{"title":"Removing the Oddity in First Degree Entailment","authors":"Andreas Kapsner","doi":"10.1002/THT3.428","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/THT3.428","url":null,"abstract":"I discuss an old problem with first degree entailment (FDE), namely the unintuitive way disjunctions and conjunctions between statements with values B and N are defined. I supply a solution tothis problem that involves a modification of FDE that leaves the philosophical motivation for the logic unharmed. Furthermore, I argue that this modification allows us to incorporate the philosophical core idea of exactly true logic without leading to the unusual inferential behavior of that logic.","PeriodicalId":44963,"journal":{"name":"Thought-A Journal of Philosophy","volume":"22 5","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2019-08-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1002/THT3.428","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50986547","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Relativizing Identity","authors":"Daniel Molto","doi":"10.1002/tht3.430","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.430","url":null,"abstract":": In this paper, I defend Peter Geach’s theory of Relative Identity against the charge that it cannot make sense of basic semantic notions.","PeriodicalId":44963,"journal":{"name":"Thought-A Journal of Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2019-08-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1002/tht3.430","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42974221","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Immigration and Rights: On Wellman's “Stark” Conclusion","authors":"Campbell Brown","doi":"10.1002/THT3.426","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/THT3.426","url":null,"abstract":"Wellman defends what he calls a \"stark\" conclusion on the ethics of immigration. This paper presents a dilemma for Wellman. His conclusion can be interpreted in two ways. On one interpretation, the conclusion is not really stark, but rather uncontroversial. On the other interpretation, the conclusion is not supported by his arguments.","PeriodicalId":44963,"journal":{"name":"Thought-A Journal of Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2019-07-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1002/THT3.426","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48473901","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Knowledge From Falsehood: An Experimental Study","authors":"John Turri","doi":"10.1002/THT3.417","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/THT3.417","url":null,"abstract":"Philosophers have debated whether it is possible to knowledgeably infer a conclusion from a false premise. For example, if a fan believes that the actress’s dress is blue, but the dress is actually green, can the fan knowledgeably infer “the dress is not red” from “the dress is blue”? One aspect of this debate concerns what the intuitively correct verdict is about specific cases such as this. Here I report a simple behavioral experiment that helps answer this question. The main finding is that people attribute knowledge in cases where a true conclusion is inferred from a false premise. People did this despite judging that the premise was false and unknown. People also viewed the agent as inferring the conclusion from the premise. In closely matched conditions where the conclusion was false, people did not attribute knowledge of the conclusion. These results support the view that the ordinary knowledge concept includes in its extension cases of knowledge inferred from false premises.","PeriodicalId":44963,"journal":{"name":"Thought-A Journal of Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2019-06-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1002/THT3.417","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42714853","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Alexander Gebharter, Dennis Graemer, Frenzis H. Scheffels
{"title":"Establishing Backward Causation on Empirical Grounds: An Interventionist Approach","authors":"Alexander Gebharter, Dennis Graemer, Frenzis H. Scheffels","doi":"10.1002/THT3.414","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/THT3.414","url":null,"abstract":"We propose an analysis of backward causation in terms of interventionism that can avoid several problems typically associated with backward causation. Its main advantage over other accounts is that it allows for reducing the problematic task of supporting backward causal claims to the unproblematic task of finding evidence for several ordinary forward directed causal hypotheses.","PeriodicalId":44963,"journal":{"name":"Thought-A Journal of Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2019-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1002/THT3.414","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41387088","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Hedonism, Desirability and the Incompleteness Objection","authors":"V. Andrić","doi":"10.1002/THT3.410","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/THT3.410","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44963,"journal":{"name":"Thought-A Journal of Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2019-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1002/THT3.410","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44363671","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Demystifying the Mystery Room","authors":"S. Wenmackers","doi":"10.1002/THT3.408","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/THT3.408","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44963,"journal":{"name":"Thought-A Journal of Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2019-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1002/THT3.408","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48684294","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Paradox Involving Representational States and Activities","authors":"B. Myers","doi":"10.1002/THT3.409","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/THT3.409","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44963,"journal":{"name":"Thought-A Journal of Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2019-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1002/THT3.409","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46749162","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Knowing Without Having The Competence to Do So","authors":"Jaakko Hirvelä","doi":"10.1002/THT3.411","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/THT3.411","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44963,"journal":{"name":"Thought-A Journal of Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2019-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1002/THT3.411","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48581775","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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