{"title":"Technical codes’potentialities in cybersecurity. A contextual approach on the ethics of small digital organizations in France","authors":"Théo Simon, B. Venard","doi":"10.1109/CyberSecurity49315.2020.9138895","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CyberSecurity49315.2020.9138895","url":null,"abstract":"With the proliferation of malware and phishing attacks, information security has become a major challenge for companies. Organizations of all sizes have had to develop efficient cybersecurity strategies. Part of the literature has explained the growing cyber risks by the human factor such as the mistakes of users. Our aim is to analyze the user’s cybersecurity ethics in their working context. We used the Feenberg’s concepts of technical codes’ potentialities to critically interpret the technical codes of users. We found three technical codes representing a variety of dimensions and combined a diversity of point of view about cybersecurity ethics: interest, values and priorities. These technical codes allow us to uncover alternative representations of user’s ethics and to think critically on the way researchers, practitioners and information security specialists view and imagine the future of information security among small organizations. Our empirical findings are based on a critical qualitative research among small organizations with similar cybersecurity systems in France.","PeriodicalId":448688,"journal":{"name":"2020 International Conference on Cyber Security and Protection of Digital Services (Cyber Security)","volume":"190 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128643639","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Sebastião Rogério da Silva Neto, Thomás Tabosa de Oliveira, V. Sampaio, Theo Lynn, P. Endo
{"title":"Platform for monitoring and clinical diagnosis of arboviruses using computational models","authors":"Sebastião Rogério da Silva Neto, Thomás Tabosa de Oliveira, V. Sampaio, Theo Lynn, P. Endo","doi":"10.1109/CyberSecurity49315.2020.9138880","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CyberSecurity49315.2020.9138880","url":null,"abstract":"As part of SDG, the members of the UN aim to end epidemics of neglected tropical diseases by 2030. These include wide range communicable diseases that prevail in tropical and subtropical conditions. These diseases are present in over 149 countries worldwide and are a significant burden on health systems and economies. One major category of neglected tropical disease are arthropod-borne viruses or arboviruses including West Nile virus, yellow fever, dengue, chikungunya and Zika. Arboviruses spread rapidly and as they present very similar symptoms, it is hard to diagnose and select the best treatment. The use of machine learning for the diagnosis and prognosis of these diseases has become increasingly common however there is a paucity of research on deep learning and associated decision support platforms for frontline staff. This work-in-progress proposes a platform for arbovirus monitoring and clinical diagnosis using deep learning models.","PeriodicalId":448688,"journal":{"name":"2020 International Conference on Cyber Security and Protection of Digital Services (Cyber Security)","volume":"120 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128120337","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Inger Anne Tøndel, Ravishankar Borgaonkar, M. Jaatun, Christian Frøystad
{"title":"What Could Possibly Go Wrong? Smart Grid Misuse Case Scenarios","authors":"Inger Anne Tøndel, Ravishankar Borgaonkar, M. Jaatun, Christian Frøystad","doi":"10.1109/CyberSecurity49315.2020.9138892","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CyberSecurity49315.2020.9138892","url":null,"abstract":"The modernisation of the power grid is ongoing, and the level of digitalisation of the power grid in, say, ten years may be quite different than today. Cyber security needs will change correspondingly. In this paper we utilise a qualitative research approach to explore misuse cases related to three main areas of modernisation that we envision for the next ten year period: 1) managing flexibility in the TSO-DSO relation, 2) smart distribution grids, and 3) microgrids. The misuse cases represent potential security challenges to be considered when working on modernising the grid, however they are not exhaustive. The misuse cases presented in this paper can contribute to identifying security requirements, thus reducing associated cyber risks, and assist in development of new cyber security mechanisms for the next-generation power grid employing digitally-connected, self-healing, and automation characteristics.","PeriodicalId":448688,"journal":{"name":"2020 International Conference on Cyber Security and Protection of Digital Services (Cyber Security)","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121254622","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Shouting Through Letterboxes: A study on attack susceptibility of voice assistants","authors":"Andrew McCarthy, Benedict R. Gaster, Phil Legg","doi":"10.1109/CyberSecurity49315.2020.9138860","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CyberSecurity49315.2020.9138860","url":null,"abstract":"Voice assistants such as Amazon Echo and Google Home have become increasingly popular for many home users, for home automation, entertainment, and convenience. These devices process speech commands from a user to execute some action, such as playing music, making online purchases, or triggering home automation such as lights or security locks. The process of mapping speech input to a text command is performed using a machine learning model. In this study, we explore the concept of how voice assistants could be exploited, where genuine audio commands are manipulated such that an attacker could trigger alternative responses from the voice assistant. We present a small-scale study to examine mis-interpretations made by voice assistants. We also study user perception of how secure their voice devices are, and their approach to security and privacy.","PeriodicalId":448688,"journal":{"name":"2020 International Conference on Cyber Security and Protection of Digital Services (Cyber Security)","volume":"87 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125914484","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Using Amazon Alexa APIs as a Source of Digital Evidence","authors":"Clemens Krueger, Sean McKeown","doi":"10.1109/CyberSecurity49315.2020.9138849","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CyberSecurity49315.2020.9138849","url":null,"abstract":"With the release of Amazon Alexa and the first Amazon Echo device, the company revolutionised the smart home. It allowed their users to communicate with, and control, their smart home ecosystem purely using voice commands. However, this also means that Amazon processes and stores a large amount of personal data about their users, as these devices are always present and always listening in peoples’ private homes. That makes this data a valuable source of evidence for investigators performing digital forensics. The Alexa Voice Service uses a series of APIs for communication between clients and the Amazon cloud. These APIs return a wide range of data related to the functionality of the device used.The first goal of this research was to clarify exactly what kind of information about the user is stored and accessible through these APIs. To do this, a combination of literature review and exploratory analysis was used to establish a list of all relevant APIs. Then, possible artefacts and conclusions to be drawn from their responses were identified and presented. Lastly, the perspective of the users was taken, and options for improving their privacy were reviewed. Specifically, the history of interaction between the user and Alexa is available through multiple APIs, and there are several options to delete it. It was determined that these options have different behaviours and that most of them do not remove all data related to user interaction.","PeriodicalId":448688,"journal":{"name":"2020 International Conference on Cyber Security and Protection of Digital Services (Cyber Security)","volume":"136 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116389603","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Restricting Data Flows to Secure Against Remote Attack","authors":"John B. O’Raw, D. Laverty","doi":"10.1109/CyberSecurity49315.2020.9138875","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CyberSecurity49315.2020.9138875","url":null,"abstract":"Fully securing networks from remote attacks is recognized by the IT industry as a critical and imposing challenge. Even highly secure systems remain vulnerable to attacks and advanced persistent threats. Air-gapped networks may be secure from remote attack. One-way flows are a novel approach to improving the security of telemetry for critical infrastructure, retaining some of the benefits of interconnectivity whilst maintaining a level of network security analogous to that of unconnected devices. Simple and inexpensive techniques can be used to provide this unidirectional security, removing the risk of remote attack from a range of potential targets and subnets. The application of one-way networks is demonstrated using IEEE compliant PMU data streams as a case study. Scalability is demonstrated using SDN techniques. Finally, these techniques are combined, demonstrating a node which can be secured from remote attack, within defined limitations.","PeriodicalId":448688,"journal":{"name":"2020 International Conference on Cyber Security and Protection of Digital Services (Cyber Security)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130271867","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Automated Artefact Relevancy Determination from Artefact Metadata and Associated Timeline Events","authors":"Xiaoyu Du, Quan Le, M. Scanlon","doi":"10.1109/CyberSecurity49315.2020.9138874","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CyberSecurity49315.2020.9138874","url":null,"abstract":"Case-hindering, multi-year digital forensic evidence backlogs have become commonplace in law enforcement agencies throughout the world. This is due to an ever-growing number of cases requiring digital forensic investigation coupled with the growing volume of data to be processed per case. Leveraging previously processed digital forensic cases and their component artefact relevancy classifications can facilitate an opportunity for training automated artificial intelligence based evidence processing systems. These can significantly aid investigators in the discovery and prioritisation of evidence. This paper presents one approach for file artefact relevancy determination building on the growing trend towards a centralised, Digital Forensics as a Service (DFaaS) paradigm. This approach enables the use of previously encountered pertinent files to classify newly discovered files in an investigation. Trained models can aid in the detection of these files during the acquisition stage, i.e., during their upload to a DFaaS system. The technique generates a relevancy score for file similarity using each artefact’s filesystem metadata and associated timeline events. The approach presented is validated against three experimental usage scenarios.","PeriodicalId":448688,"journal":{"name":"2020 International Conference on Cyber Security and Protection of Digital Services (Cyber Security)","volume":"81 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124849002","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Automated Vulnerability Testing via Executable Attack Graphs","authors":"Drew Malzahn, Zachary Birnbaum, Cimone Wright-Hamor","doi":"10.1109/CyberSecurity49315.2020.9138852","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CyberSecurity49315.2020.9138852","url":null,"abstract":"Cyber risk assessments are an essential process for analyzing and prioritizing security issues. Unfortunately, many risk assessment methodologies are marred by human subjectivity, resulting in non-repeatable, inconsistent findings. The absence of repeatable and consistent results can lead to suboptimal decision making with respect to cyber risk reduction. There is a pressing need to reduce cyber risk assessment uncertainty by using tools that use well defined inputs, producing well defined results. This paper presents Automated Vulnerability and Risk Analysis (AVRA), an end-to-end process and tool for identifying and exploiting vulnerabilities, designed for use in cyber risk assessments. The approach presented is more comprehensive than traditional vulnerability scans due to its analysis of an entire network, integrating both host and network information. AVRA automatically generates a detailed model of the network and its individual components, which is used to create an attack graph. Then, AVRA follows individual attack paths, automatically launching exploits to reach a particular objective. AVRA was successfully tested within a virtual environment to demonstrate practicality and usability. The presented approach and resulting system enhances the cyber risk assessment process through rigor, repeatability, and objectivity.","PeriodicalId":448688,"journal":{"name":"2020 International Conference on Cyber Security and Protection of Digital Services (Cyber Security)","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129218896","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"An Empirical Study of CERT Capacity in the North Sea","authors":"M. Jaatun, L. Bodsberg, T. Grøtan, M. Moe","doi":"10.1109/CyberSecurity49315.2020.9138865","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CyberSecurity49315.2020.9138865","url":null,"abstract":"This paper documents the results of an empirical study of cyber incident response readiness in the Norwegian petroleum industry. The study addressed the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) capacity among various actors in the industry in handling critical cybersecurity incidents in industrial control and safety systems, with a focus on Operational Technology (OT) systems. The paper presents results from interviews with personnel in petroleum companies as well as interviews with national and international CERT actors. The informants in the petroleum industry are relatively satisfied with their own CERT capacity today, but it is acknowledged that one can always improve. Oil and gas companies and drilling companies share information and experience in various (virtual) meeting places and forums organized by external actors, but there is little focus, especially among the smaller companies, on systematic sharing of information and experiences of cyber incidents. There is a strong need for coordinating and harmonizing cybersecurity in IT and OT systems, as there are significant differences in terminology, maturity of technical solutions and culture today. CERT actors pointed out a need for better communication and contact between CERT actors and key persons within the companies, something that could be accomplished with the establishment of a petroleum sector Information Sharing and Analysis Centre (ISAC).","PeriodicalId":448688,"journal":{"name":"2020 International Conference on Cyber Security and Protection of Digital Services (Cyber Security)","volume":"103 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116031827","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Christopher Kelly, N. Pitropakis, Sean McKeown, C. Lambrinoudakis
{"title":"Testing And Hardening IoT Devices Against the Mirai Botnet","authors":"Christopher Kelly, N. Pitropakis, Sean McKeown, C. Lambrinoudakis","doi":"10.1109/CyberSecurity49315.2020.9138887","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CyberSecurity49315.2020.9138887","url":null,"abstract":"A large majority of cheap Internet of Things (IoT) devices that arrive brand new, and are configured with out-of-the- box settings, are not being properly secured by the manufactures, and are vulnerable to existing malware lurking on the Internet. Among them is the Mirai botnet which has had its source code leaked to the world, allowing any malicious actor to configure and unleash it. A combination of software assets not being utilised safely and effectively are exposing consumers to a full compromise. We configured and attacked 4 different IoT devices using the Mirai libraries. Our experiments concluded that three out of the four devices were vulnerable to the Mirai malware and became infected when deployed using their default configuration. This demonstrates that the original security configurations are not sufficient to provide acceptable levels of protection for consumers, leaving their devices exposed and vulnerable. By analysing the Mirai libraries and its attack vectors, we were able to determine appropriate device configuration countermeasures to harden the devices against this botnet, which were successfully validated through experimentation.","PeriodicalId":448688,"journal":{"name":"2020 International Conference on Cyber Security and Protection of Digital Services (Cyber Security)","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126545957","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}