American Bankruptcy Law Journal最新文献_第3页

Litigation of Employee Loans as a Labour Dispute: Comparing the Law and Practice in Nigeria with other Jurisdictions 作为劳资纠纷的雇员贷款诉讼:尼日利亚与其他司法管辖区的法律与实践比较

3区社会学

American Bankruptcy Law Journal Pub Date : 2020-01-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3512518

Michael Dugeri

引用次数: 0

Interpretation of Financial Creditor and Operational Creditor 金融债权人与经营债权人的解释

3区社会学

American Bankruptcy Law Journal Pub Date : 2020-01-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3702815

Riyanka Jain

引用次数: 0

How Legal and Institutional Environments Shape the Private Debt Renegotiation Process? 法律和制度环境如何影响私人债务重新谈判进程?

3区社会学

American Bankruptcy Law Journal Pub Date : 2019-12-08 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3500404

Christophe J. Godlewski

引用次数: 11

The Role of Consent in Cross-Border Insolvency Proceedings: European and Comparative Perspectives From the Unilateral Undertaking Under Article 36 EIRR 同意在跨境破产程序中的作用:基于EIRR第36条的单方面承诺的欧洲和比较视角

3区社会学

American Bankruptcy Law Journal Pub Date : 2019-12-02 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3553754

M. Gaboardi

{"title":"The Role of Consent in Cross-Border Insolvency Proceedings: European and Comparative Perspectives From the Unilateral Undertaking Under Article 36 EIRR","authors":"M. Gaboardi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3553754","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3553754","url":null,"abstract":"Properly balancing between public and private interests is one of the most significant and complex challenges presented by modern insolvency law. The European Union insolvency law has recently embraced that challenge, by reinforcing the role that private actors, such as creditors and stakeholders, are called upon to play within the context of insolvency proceedings. That approach to insolvency has gradually reduced the impact of public actors, such as judges and public officers, in managing the debtor’s financial difficulties. The individual consent seems to be the new way of facing the debtor’s insolvency. First, this Article examines the role of individual consent in insolvency proceedings in terms of economic efficiency. It focuses on the tendency to favor agreements between the debtor and creditors or the insolvency practitioner in several European legal systems when they increase the likelihood to produce efficient results for both the parties. The second part of this Article focuses on the European Regulation on cross-border insolvency proceedings no. 848/2015. I offer some critical thoughts about the unilateral undertaking under article 36 of the European Regulation. It represents a relevant means of managing the debtor’s cross-border insolvency through an agreement between the insolvency practitioner in the main insolvency proceedings and local creditors in order to avoid the opening of inefficient secondary proceedings.","PeriodicalId":44862,"journal":{"name":"American Bankruptcy Law Journal","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81962635","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The Italian Insolvency Law Reform 意大利破产法改革

3区社会学

American Bankruptcy Law Journal Pub Date : 2019-11-23 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3492422

A. Zorzi

引用次数: 1

Dismantling Bondholder Rights 拆解债券持有人权利

3区社会学

American Bankruptcy Law Journal Pub Date : 2019-10-21 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3473212

Yesha Yadav

{"title":"Dismantling Bondholder Rights","authors":"Yesha Yadav","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3473212","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3473212","url":null,"abstract":"Totaling in excess of $100 billion dollars in transactions annually, debt buybacks allow a company to repurchase bonds from investors, rewriting bargains and stripping away creditor control rights in the process. This Article shows that regulation systematically under-protects bondholders in the context of debt buybacks. It makes three points. First, bondholders confront information asymmetries that enable issuers to buy back creditor claims cheaply. Regulation imposes near negligible requirements on issuers to disclose information about the transaction. Lacking fiduciary protection, bondholder interests are vulnerable to being extinguished by issuers in the interests of promoting those of shareholders and managers. Second, buybacks diminish the power of creditor control rights. Alongside information asymmetries, bondholders confront coordination costs and tight deadlines within which to evaluate the terms of a buyback and changes to bondholder control rights. Owing to these costs, issuers can systematically underprice control rights. Bondholders will not act where the gains of agitation will be less than the cost of information gathering, coordination, and action. By strategically underpricing a buyback by an amount approximating these transaction costs, an issuer can pocket the difference between the price paid for the claim and that which should have been paid to bondholders for their bargain. Third, debt buybacks can allow one set of creditors (notably, banks) to extract value from bondholders. By pushing an issuer to buy back bond claims cheaply, banks (usually with greater individual exposure through loans) can increase their chances of being repaid. They can also acquire a more powerful voice in the issuer’s internal governance by muting that of bondholders. In concluding, this Article offers two proposals to bolster bondholder protection, advocating for greater disclosure and contractual fixes to safeguard the value of claims. These proposals help to preserve the welfare of investors and protect their longer-term confidence in debt capital allocation.","PeriodicalId":44862,"journal":{"name":"American Bankruptcy Law Journal","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75537267","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Reprofiling Today for a Sustainable Tomorrow: A Unilateral Italian Debt Restructuring 为可持续的明天重塑今天:意大利单方面债务重组

3区社会学

American Bankruptcy Law Journal Pub Date : 2019-04-12 DOI: 10.1093/CMLJ/KMAA007

Emma Cervantes, Victoria Dodev, Shane Ellement, Isabelle Sawhney

{"title":"Reprofiling Today for a Sustainable Tomorrow: A Unilateral Italian Debt Restructuring","authors":"Emma Cervantes, Victoria Dodev, Shane Ellement, Isabelle Sawhney","doi":"10.1093/CMLJ/KMAA007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/CMLJ/KMAA007","url":null,"abstract":"Italy should unilaterally extend maturities for its domestic government securities to facilitate an orderly and streamlined restructuring that provides Italy with necessary debt relief. \u0000 \u0000Italy’s domestic government securities are issued as decrees under a 2003 Consolidated Act (the “Act”). Article 3 of the Act explicitly grants Italy the power to unilaterally extend maturities for all domestic government securities. To exercise this restructuring power, the Ministry of Economy and Finance (the “Ministry”) must issue a framework decree that authorizes the Treasury to unilaterally reprofile Italy’s debt. \u0000 \u0000In 2011, Edelen et al. first proposed that Italy had the authority under its existing laws to unilaterally reprofile its sovereign debt. The following proposal expands upon and updates the Edelen et al. proposal. It demonstrates that the inclusion of the Collective Action Clauses (“CACs”) in some of its bonds does not foreclose the use of Italy’s Article 3 power. The proposal also describes the mechanics by which Italy would exercise its right to extend maturities. Unilaterally extending maturities does not require any retroactive utilization of the local law advantage. Nor does it expose Italy to significant legal risks in its domestic courts or under European treaties and conventions.","PeriodicalId":44862,"journal":{"name":"American Bankruptcy Law Journal","volume":"223 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79974550","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Index 指数

3区社会学

American Bankruptcy Law Journal Pub Date : 2019-03-31 DOI: 10.1017/9781316711484.009

引用次数: 0

Consumer Bankruptcy Theory and the Case for Debt Relief 消费者破产理论与债务减免案例

3区社会学

American Bankruptcy Law Journal Pub Date : 2019-03-31 DOI: 10.1017/9781316711484.003

引用次数: 0

Financialised Capitalism and the Centrality of Household Debt 金融化的资本主义和家庭债务的中心地位

3区社会学

American Bankruptcy Law Journal Pub Date : 2019-03-31 DOI: 10.1017/9781316711484.002

引用次数: 0