{"title":"Policy-Development and Deference to Moral Experts.","authors":"Jakob Elster","doi":"10.1007/s11158-022-09577-w","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s11158-022-09577-w","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The involvement of ethicists, philosophers or others who might qualify as 'moral experts' in policy-development, where they are sometimes, typically as members of a committee, given an advisory role, is often seen as problematic, for several reasons. First, there may be doubts as to the very existence of moral experts, and it may be hard to know who the moral experts are. Next, even if these problems are solved, giving experts a special role in policy-making might be problematic from a democratic point of view, if it involves politicians deferring to the moral judgements of experts. The paper considers possible replies to this problem of moral deference. One reply is that moral deference is unnecessary, because even moral non-experts are well equipped to assess the arguments offered by moral experts; I argue that this reply underestimates the complexity of moral arguments. Another reply is that if moral experts are simply given the 'technical' role of clarifying which concrete positions that follow from the values which decision-makers already accept, deference is not problematic. I will argue that this reply underestimates how a given set of moral values underdetermines which concrete positions follow from it. Finally, I will consider and defend the reply that since policy decisions are subject to a requirement that they be justified within the limits of public reason, and since these limits include a requirement that the justification be accessible, moral experts are barred from providing policy advice which rests on too complex moral arguments.</p>","PeriodicalId":45474,"journal":{"name":"Res Publica-A Journal of Moral Legal and Political Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-02-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9909633/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"10773342","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Right to Break the Law? On the Political Function and Moral Grounds of Civil Disobedience","authors":"Johan Andreas Trovik","doi":"10.1007/s11158-022-09578-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-022-09578-9","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45474,"journal":{"name":"Res Publica-A Journal of Moral Legal and Political Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46310646","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Positional Goods and Social Equality: Examining the Convergence Thesis.","authors":"Devon Cass","doi":"10.1007/s11158-023-09581-8","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s11158-023-09581-8","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Several philosophers argue for the 'convergence thesis' for positional goods: prioritarians, sufficientarians, and egalitarians may converge on favouring an equal (or not too unequal) distribution of goods that have positional aspects. I discuss some problems for this thesis when applied to two key goods for which it has been proposed: education and wealth. I show, however, that there is a variant of the thesis that avoids these problems. This version of the thesis is significant, I demonstrate, because it applies to a person's status as a citizen, which I suggest is the central concern of social or 'relational' egalitarianism.</p>","PeriodicalId":45474,"journal":{"name":"Res Publica-A Journal of Moral Legal and Political Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10409832/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"10327496","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Backward-Looking Principles of Climate Justice: The Unjustified Move from the Polluter Pays Principle to the Beneficiary Pays Principle.","authors":"Laura García-Portela","doi":"10.1007/s11158-022-09569-w","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s11158-022-09569-w","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Climate change involves changes in the climate system caused by polluting human activities and the social and natural effects of these changes. The historical and anthropogenic grounds of climate change play an important role in climate justice claims. Many climate justice scholars believe that principles of climate justice should account for the historical and anthropogenic sources of climate change. Two main backward-looking principles have been proposed: the polluter pays principle (PPP) and the beneficiary pays principle (BPP). The BPP emerged in the literature on climate justice in response to certain objections raised against the PPP. In this paper, I focus on two of these objections: the causation objection and the excusable ignorance objection. Defenders of the BPP have traditionally assumed that this principle is not vulnerable to those objections, which renders the BPP superior to the PPP. In this paper, I challenge this underlying assumption. My argument here is simple: moving from the PPP to the BPP in response to any of these objections might be unjustified because the BPP is affected by at least some of the considerations giving rise to these objections.</p>","PeriodicalId":45474,"journal":{"name":"Res Publica-A Journal of Moral Legal and Political Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10409675/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"10327495","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Why and How Should the European Union Defend its Values?","authors":"Tore Vincents Olsen","doi":"10.1007/s11158-022-09560-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-022-09560-5","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>This article provides a normative framework for evaluating the moral permissibility of various defences of European Union (EU) values against their violation in EU member states. This requires, first, a coherent interpretation of EU values as the values of liberal democracy; second, a clear notion of when they are violated; third, a theory of how liberal democracy can be defended with measures that are consistent with the values of liberal democracy themselves; and, finally, a discussion of what the EU's role is in this defence. The article argues that it would be permissible for the EU to combine a number of political, cultural, socio-economic and legal responses in a concentric defence of liberal democracy as long as they respect the separation of powers doctrine and do not rely on problematic notions of collective responsibility.</p>","PeriodicalId":45474,"journal":{"name":"Res Publica-A Journal of Moral Legal and Political Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9390962/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"10730025","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"How I Would have been Differently Treated. Discrimination Through the Lens of Counterfactual Fairness.","authors":"Michele Loi, Francesco Nappo, Eleonora Viganò","doi":"10.1007/s11158-023-09586-3","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s11158-023-09586-3","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The widespread use of algorithms for prediction-based decisions urges us to consider the question of what it means for a given act or practice to be discriminatory. Building upon work by Kusner and colleagues in the field of machine learning, we propose a counterfactual condition as a necessary requirement on discrimination. To demonstrate the philosophical relevance of the proposed condition, we consider two prominent accounts of discrimination in the recent literature, by Lippert-Rasmussen and Hellman respectively, that do not logically imply our condition and show that they face important objections. Specifically, Lippert-Rasmussen's definition proves to be over-inclusive, as it classifies some acts or practices as discriminatory when they are not, whereas Hellman's account turns out to lack explanatory power precisely insofar as it does not countenance a counterfactual condition on discrimination. By defending the necessity of our counterfactual condition, we set the conceptual limits for justified claims about the occurrence of discriminatory acts or practices in society, with immediate applications to the ethics of algorithmic decision-making.</p>","PeriodicalId":45474,"journal":{"name":"Res Publica-A Journal of Moral Legal and Political Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10203005/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9525575","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Why Conscience Matters: A Theory of Conscience and Its Relevance to Conscientious Objection in Medicine.","authors":"Xavier Symons","doi":"10.1007/s11158-022-09555-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-022-09555-2","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Conscience is an idea that has significant currency in liberal democratic societies. Yet contemporary moral philosophical scholarship on conscience is surprisingly sparse. This paper seeks to offer a rigorous philosophical account of the role of conscience in moral life with a view to informing debates about the ethics of conscientious objection in medicine. I argue that conscience is concerned with a commitment to moral integrity and that restrictions on freedom of conscience prevent agents from living a moral life. In section one I argue that conscience is a principle of moral awareness in rational agents, and that it yields an awareness of the personal nature of moral obligation. Conscience also monitors the coherence between an agent's identity-conferring beliefs and intentions and their practical actions. In section two I consider how human beings are harmed when they are forced to violate their conscience. Restrictions on the exercise of conscience prevent people from living in accord with their own considered understanding of the requirements of morality and undermine one's capacity for moral agency. This article concludes with a consideration of how a robust theory of conscience can inform our understanding of conscientious objection in medicine. I argue that it is in the interest of individual practitioners and the medical profession generally to foster moral agency among doctors. This provides a prima facie justification for permitting at least some kinds of conscientious objection.</p>","PeriodicalId":45474,"journal":{"name":"Res Publica-A Journal of Moral Legal and Political Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9244116/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9294687","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Paternalism and Evidence of Incapacity: Taking Reasons Seriously","authors":"soo-jin kim","doi":"10.1007/s11158-022-09576-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-022-09576-x","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45474,"journal":{"name":"Res Publica-A Journal of Moral Legal and Political Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-12-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49507791","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"What Went Wrong with Saman’s Story? Cultural Practice, Individual Rights, Gender, and Political Polarization","authors":"A. Galeotti, Roberta Sala","doi":"10.1007/s11158-022-09575-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-022-09575-y","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45474,"journal":{"name":"Res Publica-A Journal of Moral Legal and Political Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-12-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44895614","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Christian Schemmel: Justice and Egalitarian Relations","authors":"Daniel Sharp","doi":"10.1007/s11158-022-09573-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-022-09573-0","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45474,"journal":{"name":"Res Publica-A Journal of Moral Legal and Political Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-12-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42876144","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}