{"title":"Belief and\u0000 higher‐order\u0000 belief in the centipede games: An experimental investigation","authors":"Yun Wang","doi":"10.1111/1468-0106.12404","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0106.12404","url":null,"abstract":"This paper experimentally explores epistemic conditions behind the subgame perfect equilibrium (SPNE) of centipede games. We propose a novel design of laboratory experiment to elicit subjects’ beliefs regarding their opponents’ strategies and 1st-order beliefs. The measured beliefs, together with the choice data, help us to estimate each subject’s level of rationality, belief of rationality, and 2nd-order belief of rationality. We consider two experimental treatments: the classic centipede game in which an efficient non-equilibrium outcome exists, and its constant-sum variation. Data shows that, in the classic centipede treatment, fewer subjects behave rationally; meanwhile, subjects are less likely to believe in their opponents’ rationality and belief of rationality. Furthermore, in the constant-sum centipede treatment, there is a non-trivial portion of subjects who behave rationally, believe in others’ rationality, and hold 2nd-order belief of rationality. Our results indicate that the efficiency property of the classic centipede game may lead to subjects’ non-equilibrium behavior by diffusing their beliefs and higher-order beliefs.","PeriodicalId":46516,"journal":{"name":"Pacific Economic Review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47663231","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}