{"title":"In the logic of certainty, ⊃ is stronger than ⇒","authors":"Kurt Norlin","doi":"10.1002/tht3.443","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.443","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44963,"journal":{"name":"Thought-A Journal of Philosophy","volume":"9 1","pages":"58-63"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1002/tht3.443","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48098140","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Ruling out solutions to Prior's dilemma for Hume's law","authors":"Aaron Wolf","doi":"10.1002/tht3.445","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.445","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44963,"journal":{"name":"Thought-A Journal of Philosophy","volume":"9 1","pages":"84-93"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-02-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1002/tht3.445","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47213833","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"How to build a thought","authors":"Joshua Rasmussen, Andrew M. Bailey","doi":"10.1002/tht3.444","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.444","url":null,"abstract":"Correspondence Joshua Rasmussen, Department of Philosophy, Azusa Pacific University, 701 E Foothill Blvd, Azusa, CA 91702. Email: jrasmus1@gmail.com Abstract We uncover a surprising discovery about the basis of thoughts. We begin by giving some plausible axioms about thoughts and their grounds. We then deduce a theorem, which has dramatic ramifications for the basis of all thoughts. The theorem implies that thoughts cannot come deterministically from any purely “thoughtless” states. We expect this result to be too dramatic for many philosophers. Hence, we proceed to investigate the prospect of giving up the axioms. We show that each axiom's negation itself has dramatic consequences that should be of interest to philosophers of mind. Our proof of the theorem provides a new guiderail for thinking about the nature and origin of thoughts.","PeriodicalId":44963,"journal":{"name":"Thought-A Journal of Philosophy","volume":"9 1","pages":"75-83"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-02-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1002/tht3.444","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44911864","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The argument from sideways music","authors":"Sayid R. Bnefsi","doi":"10.1002/tht3.439","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.439","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44963,"journal":{"name":"Thought-A Journal of Philosophy","volume":"9 1","pages":"64-69"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-01-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1002/tht3.439","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47426513","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"What it takes to be hunky","authors":"Daniel Giberman","doi":"10.1002/tht3.442","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.442","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44963,"journal":{"name":"Thought-A Journal of Philosophy","volume":"9 1","pages":"51-57"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-01-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1002/tht3.442","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46653120","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Moral understanding and moral illusions","authors":"D. Wilkenfeld","doi":"10.1002/tht3.438","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.438","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44963,"journal":{"name":"Thought-A Journal of Philosophy","volume":"9 1","pages":"25-33"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-01-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1002/tht3.438","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48577411","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The accident of logical constants","authors":"T. Haze","doi":"10.1002/tht3.440","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.440","url":null,"abstract":"Work on the nature and scope of formal logic has focused unduly on the distinction between logical and extra-logical vocabulary; which argument forms a logical theory countenances depends not only on its stock of logical terms, but also on its range of grammatical categories and modes of composition. Furthermore, there is a sense in which logical terms are unnecessary. Alexandra Zinke has recently pointed out that propositional logic can be done without logical terms. By defining a logical-term-free language with the full expressive power of first-order logic with identity, I show that this is true of logic more generally. Further-more, having, in a logical theory, non-trivial valid forms that do not involve logical terms is not merely a technical possibility. As the case of adverbs shows, issues about the range of argument forms logic should countenance can quite naturally arise in such a way that they do not turn on whether we countenance certain terms as logical. like “ is to be explained by reference to the meanings of the particular expressions occurring in them? We a clue in an idea, from Davidson (1973, but finds of via recursive base We is syncategorematic — that is, by that a meaning in a broad","PeriodicalId":44963,"journal":{"name":"Thought-A Journal of Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-01-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1002/tht3.440","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43851892","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}