{"title":"Commentary on Catriona Mackenzie's “Autonomous agency, we‐agency, and social oppression”","authors":"S. Vincent","doi":"10.1111/sjp.12530","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12530","url":null,"abstract":"After a brief summary of Mackenzie's major claims, I offer questions to promote ongoing conversation, most especially regarding they‐ and we‐narratives.","PeriodicalId":46350,"journal":{"name":"SOUTHERN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43023432","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Dialetheism in Deleuze's event","authors":"Corry Shores","doi":"10.1111/sjp.12528","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12528","url":null,"abstract":"Deleuze never explicitly formulates his philosophy of logical truth‐values. It thus remains an open question as to the number and types he held there to be. Despite his explicit comments on these matters, additional textual evidence suggests that in his thinking on the event, he favored a third truth‐value, holding either the analetheic view that some truth‐bearers can be truth‐valueless or the dialetheic view that some truth‐bearers can be both true and false. I first argue that taking a logical approach to Deleuze's thinking is feasible, despite his and others' claims that might suggest otherwise. Next, I examine his explicit statements to show that they cannot be taken at face value and that, rather, we need to transpose his claims into contemporary terminology in order to accurately assess them. I lastly turn to his Leibniz‐inspired philosophy of time to argue that the affirmations involved in this conception strongly suggest a dialetheic tendency in his thinking.","PeriodicalId":46350,"journal":{"name":"SOUTHERN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-08-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48329840","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The cosmological ideas in Kant's critical philosophy: Their unique status and twofold regulative use","authors":"S. Howard","doi":"10.1111/sjp.12529","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12529","url":null,"abstract":"Kant's theory of the regulative use of ideas of reason has been clarified considerably in recent scholarship. Little attention has been paid, however, to the question of whether the three classes of transcendental ideas—psychological, cosmological, and theological—may differ with regard to their regulative use. This article argues that there is a fundamental difference between the classes of ideas in this respect and that an examination of this heterogeneity can provide much‐needed insight into Kant's account of the utility of the cosmological ideas. First, I set out Kant's distinction between the cosmological ideas and their psychological and theological counterparts. Second, I clarify the two distinct regulative uses of each cosmological idea. I argue that the two opposed sides of the cosmological antinomies provide two different heuristic functions, aligned with the theoretical and practical interests of reason.","PeriodicalId":46350,"journal":{"name":"SOUTHERN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-08-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48666174","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Dogmatism and perceptual justification: A reason‐theoretic foundation","authors":"H. Vahid","doi":"10.1111/sjp.12526","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12526","url":null,"abstract":"According to one prominent account of perceptual justification, “dogmatism,” whenever you have perceptual experience as if p, and lack defeaters, you thereby have immediate, prima facie justification for believing that p. The most important challenge is to show how experience can, on its own, provide justification for the belief in its content. Dogmatists often try to meet this challenge by highlighting the phenomenal character of perceptual experience and the mode of presentation of its content and defending their justifying roles by appealing to intuitively plausible examples. What is lacking here, however, is a theoretical framework to sanction and justify those roles going beyond the mere appeal to examples. Finding such a framework is the main goal of this article. I begin by criticizing a prominent response to this challenge, which suggests a composition view of perceptual experience consisting of sensory experiences and seemings. I then highlight the need for a theoretical framework to provide the rationale for the justifying roles that dogmatists allocate to perceptual experience. It is claimed that the framework in question involves the mechanism by which we possess reasons. Adapting the framework to cases where perception functions as a reason, a principled defense of dogmatism is provided.","PeriodicalId":46350,"journal":{"name":"SOUTHERN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-08-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49065029","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"“An unreserved yea‐saying even to suffering”: A skeptical defense of Nietzschean life affirmation","authors":"James A. Mollison","doi":"10.1111/sjp.12527","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12527","url":null,"abstract":"After examining the problem that gratuitous suffering poses for Nietzsche's notion of life affirmation, I mount a skeptical response to this problem on Nietzsche's behalf. I then consider an orthogonal objection to Nietzschean life affirmation, which argues that the need to justify life is symptomatic of life denial and show how strengthening the skeptical defense sidesteps this worry. Nietzsche's skepticism about our all‐too‐human, epistemic position thus aids his project of life affirmation in two ways. First, it suggests that we are unable to determine reliably whether a given instance of suffering is, in fact, gratuitous. Second, it provides a corrective to the moralistic need to redeem life, showing that all attempts to justify life as a whole are epistemically fraught. Before concluding, I examine Nietzsche's reasons for advancing such an epistemological argument and suggest how we might approach life affirmation in nonrational terms.","PeriodicalId":46350,"journal":{"name":"SOUTHERN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48934328","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Esprit de Corps and thinking on (and with) your feet: Standard, enactive, and poststructuralist aspects of relational autonomy and collective intentionality in team sports","authors":"John Protevi","doi":"10.1111/sjp.12525","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12525","url":null,"abstract":"To concretize my discussion of relational autonomy and collective intentionality, I present a case study in which we can see several themes in that scholarly literature exemplified in a real‐life event. The event in question is the Megan Rapinoe‐Abby Wambach goal in the quarterfinals of the Women's World Cup of 2011, one of the greatest in all World Cup history (A video clip of the goal can be found at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0B4q6di‐3fg.). In the case study, I concentrate on the ontological status of two key aspects of soccer, the linking of teammates by a pass, and the emergence of the team from the interactions of players. I use concepts drawn from poststructuralism, phenomenology, and enactivist approaches to embodied cognition.","PeriodicalId":46350,"journal":{"name":"SOUTHERN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-08-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49093837","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Freedom and social practices","authors":"J. Christman","doi":"10.1111/sjp.12524","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12524","url":null,"abstract":"The central idea of this article is that social freedom should range over socially constituted practices and ways of life rather than merely individual actions or aggregations of such actions. To be free, it is argued, is to be capable of pursuing opportunities to engage in socially constituted practices and ways of living that one has reason to value from the point of view of one's practical identity (or identities). The implication of this position is that supporting social freedom must involve positive support of those social relations that constitute those practices and ways of life. Hence negative freedom views, such as liberal or republican accounts, are incomplete as conceptions of the kind of freedom that is so deeply valued within democratic cultures as well as in liberation struggles against social systems where freedom is systematically denied.","PeriodicalId":46350,"journal":{"name":"SOUTHERN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-08-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42786657","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Gertrud Kuznitzky and Edith Stein on (non)conceptual experience","authors":"Daniel Neumann","doi":"10.1111/sjp.12523","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12523","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46350,"journal":{"name":"SOUTHERN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43981935","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Expressing and receiving negative emotions: Comments on Myisha Cherry's The Case for Rage","authors":"Nicolas Bommarito","doi":"10.1111/sjp.12522","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12522","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46350,"journal":{"name":"SOUTHERN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46155173","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}