Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy最新文献

{"title":"Constructivist and well-being based justifications of human rights. Rivals or allies?","authors":"Christian Baatz","doi":"10.1080/13698230.2023.2280867","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2023.2280867","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46451,"journal":{"name":"Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139258386","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Who are the people? Associative freedom and the democratic boundary problem","authors":"Frank Dietrich","doi":"10.1080/13698230.2023.2280744","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2023.2280744","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46451,"journal":{"name":"Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139265501","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Normative behaviourism: groups it cannot reach?","authors":"Simon Stevens","doi":"10.1080/13698230.2023.2281149","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2023.2281149","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46451,"journal":{"name":"Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139274576","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Boundaries and varieties of republicanism","authors":"Adrián Herranz","doi":"10.1080/13698230.2023.2280946","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2023.2280946","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTThis paper addresses a neglected question in republican political philosophy: what are the conditions for a set of arguments to be considered republican? While republicanism traditionally confers a fundamental role to the democratic ideal of participation in decision-making, recent contributions argue that freedom could be promoted by facilitating exit where possible. The strong version of the latter argument states that when exit is possible, it constitutes the most important contribution to republican freedom, and it preserves the goal of isolating individual choices, i.e. it precludes collective decision-making from interfering with them, and so it intends to limit the scope of public concern considered legitimate. I examine this argument to discuss the boundaries and varieties of republicanism: (i) the boundaries establish that an argument should be couched and substantively articulated in distinctively republican terms; (ii) the strong version of the exit argument does not fall within the boundaries because it is in tension with core republican commitments to self-government and civic virtues; (iii) once we abide by the boundaries we may encounter a diversity of proposals differing on the more concrete level of institutional design and empirical assumptions – these are the varieties of republicanism.KEYWORDS: Republicanismfreedomvirtuedemocracyliberalism AcknowledgementPrevious versions of this paper were presented in Louvain (Chaire Hoover d’éthique économique et sociale), Pavia, and Braga. I am also grateful to Iñigo González-Ricoy, José Luis Martí, Rubén Marciel, Luke Newberry and the anonymous reviewer for their comments.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. By ‘classical liberalism’ (Freeman, Citation2011; De Dijn, Citation2020, pt. 3) I mean the political tradition that builds its core normative requirements around a defence of private property and related ‘economic freedoms’, including thinkers like Constant, Paley, Guizot, Mises, Hayek or Friedman.2. I do not elaborate on cases that may break this general claim, such as increasing our power by being dependent on other agents on which we rely on collective action, or diminishing our power due to collective action problems produced by exit and uncoordinated choices.3. Taylor highlights that the exit view relies on market-coordinated individual preferences rather than collective decisions or bureaucratic discretion (Taylor, Citation2017, pp. 46–49). Lovett initially considered that introducing a basic income involves a strong reform program in the economic sphere, so that it ‘would replace most other public welfare programs, and eliminate the need for much workplace regulation and the minimum wage’ (Lovett, Citation2010, p. 199). Now, he seems more cautious about introducing a more plural institutional design. He stresses the need to curb economic inequality, the empirically determined nature of institutional design and the p","PeriodicalId":46451,"journal":{"name":"Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134991255","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A Lockean account of the moral status of undocumented immigrants","authors":"J.K. Numao","doi":"10.1080/13698230.2023.2280878","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2023.2280878","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTThis article aims to show that Locke’s discussion of tacit consent and the right to punish aliens in the Second Treatise of Government has important bearings on the moral status of undocumented immigrants. It argues that Locke conceptualized both friendly and hostile aliens, counting the former as tacit consenters to whom host states owed rights and protection. Moreover, it highlights how his approach, unlike theorists before and after him, was one that saw individuals as capable of shaping their own relationship with the host. The article also examines Locke’s discussion of the federative power of the state, which includes the power to vet aliens within the country. Seen through this Lockean lens, the article argues that the vast majority of undocumented immigrants can be understood as tacit consenters or potential citizens who should be judged by how they choose to relate to the host, and not by their country of origin. While noting that the Lockean approach is not incompatible with border control, the article also shows how it puts the onus on the host to justify the power it exercises and to engage in dialogue with undocumented immigrants about what their status should be in the country.KEYWORDS: Lockeirregular migrationundocumented immigrantstacit consentpunishment AcknowledgmentsI would like to thank everyone who attended the online Locke working group workshop on June 25th, 2021. I have benefited greatly from their questions and comments. I would especially like to thank Douglas Casson who was the commentator for my session on this occasion. I would also like to thank Takuya Furuta and Brian Smith for reading an earlier version of this paper. Finally, I would like to thank the editor and the anonymous reviewers for their invaluable feedback.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. By this, I mean irregular migration as it tends to be understood today. For example, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) defines this type of migration as the ‘Movement of persons that takes place outside the laws, regulations, or international agreements governing the entry into or exit from the State of origin, transit or destination’. https://www.iom.int/key-migration-terms (Accessed on September 9, 2021). However, what may be considered ‘irregular’ by today’s standards may not have been irregular, but quite ‘regular’, in seventeenth-century England. What I am doing therefore is to consider the implications of Locke’s comments for the debate over irregular immigration today. I am grateful to Brian Smith for his suggestion to clarify this point.2. References to Locke (Citation1988) will be by book (Roman numeral) and paragraph number (Arabic numeral).3. The irrevocability of citizenship may be puzzling to some and may make Locke’s theory less appealing. I make no effort in this article to explain or defend it, simply regarding it as a part of Locke’s argument. At the same time, I do not t","PeriodicalId":46451,"journal":{"name":"Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135291167","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Response to critics","authors":"Avia Pasternak","doi":"10.1080/13698230.2023.2265217","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2023.2265217","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTIn this piece I respond to the critiques raised by the contributors to this symposium.Keywords: Collective responsibilitycitizenshipintentional participation Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. In reality, shareholders are shielded from personal responsibility through the practice of limited corporate liability. Kutz rejects this practice and I share his concerns (Kutz, Citation2000, pp. 337–354).2. King (Citation2016) offers an important alternative to this account.Additional informationNotes on contributorsAvia PasternakAvia Pasternak is an associate professor at the Department of Philosophy, The University of Toronto. Her research focuses on questions of political philosophy and public affairs.","PeriodicalId":46451,"journal":{"name":"Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135366888","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The claim-right to exclude and the right to do wrong","authors":"Sahar Akhtar","doi":"10.1080/13698230.2023.2265288","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2023.2265288","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTMost challenges to immigration restrictions have not shown that states lack a claim-right to exclude, or a moral right against outside interference to make membership decisions. And an important, unexamined aspect of the claim-right is that states have the right against interference to wrongfully exclude, or the right to do wrong when making admission decisions. A major implication of this right is that even political or economic measures to affect states’ immigration policies are off the table – significantly compromising the prospect of meaningfully addressing the world’s growing refugee crisis. In the form of a reductio argument, I provide reason to reject this position. Specifically, I try to demonstrate that, in the relevant cases, a plausible moral defense for the right to wrongfully exclude can only be given for states with objectionable character – protecting the very states whose immigration policies we should be most concerned with, which is surely morally counterintuitive.KEYWORDS: Right to excluderaceidentityrefugeeimmigrationopen borders AcknowledgmentsI owe thanks to two anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments and questions. I am alsograteful for the helpful feedback that I received from the participants at a workshop for the Georgetown Institute for the Study of Markets and Ethics.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine2. https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/. The variance is due mainly to morally irrelevant definitional issues. The traditional conception of a refugee refers to someone who has departed their original state and includes about 32 million people. But about 53 million forcibly displaced people remain in their original states, and their conditions and circumstances typically mirror those of traditional refugees. For more, see: https://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/idpersons/pages/issues.aspx3. https://www.amnesty.org/en/what-we-do/refugees-asylum-seekers-and-migrants/global-refugee-crisis-statistics-and-facts/See references in my previous note. Andrew Altman and Wellman (Citation2009, esp. pp. 181–182) likewise maintain that wealthy states have moral duties to rescue refugees, which can often only be satisfied by admitting them.4. Some notable works stand out for arguing against the claim-right to exclude (e.g. Abizadeh, Citation2008), but they don’t examine its implications for wrongful exclusions – my focus here.5. I discuss recent work below.6. My arguments also suggest a new critique of individuals’ right to do wrong.7. The only other sustained analysis concerning states seems to be Gerhard Øverland and Barry’s (Citation2011) valuable paper, but its focus is different. It concerns whether a majority has the right to have its democratically-produced, morally wrong decisions complied with/not interfered with by other members, and is thus perhaps more related to issues of democratic authority and political ob","PeriodicalId":46451,"journal":{"name":"Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135413032","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Introduction to the symposium: intentional citizenship and citizens’ remedial obligation to share the compensation burden","authors":"Jinyu Sun","doi":"10.1080/13698230.2023.2265211","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2023.2265211","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTIn this introduction, I provide a brief overview of the main arguments defended by Avia Pasternak in her book, ‘Responsible Citizens, Non-Responsible States’ and summarise the critics she will confront from four political and legal theorists who work in the area of individual citizens’ responsibility for state wrongdoings.KEYWORDS: Avia Pasternakintentional citizenshipdistributive effectstate wrongdoingsforward-looking responsibility Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Additional informationNotes on contributorsJinyu SunJinyu Sun is an Associate Researcher at the Department of Sociology, Zhejiang University. Her research interests include collective action, political obligation, and responsibility for injustice.","PeriodicalId":46451,"journal":{"name":"Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136113237","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Responsible citizens of responsible states","authors":"Jeff King","doi":"10.1080/13698230.2023.2265215","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2023.2265215","url":null,"abstract":"Avia Pasternak’s book makes a significant contribution to our understanding of citizen responsibility for historical wrongs. This review nevertheless offers some scepticism about resting citizen liability exclusively on the idea of intentional participation. It argues that the necessity of the state possessing continuing legal responsibility over time is so intrinsic to the function of statehood that the question of citizen liability should be seen as part of the general theory of political obligation. So seen, fair play duties provide a more plausible general ground for citizen liability, even when adapted to unjust regimes. The model of intentional participation may by contrast harbour a muted connection between the ideas of blameworthiness and responsibility that the book in the main wishes to deny. And the practical problems of resting responsibility on intentional participation alone are substantial. Pasternak’s major contribution, untouched by this critique, is to explain how the special obligations undertaken by intentional citizenship strengthen and extend beyond that more foundational duty of responsible citizens.","PeriodicalId":46451,"journal":{"name":"Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136112650","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Testing intentional citizenship","authors":"Jinyu Sun","doi":"10.1080/13698230.2023.2265213","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2023.2265213","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTAvia Pasternak argues that intentional citizens who are genuine participants of their state should share the liability for state wrongdoings. In real-world states, how prevalent is intentional citizenship? This commentary concerns the application of the theoretical model. I argue that there are two problems with Pasternak’s proposal of testing intentional citizenship in reality. First, the difficulty of distinguishing citizens’ ambiguous internal attitudes towards their citizenship is underestimated. Second, the objective aspect of citizens’ status in society, namely, the way they are treated by their state, is more important than their subjective attitudes, but this aspect is neglected by Pasternak.KEYWORDS: intentional citizenshipacceptancecollective liabilitysocial status Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.Additional informationNotes on contributorsJinyu SunJinyu Sun is an Associate Researcher at the Department of Sociology, Zhejiang University. Her research interests include collective action, political obligation, and responsibility for injustice.","PeriodicalId":46451,"journal":{"name":"Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136355117","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}