{"title":"Compelling Reasons","authors":"Tim Thornton","doi":"10.1353/ppp.2023.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/ppp.2023.0005","url":null,"abstract":"Compelling Reasons Tim Thornton, MA, MPhil, PhD, DLitt (bio) There are many compelling reasons to have an interest in the philosophy of/and psychiatry. In 1994, when persuaded by Bill Fulford to walk down the corridor at Warwick University to join in his teaching of what seemed a newly developing subject—against my protestations that I knew nothing about mental health care—my main interest was in the irreducibility of meaning to the 'realm of [natural scientific] law,' in Sellars's phrase. This had the bonus of complementing Bill's championing of the irreducibility and centrality of values in psychiatry. (It was only later we realized we disagreed about the not inconsequential issue of whether norms and values were subjective preferences or objective features of the world.) It seemed plausible to me that the irreducibility of the space of reasons to the realm of law might have interesting consequences for psychiatry. But mine was a purely disinterested academic interest. This is perhaps the usual approach to what is in part a professionalized academic subject with its formal rules for publication and dissemination of research. It has only been in the last decade that I have experienced things in a more personal way, following what I would term, though psychiatry would not, a nervous breakdown. My image of a breakdown came from reading Saul Bellow's novel Herzog. The titular Herzog has been left by his wife, cruelly, and retires from academic life to write letters. For example, to Heidegger. \"Dear Doktor Professor Heidegger, I should like to know what you mean by the expression 'the fall into the quotidian.' When did this fall occur? Where were we standing when it happened?\" I thought I would be able to maintain some sort of inquiring mind and write experientially grounded philosophy of psychiatry as a catharsis. I could study my own illness. This immediately proved a ridiculous hope. As a philosopher with a cognitivist bent—language, thought, and intentionality being guiding interests—I had always assumed that madness was only really a matter of what Jaspers calls 'primary delusions,' belief-like states that strain their belief-status, are hard for others to make sense of, and occur only with particularly severe forms of mental illness. But madness is also a matter of doing, saying and feeling as well as pure reasoning. What I would, previously and disinterestedly, have described as a dysregulation of emotional reactions turned out to transform my entire experience of the world and my ability to think rationally about it. I lost the ability to put my experiences into words. In truth, I lost all interest in that project. Only when not distressed could I take a view on my loss of world. Distressed, I did not understand myself. This is a neat illustration of epistemic disjunctivism. But it also highlights a challenge for, and some of the brilliance in those who have contributed to, the philosophy of mental health care, through their expertise by exp","PeriodicalId":45397,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy Psychiatry & Psychology","volume":"209 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135131005","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Arguing about Psychiatry: Natural Selection, Austinian Conservatism, and Finding Our Way to the Best","authors":"Joseph Gough","doi":"10.1353/ppp.2023.0010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/ppp.2023.0010","url":null,"abstract":"P rofessors Murphy and Lieberman have offered two generous and interesting commentaries on my article, each very insightful and helpful in its own way, and each offering an interesting alternative characterization of the subject matter of psychiatry. I found each extremely thought-provoking, hence this rather bloated response. I strongly disagree with each. In brief, I disagree with the ‘preliminaries’ of each commentary, struggle to see the tension between Hull’s view of science and my view of psychiatry, reject Lieberman’s appeal to the history of mind-like and mental-illness-like concepts, and finally, believe my position neither suffers from the instability of psychiatry, nor blocks the route to best practice, nor counsels despair. Metaphysical precision and conceptual evolution: response to Murphy","PeriodicalId":45397,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy Psychiatry & Psychology","volume":"1 1","pages":"45 - 51"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89842817","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Future Is Political and Transdisciplinary","authors":"A. Aftab","doi":"10.1353/ppp.2023.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/ppp.2023.0002","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45397,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy Psychiatry & Psychology","volume":"17 1","pages":"5 - 6"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89668647","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Can The Psychopathologized Speak? Notes on Social Objectivity and Psychiatric Science","authors":"A. Aftab","doi":"10.1353/ppp.2022.0045","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/ppp.2022.0045","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45397,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy Psychiatry & Psychology","volume":"28 1","pages":"267 - 270"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87343648","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Socrates' Maieutics and the Ethical Foundations of Psychotherapy","authors":"O. Doerr-Zegers","doi":"10.1353/ppp.2022.0048","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/ppp.2022.0048","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:Since Homeric times, psychotherapy has been an essential part of the medical act. Initially, the word of physicians had a magical character. Plato rationalizes this in many of his dialogues. In \"Charmides,\" he dives deeper into this matter and proposes to apply it to every disease. Analysing this dialogue has fundamental consequences for psychotherapy: 1) Remedy and epodé (charm) must be applied in every doctor–patient relationship. 2) The body can only be healed if the soul is cured first by a charm. Patients must \"offer\" their souls to the physician, which implies the need for confidence and the unavoidable asymmetry which characterize doctor–patient relationships. 3) The openness of the patient's soul to the physician and the physician's \"beautiful speech\" to the patient will enable the latter to reach the state of sophrosyne (temperance), the condition of the possibility of true health. In the discussion of the meaning of sophrosyne, Socrates questions every one of the disciples' propositions and concludes that the only thing one can be sure of is that sophrosyne is a way of searching for virtue (areté). Later, in Theaetetus, Plato adds another element: temperance is a homoiosis theó, that is, the assimilation of patient with God. With this, Plato seals the ethical character of psychotherapy forever.","PeriodicalId":45397,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy Psychiatry & Psychology","volume":"39 1","pages":"279 - 285"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87432229","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}