Journal of Management Accounting Research最新文献

筛选
英文 中文
Customer Satisfaction and Internal Control 顾客满意与内部控制
Journal of Management Accounting Research Pub Date : 2023-09-01 DOI: 10.2308/jmar-2022-073
Ting Chen, Xiaotao Kelvin Liu, Chi Wan, Yakun Wang
{"title":"Customer Satisfaction and Internal Control","authors":"Ting Chen, Xiaotao Kelvin Liu, Chi Wan, Yakun Wang","doi":"10.2308/jmar-2022-073","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/jmar-2022-073","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT We investigate whether firms’ ineffective internal control over financial reporting is associated with customer satisfaction, measured by product ratings on Amazon.com. Internal control weaknesses will likely corrupt the information environment, compromise coordination, and divert corporate resources to address the control deficiencies. Using a large sample of product rating data from Amazon.com, we find robust and consistent evidence that internal control weaknesses are negatively associated with customer satisfaction. Furthermore, the negative association is more pronounced for environment-level (versus other) internal control weaknesses, noncore (versus core) products, and more (versus less) operationally complex firms. Our findings provide initial evidence that ineffective internal control compromises customer satisfaction. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: M11; M41; M42; M48.","PeriodicalId":46474,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Management Accounting Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135255105","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Management Accounting Research Opportunities in Climate Change Reporting 气候变化报告中的管理会计研究机会
Journal of Management Accounting Research Pub Date : 2023-09-01 DOI: 10.2308/jmar-2023-022
Jonathan Jona, Naomi S. Soderstrom
{"title":"Management Accounting Research Opportunities in Climate Change Reporting","authors":"Jonathan Jona, Naomi S. Soderstrom","doi":"10.2308/jmar-2023-022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/jmar-2023-022","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Climate risk is a critically important challenge for society. Current accounting-related efforts include initiatives by regulators to promulgate climate risk disclosure standards, focusing on disclosure of nonfinancial and forward-looking information. These proposals are certain to evolve over time. With management accounting research’s focus on decision-making and performance evaluation using nonfinancial performance measures and effective management control systems, management accounting researchers are in a strong position to provide unique input into the ongoing development of these reporting standards. In this commentary, we discuss topics where management accounting researchers can contribute to the standard-setting efforts. Contributing to these efforts requires a change in mindset for management accounting researchers from primarily focusing on internal and potentially idiosyncratic decision-makers to a broader audience that includes external providers of capital. However, the reward to doing so is participation in interesting and important research avenues that can have a real impact on society. JEL Classifications: M49; M48; M14.","PeriodicalId":46474,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Management Accounting Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135895160","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Digital Anxiety in the Finance Function: Consequences and Mitigating Factors 财务职能中的数字焦虑:后果和缓解因素
IF 1.7
Journal of Management Accounting Research Pub Date : 2023-08-21 DOI: 10.2308/jmar-2021-056
Sebastian Firk, Yannik Gehrke, Michael Wolff
{"title":"Digital Anxiety in the Finance Function: Consequences and Mitigating Factors","authors":"Sebastian Firk, Yannik Gehrke, Michael Wolff","doi":"10.2308/jmar-2021-056","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/jmar-2021-056","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This study investigates digital anxiety as a potential barrier to the digital transformation of the finance function. To embrace digital transformation, the finance function crucially relies on the engagement of its employees. However, due to this transformation, these employees face high uncertainty regarding future job demands, possibly invoking digital anxiety. Based on a survey of 1,038 finance employees from a multinational business group and rich qualitative insights, we first indicate the relevance of digital anxiety in the finance function. Our results further show that digital anxiety is negatively associated with work engagement. Finally, we find that employees who have taken part in digital trainings, who are surrounded by digitally savvy peers, and who work under a transformational leader are associated with less digital anxiety. Our study highlights the need to carefully consider employee emotions to digitally transform the finance function and outlines means for organizations to cope with these emotions.","PeriodicalId":46474,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Management Accounting Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45044589","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Superior-Subordinate Divergence in Controllability Judgments 可控性判断的上下级差异
IF 1.7
Journal of Management Accounting Research Pub Date : 2023-08-16 DOI: 10.2308/jmar-2022-051
J. Gay, Scott B. Jackson, Nathan Waddoups, Xiaomei Xiong
{"title":"Superior-Subordinate Divergence in Controllability Judgments","authors":"J. Gay, Scott B. Jackson, Nathan Waddoups, Xiaomei Xiong","doi":"10.2308/jmar-2022-051","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/jmar-2022-051","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The controllability principle states that superiors should hold subordinates responsible only for outcomes and events that the subordinates can control. Although the principle is intuitively appealing, the extent to which this principle is applied can vary substantially in practice. Using four experiments, we predict and find evidence suggesting that the controllability judgments of superiors and subordinates can diverge even when the objective controllability of the outcome is held constant. Specifically, we find that subordinates' controllability judgments, relative to those of superiors, are consistently lower when performance outcomes are negative and sometimes higher when performance outcomes are positive. Further, we find that divergence in controllability judgments has important, negative implications for subordinates' perceptions of fairness and trust, intended effort, job satisfaction, and turnover intentions. Our results highlight several costs of implementing the controllability principle, which may help explain why the controllability principle is not universally adopted.\u0000 Data Availability: Data are available from the authors upon written request.","PeriodicalId":46474,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Management Accounting Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-08-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44209899","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Institutional Theory and Hybrid Accounting and Control Systems 制度理论与混合会计与控制系统
IF 1.7
Journal of Management Accounting Research Pub Date : 2023-08-16 DOI: 10.2308/jmar-2023-024
Nishant Agarwal, Ranjani Krishnan, Luke Weiler
{"title":"Institutional Theory and Hybrid Accounting and Control Systems","authors":"Nishant Agarwal, Ranjani Krishnan, Luke Weiler","doi":"10.2308/jmar-2023-024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/jmar-2023-024","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We identify several manifestations of hybridity in accounting and control systems. Hybridity in the form of multiple accounting systems and actual or postural conformity to institutional expectations can enable organizations to overtly, but sometimes ostensibly, combine multiple logics to appease stakeholders. Hybridity increases costs and the risk of internal inconsistency. Consequently, firms decouple some practices to provide an impression of conformance. We offer a typology of three forms of hybridity—compliance, complete decoupling, and partial decoupling—and illustrate using examples from accounting hybridization choices regarding corporate social responsibility (CSR), diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI), and international reporting standards. We empirically examine hybridity in the context of the voluntary adoption of international financial reporting standards (IFRS). We find that instrumental pressures are associated with adoption through compliance; however, social pressures are likely to be placated through complete decoupling, whereby firms voluntarily adopt multiple systems in policy, but not in practice.\u0000 Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.\u0000 JEL Classifications: B50; L21; M41.","PeriodicalId":46474,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Management Accounting Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-08-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41346119","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Enhanced Compensation Disclosure and Ex Post Discretionary Adjustments of Realized Performance in Executive Incentive Contracts 高管激励合同中强化薪酬披露与实现绩效事后自由调整
IF 1.7
Journal of Management Accounting Research Pub Date : 2023-08-12 DOI: 10.2308/jmar-2020-082
Sunyoung Kim, J. Shin
{"title":"Enhanced Compensation Disclosure and Ex Post Discretionary Adjustments of Realized Performance in Executive Incentive Contracts","authors":"Sunyoung Kim, J. Shin","doi":"10.2308/jmar-2020-082","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/jmar-2020-082","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Recent research shows that the United States Securities and Exchange Commission’s enhanced compensation disclosures introduced in 2006 reduced boards’ flexibility in their compensation decisions and that boards immediately reacted by increasing executive pay to compensate for additional pay risk. We investigate firms’ longer-term reactions to these new disclosure rules. We find that firms often adjust realized earnings per share ex post when deciding their executives’ bonuses, and this practice has gained popularity since 2006. The use of ex post discretionary adjustments is more pronounced when boards’ demand for compensation flexibility is higher. Overall, our findings suggest that ex post discretionary adjustments are a source of flexibility that boards use to cope with limited compensation flexibility under the new compensation discussion and analysis disclosure rules.\u0000 Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.\u0000 JEL Classifications: M41; M52.","PeriodicalId":46474,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Management Accounting Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47471019","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Effects of Span of Control and Temporal Disaggregation of Performance Reports on Discretionary Performance Evaluations 绩效报告的控制广度和时间分解对自主绩效评估的影响
IF 1.7
Journal of Management Accounting Research Pub Date : 2023-08-12 DOI: 10.2308/jmar-2022-066
Razvan S. Ghita, V. S. Maas
{"title":"The Effects of Span of Control and Temporal Disaggregation of Performance Reports on Discretionary Performance Evaluations","authors":"Razvan S. Ghita, V. S. Maas","doi":"10.2308/jmar-2022-066","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/jmar-2022-066","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Span of control and temporal disaggregation of performance reports are two important control system elements that jointly determine the benchmarks that managers have available when evaluating employees’ performance. Using an experiment, we investigate whether widening managers’ span of control and temporally disaggregating performance reports affect managers’ evaluation decisions. We predict and find that managers with a wider span of control evaluate their best performing employees more favorably and their worst performing employees less favorably. We also find that disaggregating performance reports, i.e., providing quarterly performance figures in addition to annual performance figures, has a negative effect on managers’ evaluations of their best performing employees, but only when their span of control is wide. We discuss the implications of our findings for management accounting research and practice.\u0000 Data Availability: The data and research instrument are available from the authors upon request.\u0000 JEL Classifications: M10; M40; M50; D91.","PeriodicalId":46474,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Management Accounting Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46051704","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Influence of Controllability and Outcome Valence on Cost-Shifting 可控性和结果价对成本转移的影响
IF 1.7
Journal of Management Accounting Research Pub Date : 2023-08-12 DOI: 10.2308/jmar-2021-030
Jeffrey R. Cohen, Dennis D. Fehrenbacher, A. Schulz, M. Weisner
{"title":"The Influence of Controllability and Outcome Valence on Cost-Shifting","authors":"Jeffrey R. Cohen, Dennis D. Fehrenbacher, A. Schulz, M. Weisner","doi":"10.2308/jmar-2021-030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/jmar-2021-030","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In a setting that considers both operational and accounting decentralization, we propose that controllability and outcome valence effects (i.e., positive versus negative contractual outcomes for managers) interact to affect managers’ misreporting behavior. Experimental results show that the level of cost-shifting under negative outcome valence is relatively invariant to the amount of control over a project’s results, whereas the decision to engage in cost-shifting under positive outcome valence is contingent upon whether the manager had control or not. We contribute to the management accounting literature on contract framing and misreporting and extend research on how decentralization choices affect managers’ use of private information, with direct implications for practice. Our results suggest that limiting individual managers’ operational control primarily to constrain misreporting may only be beneficial when contracts stipulate positive outcomes for managers.","PeriodicalId":46474,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Management Accounting Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41477296","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
CSR Restatements: Mischief or Mistake? CSR重述:错误还是失误?
IF 1.7
Journal of Management Accounting Research Pub Date : 2023-08-02 DOI: 10.2308/jmar-2022-028
Rebecca L. Bachmann, Helen Spiropoulos
{"title":"CSR Restatements: Mischief or Mistake?","authors":"Rebecca L. Bachmann, Helen Spiropoulos","doi":"10.2308/jmar-2022-028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/jmar-2022-028","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Using a sample of Australian Securities Exchange Ltd. (ASX) 500 firms over the 2004–2020 period, we find that contracting on corporate social responsibility (CSR) increases the likelihood of CSR restatements and that these restatements are biased toward showing improvements in CSR performance for the current period. This is especially the case when firms contract on social CSR performance measures. We also find that CEOs’ short-term incentive compensation is significantly greater when restatements result in improved comparative performance, but only for firms that contract on CSR. Overall, our results suggest that contracting on CSR is another explanation for the increasing prevalence of CSR restatements and that standard setters should address metrics and measures when formulating policies with respect to CSR reporting.\u0000 Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.\u0000 JEL Classifications: M12; M14; M52.","PeriodicalId":46474,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Management Accounting Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42799243","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
The More, the Merrier? The Behavioral Effects of a Firm’s CSR Mission and Monetary CSR Incentives on Employee CSR Engagement 人越多越有意思企业社会责任使命和货币社会责任激励对员工社会责任参与的行为效应
IF 1.7
Journal of Management Accounting Research Pub Date : 2023-08-02 DOI: 10.2308/jmar-2022-037
Franziska Spallek, Karola Bastini, M. Lachmann
{"title":"The More, the Merrier? The Behavioral Effects of a Firm’s CSR Mission and Monetary CSR Incentives on Employee CSR Engagement","authors":"Franziska Spallek, Karola Bastini, M. Lachmann","doi":"10.2308/jmar-2022-037","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/jmar-2022-037","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We experimentally investigate the combined effects of CSR-related informal (i.e., CSR mission) and formal control elements (i.e., provision of monetary CSR incentives) on employee CSR engagement, considering employees’ CSR norms. We predict that a substantive rather than a symbolic CSR mission positively impacts the CSR engagement of employees who attach high importance to CSR and expect monetary CSR incentives to be effective under a symbolic CSR mission, and if employees attach low importance to CSR. The findings show that a substantive relative to a symbolic CSR mission increases the CSR engagement of employees who attach high importance to CSR. Under a symbolic CSR mission, employees increase their CSR engagement when monetary CSR incentives are provided, while under a substantive CSR mission, monetary CSR incentives are only effective for participants who attach low importance to CSR. The results support firms in designing suitable and effective CSR-related management control systems.\u0000 Data Availability: Data is available from the authors upon request.\u0000 JEL Classifications: M41; M52.","PeriodicalId":46474,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Management Accounting Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47549495","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
相关产品
×
本文献相关产品
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信