers, and these cultural foundations helped guilds, trade associations, merchant courts, and universities operate cooperatively far beyond kinship. In contrast, Chinese emperors relied on ancient Confucian moral codes and system-spanning Confucian-educated officialdom; but fiscal limitations compelled officials to defer to local lineage orders, resulting in an enduring cultural pattern of guanxi and a polity whose institutional problem-solving capacity falter beyond the local level. Yet the civil service system has enabled China to outperform similar lineage-dependent regimes. Probing network topologies, we find that system-spanning networks can facilitate technological diffusion, but local networks influence cultural and behavioral change.","PeriodicalId":47221,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Institutional Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2022-09-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"56949927","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The authors of economics journals revisited: evidence from a large-scale replication of Hodgson and Rothman (1999) 经济学期刊的作者重新审视:来自霍奇森和罗斯曼(1999)大规模复制的证据
IF 2.2 2区 经济学
Journal of Institutional Economics Pub Date : 2022-09-16 DOI: 10.1017/s174413742200025x
Matthias Aistleitner, Jakob Kapeller, Dominik Kronberger
{"title":"The authors of economics journals revisited: evidence from a large-scale replication of Hodgson and Rothman (1999)","authors":"Matthias Aistleitner, Jakob Kapeller, Dominik Kronberger","doi":"10.1017/s174413742200025x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s174413742200025x","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In this paper, we present results from of a large-scale replication of Hodgson and Rothman's (1999, The Economic Journal, 109(453): 165–186) seminal analysis of the institutional and geographical concentration of authors publishing in top economic journals. We analyze bibliometric data of more than 49,000 articles published in a set of 30 highly influential economic journals between 1990 and 2018. Based on a random sample of 3,253 authors, we further analyze the PhD-granting institutions of the authors under study to better scrutinize the claim of an ‘institutional oligopoly’. The findings confirm the long-term persistence of strong oligopolistic structures in terms of both, author affiliations as well as PhD-granting institutions.","PeriodicalId":47221,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Institutional Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2022-09-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42618979","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Does democracy cause gender equality? 民主会导致性别平等吗?
IF 2.2 2区 经济学
Journal of Institutional Economics Pub Date : 2022-09-13 DOI: 10.1017/s1744137422000236
T. B. Andersen
{"title":"Does democracy cause gender equality?","authors":"T. B. Andersen","doi":"10.1017/s1744137422000236","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1744137422000236","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Does democracy cause gender equality? To address this question, I use the unexpected Second Vatican Council (1962–65) as part of a shock-based identification strategy. The Second Vatican Council brought forward in time transitions to democracy that would have happened anyway and triggered transitions to democracy that would not otherwise have occurred. I use this plausibly exogenous variation in democracy to offer a causal estimate. According to my baseline specification, one standard deviation increase in democracy leads to three-fifths of a standard deviation increase in gender equality. I also peruse qualitative evidence to sketch a causal mechanism.","PeriodicalId":47221,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Institutional Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2022-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47386393","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
On the adapting function of social institutions 论社会制度的适应功能
IF 2.2 2区 经济学
Journal of Institutional Economics Pub Date : 2022-09-08 DOI: 10.1017/s1744137422000261
Alexander Lascaux
{"title":"On the adapting function of social institutions","authors":"Alexander Lascaux","doi":"10.1017/s1744137422000261","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1744137422000261","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In this paper, I introduce an important dynamic function performed by social institutions, which consists in helping individual actors to adapt to significant changes taking place in their environment. This adapting function is juxtaposed against the statically-oriented properties of institutions, which comprise their enabling, constraining, and orienting functions. I explicate the three major adapting roles of social institutions, which correspond to the cognitive, normative, and regulatory institutional elements, and explore the nine principal mechanisms by which social institutions can accelerate the adaptation processes. I examine the main outcomes of the adaptation processes supported by social institutions, as well as the key enablers and barriers to successful adaptation. I present a co-evolutionary model of adaptive dynamics involving individuals, institutions, and the broader external environment, and discuss the major implications of the proposed framework.","PeriodicalId":47221,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Institutional Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2022-09-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45159142","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Environmental economics in Classical Athens 古典雅典的环境经济学
IF 2.2 2区 经济学
Journal of Institutional Economics Pub Date : 2022-08-25 DOI: 10.1017/s1744137422000194
Emmanouil M. L. Economou, G. Halkos, Nicholas C. Kyriazis
{"title":"Environmental economics in Classical Athens","authors":"Emmanouil M. L. Economou, G. Halkos, Nicholas C. Kyriazis","doi":"10.1017/s1744137422000194","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1744137422000194","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In this paper, we present a series of environmental policies that were implemented by the city-state of Athens during the Classical period (508–323 BCE) through a specific set of environmental institutions. They included: waste management, the implementation of a recycling process regarding animal manure as well as hygiene practices. Special administrative bodies were set up for this purpose with the power to impose heavy fines to offenders, and the actual job of environmental protection was contracted out to private operators. We argue that the success of the Athenian environmental institutions should primarily be attributed to the economic stimuli that the Athenian state provided to their staff so as to perform their duties efficiently, as well as to the imposition of fines and/or other penalties if they provided subpar services. We finally provide proposals as to how the Athenian environmental policies may be seen as an inspiration for our modern societies.","PeriodicalId":47221,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Institutional Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2022-08-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"56950360","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The dynamic efficiency of gifting 送礼的动态效率
IF 2.2 2区 经济学
Journal of Institutional Economics Pub Date : 2022-08-25 DOI: 10.1017/s1744137422000200
A. Gill, Michael D. Thomas
{"title":"The dynamic efficiency of gifting","authors":"A. Gill, Michael D. Thomas","doi":"10.1017/s1744137422000200","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1744137422000200","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In his Scroogenomics, Joel Waldfogel argues that gifting creates enormous deadweight loss, as individuals give one another gifts that they do not want or cannot use. He views efficiency as static, calculating the gains from trade (or gifting) at the moment of transaction. A puzzle arises, however, when one realizes that gifting has been a nearly ubiquitous institution throughout history. If gifting wastes valuable resources, why does it persist? We argue that gift giving is dynamically efficient despite the possibility of generating short-term deadweight loss. A well-functioning market economy requires expanded social networks and trustworthiness among anonymous and quasi-anonymous exchange partners. Gifting allows individuals to signal trustworthiness by offering ‘burnt sacrifices’. Gifting practices that include a willingness to sacrifice via reciprocity norms, public visibility and ritual will tend to promote generalized trust. We consider these four elements – sacrifice, reciprocity, publicness, and ritual – to be critical institutional design principles for fostering dynamic efficiency. Our essay contributes to the literature on institutional economics by prompting scholars to think about the long-term (dynamic) efficiencies generated by cultural practices that appear inexplicably inefficient.","PeriodicalId":47221,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Institutional Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2022-08-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48251996","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
The primacy of property; or, the subordination of property rights 财产至上:财产至上;或者，物权的从属关系
IF 2.2 2区 经济学
Journal of Institutional Economics Pub Date : 2022-08-24 DOI: 10.1017/s1744137422000212
Bart J. Wilson
{"title":"The primacy of property; or, the subordination of property rights","authors":"Bart J. Wilson","doi":"10.1017/s1744137422000212","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1744137422000212","url":null,"abstract":"<p>A property right, the standard view maintains, is a proper subset of the most complete and comprehensive set of incidents for full ownership of a thing. The subsidiary assumption is that the pieces that are property rights compose the whole that is ownership or property, i.e., that property rights explain property. In reversing the standard view I argue that (1) a custom of intelligent and meaningful human action explains property and that (2) as a custom, property is a historical process of selecting actions conditional on the context. My task is to explain how a physical world of human bodies with minds that feel, think, know, and want gives rise to a custom of property with meaning and purpose. Property is primary because ideas are primary.</p>","PeriodicalId":47221,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Institutional Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2022-08-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138512680","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Do partisan politics influence domestic credit? 党派政治会影响国内信贷吗？
IF 2.2 2区 经济学
Journal of Institutional Economics Pub Date : 2022-08-18 DOI: 10.1017/s1744137422000182
V. Tawiah, Sivathaasan Nadarajah, M. Alam, T. Allen
{"title":"Do partisan politics influence domestic credit?","authors":"V. Tawiah, Sivathaasan Nadarajah, M. Alam, T. Allen","doi":"10.1017/s1744137422000182","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1744137422000182","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Left-leaning and right-leaning governments hold opposing views on economic policy, resulting in disparities in economic behaviours and outcomes. Given this context, we explore the effect of political ideology on domestic credit using an unbalanced panel data of 29 countries from 1960 to 2014. Our empirical analysis shows that left-leaning governments reduce total domestic credit allocations. Also, we find that right-leaning governments provide more credit to the private sector, while left-leaning governments prefer to boost domestic credit to the public sector. In a further analysis, we show that political parties and their domestic credit strategies remain unchanged even during electoral periods. Our novel insights, that are robust to alternative measures, samples, and a set of econometric identifications, contribute to the literature on partisan politics and lending behaviour.","PeriodicalId":47221,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Institutional Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2022-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47195604","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Markets, repugnance, and externalities 市场、反感和外部性
IF 2.2 2区 经济学
Journal of Institutional Economics Pub Date : 2022-07-25 DOI: 10.1017/s1744137422000157
K. Krawiec
{"title":"Markets, repugnance, and externalities","authors":"K. Krawiec","doi":"10.1017/s1744137422000157","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1744137422000157","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This Article considers one aspect of the ongoing debate about the moral limits of markets – namely, the purported harmful effects of market transactions on particular relations, goods, services, or society at large, due to an inappropriate valuation. In other words, the argument is that some markets are ‘repugnant’ because they degrade and corrupt a variety of nonmarket values and relations, not just to the willing parties to the exchange, but to larger segments of society. This objection contains both a (frequently unacknowledged) empirical component and a moral component. This Article critiques these empirical claims on two grounds. First, market skeptics fail to provide evidence of the negative effects they hypothesize, despite widespread variation over time and across legal regimes. Second, these objections fail to account for the well-documented human tendency to fashion repugnant exchanges in a manner that reinforces – rather than undermines – deeply held values and relationships.","PeriodicalId":47221,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Institutional Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2022-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43243833","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Cascading expert failure 级联专家故障
IF 2.2 2区 经济学
Journal of Institutional Economics Pub Date : 2022-07-25 DOI: 10.1017/s1744137422000169
Jon Murphy
{"title":"Cascading expert failure","authors":"Jon Murphy","doi":"10.1017/s1744137422000169","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1744137422000169","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Recent research has shown how experts may fail in their duty as advisors by providing advice that leads to a worse outcome than that anticipated by the user of expert opinion. However, those models have focused on the immediate effects of the failure on experts and nonexperts. Using a cascading network failure model, I show how expert failure can cascade throughout multiple sectors, even those not necessarily purchasing the expert opinion. Consequently, even relatively small failures end up having outsized aggregate effects. To provide evidence of my theory, I look at two case studies of COVID expert advice to show how one seemingly minor failure ended up contributing to the pandemic. I conclude with a discussion on institutional frameworks that can prevent such cascades.</p>","PeriodicalId":47221,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Institutional Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2022-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138512684","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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