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Public discourse and its problems 公共话语及其问题
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Politics Philosophy & Economics Pub Date : 2022-05-16 DOI: 10.1177/1470594X221100578
Michael Hannon
{"title":"Public discourse and its problems","authors":"Michael Hannon","doi":"10.1177/1470594X221100578","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594X221100578","url":null,"abstract":"It is widely believed that open and public speech is at the heart of the democratic ideal. Public discourse is instrumentally epistemically valuable for identifying good policies, as well as necessary for resisting domination (e.g. by vocally challenging decision-makers, demanding public justifications, and using democratic speech to hold leaders accountable). But in our highly polarized and socially fragmented political environment, an increasingly pressing question is: Do actual democratic societies live up to the ideal of inclusive public speech? In this essay, I explore Maxime Lepoutre's defense of discursive democracy from the challenge of defective public discourse. I argue that political ignorance, dogmatism, and social fragmentation present more formidable challenges to discursive democracy than Lepoutre acknowledges.","PeriodicalId":45971,"journal":{"name":"Politics Philosophy & Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73369808","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Why not anarchism? 为什么不是无政府主义?
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Politics Philosophy & Economics Pub Date : 2022-05-04 DOI: 10.1177/1470594X221098098
J. Brennan, Christopher Freiman
{"title":"Why not anarchism?","authors":"J. Brennan, Christopher Freiman","doi":"10.1177/1470594X221098098","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594X221098098","url":null,"abstract":"Recent debates over ideal theory have reinvigorated interest in the question of anarchy. Would a perfectly just society need—or even permit—a state? Ideal anarchists such as Jason Brennan, G.A. Cohen, Christopher Freiman, and Jacob Levy argue that strict compliance with justice obviates the need for a state. Ideal statists such as David Estlund, Gregory Kavka, and John Rawls think that coercive political institutions serve indispensable functions even in ideal conditions. This paper defends ideal anarchism. Our argument begins by describing a camping trip inspired by Cohen that illustrates why an anarchist form of cooperation is more intrinsically desirable than the statist alternative. After detailing Rawls's ideal theory and Estlund's “nonconcessive” moral theory, we argue—contrary to Rawls, Estlund, and Kavka—that large-scale societies without moral imperfection do not need a state.","PeriodicalId":45971,"journal":{"name":"Politics Philosophy & Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80462603","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Sanctuary as democratic non-cooperation 庇护为民主不合作
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Politics Philosophy & Economics Pub Date : 2022-05-04 DOI: 10.1177/1470594X221098001
P. Lenard
{"title":"Sanctuary as democratic non-cooperation","authors":"P. Lenard","doi":"10.1177/1470594X221098001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594X221098001","url":null,"abstract":"Across North America, Europe and Latin America, multiple sub-state jurisdictions have declared themselves to be migrant “sanctuaries”. By adopting sanctuary status, sub-state jurisdictions signal their welcoming attitude towards migrants as well their opposition to the state-level policies that target them for exclusion. In this article, I examine the place of sanctuary in the broader literature of political resistance and opposition in democratic states, and then whether it can be justified all things considered. I locate my examination in the political theory of federalism, to identify an expectation of cooperation – which, it appears, sanctuary jurisdictions are refusing to accept, usually with respect to immigration enforcement efforts. I refer to this form of opposition as “democratic non-cooperation” and identify its key features. I describe a “cooperation continuum”, to suggest that non-cooperation takes four main forms – evasion, non-engagement, disruption and obstruction – which I describe both in general terms and in relation to sanctuary practices in particular. Finally, I observe that the form of opposition that sanctuary is, is not limited to sanctuary: that is, there are other cases of this form of opposition in other policy domains, and moreover, not all of the objectives taken by those who deploy this form of opposition are progressive. Ultimately, this article's central contribution is to fleshing out modes of opposition in democratic spaces in general, by examining the morality of sanctuary actions taken around the world.","PeriodicalId":45971,"journal":{"name":"Politics Philosophy & Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72805582","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Political equality, plural voting, and the leveling down objection 政治平等、多元投票和平权反对
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Politics Philosophy & Economics Pub Date : 2022-05-01 DOI: 10.1177/1470594X221087470
David Peña-Rangel
{"title":"Political equality, plural voting, and the leveling down objection","authors":"David Peña-Rangel","doi":"10.1177/1470594X221087470","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594X221087470","url":null,"abstract":"I argue that the consensus view that one must never level down to equality gives rise to a dilemma. This dilemma is best understood by examining two parallel cases of leveling down: one drawn from the economic domain, the other from the political. In the economic case, both egalitarians and non-egalitarians have resisted the idea of leveling down wages to equality. With no incentives for some people to work hard social productivity will likely decline, further lowering people's wages and thus leaving everybody all-things-considered worse off as a result—hence “never level down.” On the other hand, however, the argument against leveling down does not appear to pass muster in the political sphere: denying political equality in the form of “one person, one vote” (OPOV), for example, by giving a higher share of voting power to people with, say, more education seems straightforwardly objectionable, even if such a voting scheme would improve the outcomes of all people, including those who are ultimately left with fewer votes. Thus, a fundamental tension arises: we can either endorse the widely-affirmed “never-level-down” thesis, which says that sacrificing people's well-being exclusively for the sake of promoting equality can never be the right thing to do, or we can endorse the principle of “one person, one vote.” But we cannot do both. I defend this dilemma against a view I call the compatibility view: roughly, that because OPOV is strictly necessary to advance some weighty, non-egalitarian interest people have, accepting OPOV as a principle of justice is compatible with one's rejection of leveling down.","PeriodicalId":45971,"journal":{"name":"Politics Philosophy & Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74079364","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Who cares what the people think? Public attitudes and refugee protection in Europe 谁在乎别人怎么想?公众态度与欧洲难民保护
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Politics Philosophy & Economics Pub Date : 2022-04-26 DOI: 10.1177/1470594X221085701
M. Ruhs
{"title":"Who cares what the people think? Public attitudes and refugee protection in Europe","authors":"M. Ruhs","doi":"10.1177/1470594X221085701","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594X221085701","url":null,"abstract":"This paper discusses why and how public attitudes should matter in regulating asylum and refugee protection in rich democracies, with a focus on Europe. Taking a realistic approach, I argue that public views constitute a soft feasibility constraint on effective and sustainable policies towards asylum seekers and refugees, and that a failure to take seriously and understand the attitudes of the host country’s population can have a very damaging effect on refugee protection and migrants’ rights in practice. Bringing together insights from political philosophy, the politics of asylum, and research on public attitudes, I develop my argument by discussing why ‘what the people think’ should matter in asylum and refugee polices; how public views can and should matter given the well-known challenges with measuring attitudes and policy preferences; and what the prevailing public views might mean for the reform of asylum and refugee policies in Europe.","PeriodicalId":45971,"journal":{"name":"Politics Philosophy & Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-04-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76043172","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Only libertarianism can provide a robust justification for open borders 只有自由意志主义才能为开放边境提供有力的理由
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Politics Philosophy & Economics Pub Date : 2022-04-21 DOI: 10.1177/1470594X221091278
Christopher Freiman, Javier Hidalgo
{"title":"Only libertarianism can provide a robust justification for open borders","authors":"Christopher Freiman, Javier Hidalgo","doi":"10.1177/1470594X221091278","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594X221091278","url":null,"abstract":"This paper argues that libertarianism—and only libertarianism—can vindicate immigration's status as a human right whose protection is morally required in nearly all circumstances. Competing political theories such as liberal egalitarianism fail to rule out significant immigration restrictions in a range of realistic conditions. We begin by outlining the core tenets of libertarianism and their implications for immigration policy. Next, we explain why arguments that appeal to alternative principles are unable to provide robust justification for open borders. We conclude by considering whether our argument vindicates libertarianism or undermines open borders.","PeriodicalId":45971,"journal":{"name":"Politics Philosophy & Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-04-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88812414","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The problem of equal moral status 道德地位平等的问题
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Politics Philosophy & Economics Pub Date : 2022-03-31 DOI: 10.1177/1470594X221091285
Zoltan Miklosi
{"title":"The problem of equal moral status","authors":"Zoltan Miklosi","doi":"10.1177/1470594X221091285","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594X221091285","url":null,"abstract":"A central puzzle of contemporary moral and political philosophy is that while most of us believe that all or almost all human beings enjoy the same moral status, human beings possess the capacities that supposedly ground moral status to very unequal levels. This paper aims to develop a novel strategy to vindicate the idea of moral equality against this challenge. Its central argument is that the puzzle emerges only if one accepts a usually unstated theoretical premise about value and the proper response to value. The premise holds that if the presence of a valuable property warrants a certain kind of response towards its bearers, then every variation in the degree to which the property is present necessarily constitutes a reason for a corresponding variation in the response that is warranted towards its bearers. It argues that despite its intuitive appeal, the premise is not plausible as a general view about the proper way of responding to value, and as a view about responding to the value of rational beings in particular. It proposes an account of the proper manner of valuing rational beings that supports a distinctive version of the so-called threshold approach to justifying equal moral status.","PeriodicalId":45971,"journal":{"name":"Politics Philosophy & Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89992418","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
A market failures approach to justice in health 从市场失灵的角度看待卫生司法
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Politics Philosophy & Economics Pub Date : 2022-03-31 DOI: 10.1177/1470594X221089670
L. Horne, Joseph Heath
{"title":"A market failures approach to justice in health","authors":"L. Horne, Joseph Heath","doi":"10.1177/1470594X221089670","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594X221089670","url":null,"abstract":"It is generally acknowledged that a certain amount of state intervention in health and health care is needed to address the significant market failures in these sectors; however, it is also thought that the primary rationale for state involvement in health must lie elsewhere, for example in an egalitarian commitment to equalizing access to health care for all citizens. This paper argues that a complete theory of justice in health can be derived from a commitment to correcting market failure, or in other words promoting Pareto-efficiency, in the domain of health. This approach can address familiar problems around access to care, as well as problems related to resource allocation and rationing (including resource allocation between generations), the control of health care costs, and the foundations of public health. Egalitarian theories of justice in health cannot make sense of the depth and pervasiveness of state involvement in health and health care; only a theory rooted in the need to correct market failure can.","PeriodicalId":45971,"journal":{"name":"Politics Philosophy & Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89317175","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
The puzzle of competitive fairness 竞争公平之谜
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Politics Philosophy & Economics Pub Date : 2022-03-07 DOI: 10.1177/1470594X221082260
O. Suttle
{"title":"The puzzle of competitive fairness","authors":"O. Suttle","doi":"10.1177/1470594X221082260","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594X221082260","url":null,"abstract":"There is a sense of fairness that is distinctive of markets. This is fairness among economic competitors, competitive fairness. We regularly make judgments of competitive fairness about market participants, public policies and institutions. However, it is not clear to what these judgments refer, or what moral significance they have. This paper offers a rational reconstruction of competitive fairness in terms of non-domination. It first identifies competitive fairness as a distinctive claim, advanced within markets in turn characterized as antagonistic, instrumental and procedural. It distinguishes competitive fairness from a number of familiar ideals with which it might be confused: legitimate expectation, equality of opportunity, sporting fairness and economic efficiency. While many exponents likely assume competitive fairness can be explained in terms of one of these ideals, in each case there are significant objections to doing so. Instead, the paper argues that the most promising justification of competitive fairness is under the republican ideal of non-domination, which can reconstruct many of the intuitive judgments of competitive fairness that we make in particular cases. However, it concludes, this explanation makes it difficult for exponents to continue to emphasize competitive fairness, given diverse other risks of domination, and to other values, in markets.","PeriodicalId":45971,"journal":{"name":"Politics Philosophy & Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74691890","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Commons, Communes, and Freedom 公地、公社和自由
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Politics Philosophy & Economics Pub Date : 2022-02-14 DOI: 10.1177/1470594X221079055
Harrison Frye
{"title":"Commons, Communes, and Freedom","authors":"Harrison Frye","doi":"10.1177/1470594X221079055","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594X221079055","url":null,"abstract":"Private property rights involve coercion against non-owners in their enforcement. As critics of private property point out, this coercion involves a restriction on freedom. Sometimes, such critics suggest that collective property expands rights of access, and therefore expands freedom relative to private property. Does this follow? This paper argues no. To make this argument, I look at two particular forms of collective property: open-access commons and closed-access communes. Both may give rise to potential threats to freedom. This does not mean that collective property never expands freedom relative to private property. It only means we cannot infer from the fact that collective property rules extend rights of access that collective property expands freedom. The upshot is a need to pay more attention to how different property rights work in practice.","PeriodicalId":45971,"journal":{"name":"Politics Philosophy & Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79942600","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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