Journal of Empirical Legal Studies最新文献

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Correction to “Paying for Performance? Attorneys' Fees in Fraud Class Actions” 更正“按业绩付费?”欺诈集体诉讼中的律师费
IF 1.2 2区 社会学
Journal of Empirical Legal Studies Pub Date : 2025-04-03 DOI: 10.1111/jels.12416
{"title":"Correction to “Paying for Performance? Attorneys' Fees in Fraud Class Actions”","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/jels.12416","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jels.12416","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Choi, S. J., J. M. Erickson, and A. C. Pritchard. 2024. “Paying for Performance? Attorneys' Fees in Fraud Class Actions.” <i>Journal of Empirical Legal Studies</i> 21, no. 4: 899–926. https://doi.org/10.1111/jels.12402.</p><p>The title of the article should be “Paying for Performance? Attorneys' Fees in Securities Fraud Class Actions.” The word “securities” was inadvertently omitted from the title.</p><p>We apologize for this error.</p>","PeriodicalId":47187,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Empirical Legal Studies","volume":"22 2","pages":"185"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jels.12416","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143925912","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Molecular Diagnostic Patenting After Mayo v. Prometheus: An Empirical Analysis 梅奥诉普罗米修斯案后的分子诊断专利:实证分析
IF 1.2 2区 社会学
Journal of Empirical Legal Studies Pub Date : 2025-01-14 DOI: 10.1111/jels.12409
Colleen V. Chien, Jenna Clark, Arti K. Rai
{"title":"Molecular Diagnostic Patenting After Mayo v. Prometheus: An Empirical Analysis","authors":"Colleen V. Chien,&nbsp;Jenna Clark,&nbsp;Arti K. Rai","doi":"10.1111/jels.12409","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jels.12409","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Since the United States Supreme Court's 2012 decision in Mayo v. Prometheus announced a new legal test for patent-eligible subject matter, policymakers, and scholars have vigorously debated the decision's impact on molecular diagnostics innovation. Molecular diagnostics serve as the cornerstone of personalized medicine and its promise of treatments with fewer side effects and better outcomes for patients. This article contributes to the presently thin evidence base on the impact of Mayo by using data on patent applications, examinations, and grants from 2010 to 2019 to comprehensively trace the effects of the test and subsequent related developments. Using descriptive data as well as a difference-in-difference (DID) design we evaluate the extent to which the decision was followed by one of three expected outcomes: a decline in patent quantity (“retrenchment”); increase in patent prosecution “toughness”; and applicant “adaptation” with respect to submitted claims. We find substantial support for our toughness and adaptation hypotheses, but not our retrenchment hypothesis: molecular diagnostic patenting did not decline in aggregate, though there is some evidence of a decline, relative to a control, in the number of diagnostic patent applications and grants associated with small, U.S.-based firms. These results suggest that molecular diagnostic patents are harder to get but they are still being applied for and granted, with their narrowed scope making them less likely to block follow on innovation.</p>","PeriodicalId":47187,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Empirical Legal Studies","volume":"22 2","pages":"144-162"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-01-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jels.12409","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143926138","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Impact of Judicial Leadership on Consensus Formation: Evidence From the Supreme Court of Norway 司法领导对共识形成的影响:来自挪威最高法院的证据
IF 1.2 2区 社会学
Journal of Empirical Legal Studies Pub Date : 2025-01-08 DOI: 10.1111/jels.12408
Henrik Litleré Bentsen, Jon Kåre Skiple, Mark Jonathan McKenzie, Gunnar Grendstad
{"title":"The Impact of Judicial Leadership on Consensus Formation: Evidence From the Supreme Court of Norway","authors":"Henrik Litleré Bentsen,&nbsp;Jon Kåre Skiple,&nbsp;Mark Jonathan McKenzie,&nbsp;Gunnar Grendstad","doi":"10.1111/jels.12408","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jels.12408","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Which judicial leaders are more successful in achieving consensus? This article examines the impact of the leadership of presiding justices on consensus formation on the Norwegian Supreme Court where cases are distributed randomly to two parallel decisional panels. We hypothesize that presiding justices with certain characteristics (e.g., gender and chief justice), when in charge of the decision-making process, are more willing and better able to forge consensus, which could lead to greater respect for courts and the rule of law. We account for a variety of characteristics of the justices, as well as several conditions under which the cases were decided. The results confirm that both chief justices and female justices, when operating as the presiding justice of the panel, are significantly more likely to steer the case towards a unanimous decision as compared to their fellow justices. Legal academics serving as presiding justices had no discernable impact on consensus formation. The results provide evidence outside the American context that chief justices and women justices have the ability to achieve greater consensus. As such, diversity and appointments have consequences for judicial leadership and for consensus formation on a court.</p>","PeriodicalId":47187,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Empirical Legal Studies","volume":"22 1","pages":"114-129"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-01-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jels.12408","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143249040","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Introducing a New Corpus of Definitive M&A Agreements, 2000–2020 引入2000-2020年新的最终并购协议语料库
IF 1.2 2区 社会学
Journal of Empirical Legal Studies Pub Date : 2024-12-29 DOI: 10.1111/jels.12410
Peter Adelson, Matthew Jennejohn, Julian Nyarko, Eric Talley
{"title":"Introducing a New Corpus of Definitive M&A Agreements, 2000–2020","authors":"Peter Adelson,&nbsp;Matthew Jennejohn,&nbsp;Julian Nyarko,&nbsp;Eric Talley","doi":"10.1111/jels.12410","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jels.12410","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Contract design and architecture is an important topic within economics, finance, and law. However, attempts to study it are significantly constrained by the limited availability of public, high quality data. In this paper, we introduce a new corpus of 7929 Definitive Merger Agreements submitted to the SEC between 2000 and 2020 involving a transaction in excess of $100 million. Through a combination of machine learning and human evaluation, we associate these agreements with other metadata, such as deal size, industry classification, and advising law firms. In addition, we identify and make available the text of individual clauses contained in these agreements. In a final step, we provide an illustration of how these data can be used to generate novel insights into M&amp;A contract design and drafting practices.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47187,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Empirical Legal Studies","volume":"22 1","pages":"130-140"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2024-12-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143253661","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Killing as Capital: Perverse Effects of Truce Negotiations on Gang Violence in El Salvador 杀戮为资本:萨尔瓦多帮派暴力停战谈判的反常影响
IF 1.2 2区 社会学
Journal of Empirical Legal Studies Pub Date : 2024-12-26 DOI: 10.1111/jels.12407
Cree Jones, Preston Lloyd
{"title":"Killing as Capital: Perverse Effects of Truce Negotiations on Gang Violence in El Salvador","authors":"Cree Jones,&nbsp;Preston Lloyd","doi":"10.1111/jels.12407","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jels.12407","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>In March 2012, the government of El Salvador brokered a truce between MS-13 and Barrio 18, the two largest and most notorious gangs in El Salvador. The truce was designed to decrease homicides in exchange for more lenient treatment of incarcerated gang leaders. Despite early, promising results, the truce was short-lived. From May 2013 to February 2015, the government walked back its concessions under the truce. Homicides increased steadily during the rescission period and exponentially in the wake of full revocation. Economic theory suggests negotiating with gangs may achieve short-term gains, but may also cause long-term losses, particularly when the government reneges: once negotiations are on the table, gangs may use killing to increase their political capital and induce the government to re-enter negotiations and make greater concessions. Using Salvadoran crime data, we deploy a difference-in-differences model to estimate the effect of the truce on homicides. We estimate the truce resulted in 1130 fewer homicides during its implementation and 551 fewer homicides during its piecemeal revocation. However, we also estimate 2250 more homicides occurred after full revocation, a perverse net effect of 569 more lives lost compared to what would have happened had the truce not been negotiated. These findings demonstrate negotiating with gangs may be an effective means to curb gang violence, but, if negotiations result in an unstable truce, they also introduce a perverse incentive structure that may result in long-term harms that exceed short-term gains.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47187,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Empirical Legal Studies","volume":"22 1","pages":"90-113"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2024-12-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143253364","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Patents Used in Patent Office Rejections as Indicators of Value 专利局驳回中作为价值指标的专利
IF 1.2 2区 社会学
Journal of Empirical Legal Studies Pub Date : 2024-12-20 DOI: 10.1111/jels.12404
Christopher A. Cotropia, David L. Schwartz
{"title":"Patents Used in Patent Office Rejections as Indicators of Value","authors":"Christopher A. Cotropia,&nbsp;David L. Schwartz","doi":"10.1111/jels.12404","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jels.12404","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper introduces a novel approach to measure a patent's economic value by examining whether the patent's disclosure leads to rejection of another pending US patent application. This approach considers the use of the patent by the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) in office action rejections on the grounds of novelty or obviousness, as well as its citation as an X or Y reference in a European Patent Office (EPO) search report, which provides analogous information. Unlike conventional citation metrics widely employed by economists, the novel metric is arguably more closely tied to private value, as it is centered on the examiner's rejection of another patent application based on the patent in question. As this metric is not directly influenced by potential strategic behavior by patent lawyers or patent applicants, it is more directly tied to private value. This study evaluates how patents used in novelty and obviousness rejections, and comparable EPO information, correspond to common measures of private value—specifically patent renewal, the assertion of a patent in litigation, the number of independent patent claims, and classification in multiple technological subject matters. We examine rejection data over a defined time period for US patents issued from 1999 to 2007 and then link value data to these patents. A similar analysis is also conducted for EPO search reports. Our findings reveal that rejection uses, as well as X and Y EPO search citations, independently exhibit positive correlations with all of these value measurements. Moreover, when information from both the USPTO and EPO concerning a given patent is combined, further insights about that patent's value are obtained. We also find that rejection uses provide unique insights into additional measures of private value such as the patent being listed in the Orange Book or as a Standard Essential Patent. Accordingly, these rejection use metrics provide another independent tool for evaluating a patent's value.</p>","PeriodicalId":47187,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Empirical Legal Studies","volume":"22 1","pages":"76-89"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2024-12-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jels.12404","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143252961","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Plea Bargaining Procedures Worldwide: Drivers of Introduction and Use 全球辩诉交易程序:引进和使用的驱动因素
IF 1.2 2区 社会学
Journal of Empirical Legal Studies Pub Date : 2024-12-19 DOI: 10.1111/jels.12406
Gabriele Paolini, Elena Kantorowicz-Reznichenko, Stefan Voigt
{"title":"Plea Bargaining Procedures Worldwide: Drivers of Introduction and Use","authors":"Gabriele Paolini,&nbsp;Elena Kantorowicz-Reznichenko,&nbsp;Stefan Voigt","doi":"10.1111/jels.12406","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jels.12406","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Over the last three decades, plea bargaining has been adopted by many jurisdictions worldwide. However, a comprehensive account of both its adoption as well as its use is still missing. We survey 174 jurisdictions, finding that 101 allow plea-bargaining. For 52 jurisdictions, we also compute plea-bargaining rates, as the percentage of convictions imposed through plea bargaining over all criminal convictions. Relying on this novel dataset, we find that Muslim-majority populations and the French and Scandinavian legal origins are associated with lower probabilities of formalizing plea bargaining, while democracies are associated with higher probabilities. The Spanish and Socialist legal origins, a looser regulation of the procedure, and jury trials are associated with higher plea-bargaining rates, while higher income levels correlate with higher plea-bargaining rates only up to a certain point.</p>","PeriodicalId":47187,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Empirical Legal Studies","volume":"22 1","pages":"27-75"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2024-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jels.12406","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143252917","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Market Response to Court Rejection of California's Board Diversity Laws 市场对法院驳回加州董事会多元化法案的反应
IF 1.2 2区 社会学
Journal of Empirical Legal Studies Pub Date : 2024-12-19 DOI: 10.1111/jels.12405
Jonathan Klick
{"title":"Market Response to Court Rejection of California's Board Diversity Laws","authors":"Jonathan Klick","doi":"10.1111/jels.12405","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jels.12405","url":null,"abstract":"<p>California mandated that firms headquartered in the state include women (SB 826) and underrepresented minorities (AB 979) on their corporate boards. These laws, passed in 2018 and 2020 respectively, were held to violate the state's constitution by judges on the Los Angeles County Superior Court in 2022. This paper examines the market reaction to these surprising court decisions, finding that California firms appreciated significantly on the days of the rulings, and there is evidence that firms that were not in compliance with the laws exhibited larger abnormal returns than firms that were in compliance.</p>","PeriodicalId":47187,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Empirical Legal Studies","volume":"22 1","pages":"4-26"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2024-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jels.12405","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143252916","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Paying for performance? Attorneys' fees in fraud class actions 为业绩付费?欺诈集体诉讼中的律师费
IF 1.2 2区 社会学
Journal of Empirical Legal Studies Pub Date : 2024-11-17 DOI: 10.1111/jels.12402
Stephen J. Choi, Jessica M. Erickson, A. C. Pritchard
{"title":"Paying for performance? Attorneys' fees in fraud class actions","authors":"Stephen J. Choi,&nbsp;Jessica M. Erickson,&nbsp;A. C. Pritchard","doi":"10.1111/jels.12402","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jels.12402","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper studies whether plaintiffs' lawyers matter in securities class actions. We use inverse propensity score weighting (IPW) to compare the results in cases led by top-tier firms against those brought by lower-tier firms. This technique addresses case selection effects by using all of the cases led by a top-tier firm and then weighting the cases led by lower-tier firms based on how similar these cases are to the cases led by top-tier firms. We do find that top-tier lawyers obtain better outcomes for shareholders in a subset of securities class actions, specifically the cases against the larger (although not the very largest) companies. Outside of these cases, we find that most of the difference in the results obtained by top- and lower-tier firms disappears when we balance observable characteristics using the IPW technique. Although the top-tier firms do not get better results in most cases, they do invest more hours and money into their cases.</p>","PeriodicalId":47187,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Empirical Legal Studies","volume":"21 4","pages":"899-926"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2024-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jels.12402","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142674045","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Emotional bargaining after litigation: An experimental study of the Coase theorem 诉讼后的情感讨价还价:科斯定理的实验研究
IF 1.2 2区 社会学
Journal of Empirical Legal Studies Pub Date : 2024-11-17 DOI: 10.1111/jels.12397
Yun-chien Chang, David Ta-wei Hung, Chang-Ching Lin, Joseph Tao-yi Wang
{"title":"Emotional bargaining after litigation: An experimental study of the Coase theorem","authors":"Yun-chien Chang,&nbsp;David Ta-wei Hung,&nbsp;Chang-Ching Lin,&nbsp;Joseph Tao-yi Wang","doi":"10.1111/jels.12397","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jels.12397","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Entitlement assignment is unimportant if transaction cost is sufficiently low, as post-litigation bargaining can redress allocative inefficiency, or so goes the Coase theorem. Ward Farnsworth, based on interviews with lawyers, argues that animosity created during litigation, a key mechanism to (re)allocate entitlement, will hinder the conclusion of any deal following litigation. Using a laboratory experiment, we test whether animosity generated before negotiations reduce the rate at which deals are successfully concluded and find evidence for a lower deal rate under one of the treatment conditions (the raw difference being three percentage points). The small practical effect may be attributed to rationality carrying the day and/or the limited degree of animosity we can generated in the lab with human subjects. The Coase theorem holds, while Farsworth's observation should not be ignored.</p>","PeriodicalId":47187,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Empirical Legal Studies","volume":"21 4","pages":"786-825"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2024-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142674042","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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