{"title":"Escaping Stalemate","authors":"Keir A. Lieber, Daryl G. Press","doi":"10.7591/cornell/9781501749292.003.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501749292.003.0004","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter analyzes the durability of stalemate. It investigates whether the situation can be reversed once countries reach the point where neither can disarm the other. For geopolitical competition to be greatly mitigated, the path to stalemate must be a one-way street. If the opposite were true, then even the achievement of stalemate would not eliminate competitive dynamics. The chapter shows that the survivability of nuclear arsenals has varied over time. During the later decades of the Cold War, it seemed that the superpowers were permanently locked into stalemate. It talks about “counterforce” attacks that are aimed at disarming the enemy's nuclear forces and appeared impossible because the superpower arsenals were enormous and dispersed, and some weapons seemed impossible to find.","PeriodicalId":448776,"journal":{"name":"The Myth of the Nuclear Revolution","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124724887","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Introduction: The Nuclear Puzzle","authors":"Keir A. Lieber, Daryl G. Press","doi":"10.1515/9781501749315-002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/9781501749315-002","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":448776,"journal":{"name":"The Myth of the Nuclear Revolution","volume":"201 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122587337","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Power Politics in the Nuclear Age","authors":"Keir A. Lieber, Daryl G. Press","doi":"10.7591/cornell/9781501749292.003.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501749292.003.0002","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter describes the unique attributes of nuclear weapons that make them the most effective instruments of deterrence ever created. It discusses the intensely competitive nature of international politics that has endured despite the nuclear stalemate. Stalemate exists when neither adversary in a war can escape destruction and emerge victorious in any practical sense of the term. The chapter talks about the Clausewitzian definition of war as an extension of politics, by which other means becomes an absurdity since no rational goal of statecraft can entail suicidal destruction. It emphasizes why strategic stalemate should not only deter war but also allow countries to abandon a wide range of costly and risky policies designed to increase their security.","PeriodicalId":448776,"journal":{"name":"The Myth of the Nuclear Revolution","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130831241","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}