INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION最新文献_第2页

Another Wittgensteinian response to the evolutionary argument against naturalism 维特根斯坦对进化论反自然主义论点的另一种回应

IF 0.9 3区哲学

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION Pub Date : 2024-02-10 DOI: 10.1007/s11153-024-09904-6

Zoheir Bagheri Noaparast

{"title":"Another Wittgensteinian response to the evolutionary argument against naturalism","authors":"Zoheir Bagheri Noaparast","doi":"10.1007/s11153-024-09904-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-024-09904-6","url":null,"abstract":"In “The evolutionary argument against naturalism: a Wittgensteinian response,” DeVito and McNabb (Int J Philos Relig 92(2):91–98, 2022, 10.1007/s11153-022-09832-3) propose a Wittgensteinian argument against Alvin Plantinga’s evolutionary argument against naturalism. In their paper, they seek to establish symmetry between a component of Plantinga’s premise and the premise of the radical skeptic. The first premise of Plantinga’s argument assumes the possibility of doubting the reliability of our cognitive abilities. The Radical skeptic doubts we have rational grounds to refute being brains in vats. DeVito and McNaab use hinge epistemology and Pritchard’s strategy against the radical skeptic to undermine Plantinga’s premise. This paper offers an alternative argument based on hinge epistemology against Plantinga’s argument. Relying on the various types of certainties Wittgenstein discussed, I argue that some scientific facts are among our certainties and hinges. Evolution (i.e., the theory of evolution by natural selection) is a well-established scientific fact and a hinge. As a result, in Plantinga’s first premise, we have two hinges: evolution and the reliability of our cognitive abilities. I will argue that given that hinges cannot trump one another, we can have these two hinges in place, and therefore, by endorsing hinge epistemology, there is another argument that shows why Plantinga’s argument cannot undermine naturalism if one accepts evolution.","PeriodicalId":45180,"journal":{"name":"INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION","volume":"8 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139769780","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The negative theology of absolute infinity: Cantor, mathematics, and humility 绝对无限的消极神学：康托尔、数学与谦逊

IF 0.9 3区哲学

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION Pub Date : 2024-02-08 DOI: 10.1007/s11153-023-09897-8

Rico Gutschmidt, Merlin Carl

引用次数: 0

On the incoherence of molinism: incompatibility of middle knowledge with divine immutability 论莫利纳主义的不一致性：中间知识与神的永恒性不相容

IF 0.9 3区哲学

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION Pub Date : 2024-02-07 DOI: 10.1007/s11153-024-09906-4

Farid al-Din Sebt, Ebrahim Azadegan, Mahdi Esfahani

{"title":"On the incoherence of molinism: incompatibility of middle knowledge with divine immutability","authors":"Farid al-Din Sebt, Ebrahim Azadegan, Mahdi Esfahani","doi":"10.1007/s11153-024-09906-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-024-09906-4","url":null,"abstract":"We argue that there is an incompatibility between the two basic principles of Molinism, i.e., God’s middle knowledge of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, and divine immutability. To this end, firstly, we set out the difference between strong and weak immutability: according to the latter only God’s essential attributes remain unchanged, while the former affirms that God cannot change in any way. Our next step is to argue that Molinism ascribes strong immutability to God. However, according to Molinism, some counterfactuals of freedom need to be actualized by divine will. We argue that this claim does entail a change in God because it attributes a knowledge to God that involves moving from possibility to actuality through divine will. Therefore, claiming God knows counterfactuals of freedom leads us to reject the strong sense of divine immutability. Further, we argue that assuming God’s knowledge encompasses counterfactuals of freedom cannot be consistent even with weak immutability because, according to Molinism, a change in God’s knowledge requires a change in His essence. We conclude that Molinism is incoherent.","PeriodicalId":45180,"journal":{"name":"INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION","volume":"34 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-02-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139770142","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Spiritual oneness and the cognitive science of religion 精神本体与宗教认知科学

IF 0.9 3区哲学

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION Pub Date : 2024-02-01 DOI: 10.1007/s11153-024-09902-8

Veronica Campos, Daniel De Luca-Noronha

{"title":"Spiritual oneness and the cognitive science of religion","authors":"Veronica Campos, Daniel De Luca-Noronha","doi":"10.1007/s11153-024-09902-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-024-09902-8","url":null,"abstract":"In a 2008 paper, Justin Barrett designed a conceptual scale to measure the level of counterintuitiveness of concepts, “Barrett’s counterintuitiveness coding and quantifying scheme”. According to Barrett, the higher a concept scores in this scale, the more counterintuitive it is. The scale is meant as an auxiliary tool for one of the mainstream theories in the cognitive science of religion, namely, the Minimal Counterintuitiveness Hypothesis. For a concept to be adherent, i.e., to survive across cultures and across time, it has to score points in the counterintuitiveness scale, but it has to score low. Concepts that score too high or that don’t score at all are non-adherent. In this paper the case is made that at least some varieties of religious belief involve concepts that resist accurate measuring. The case study presented here features Spiritual Oneness, the belief that “all things are one”, frequently prompted by mystical experiences and frequently described as being very adherent. We purport that the failure of Barrett’s scale to allow for an examination of the concepts at stake in Spiritual Oneness is to be explained by the fact that the background assumptions about counterintuitiveness underpinning the scale are too narrow.","PeriodicalId":45180,"journal":{"name":"INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION","volume":"34 2-4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139657034","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Time, atemporal existence, and divine temporal consciousness: a bimodalist account for divine consciousness 时间、时空存在与神性时空意识：神性意识的双峰论述

IF 0.9 3区哲学