SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY最新文献_第8页

Larval intelligence: Approaching AI in terms of Deleuze’s “system of the dissolved self” 幼虫智能:从德勒兹的“溶解自我系统”来看人工智能

IF 0.4 3区哲学

SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2021-04-03 DOI: 10.1080/02580136.2021.1933724

J. Kruger

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引用次数: 0

Moral risks and government policy in South Africa in the context of 4IR 第四次工业革命背景下南非的道德风险与政府政策

IF 0.4 3区哲学

SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2021-04-03 DOI: 10.1080/02580136.2021.1921933

John M. Ostrowick

引用次数: 1

Is a sensation a concept-involving object? 感觉是一个涉及物体的概念吗？

IF 0.4 3区哲学

SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2021-01-02 DOI: 10.1080/02580136.2021.1891800

Haiqiang Dai

引用次数: 0

Rethinking history and potentiality: Across Aristotle, Hegel, and Heidegger 重新思考历史和潜力:横跨亚里士多德、黑格尔和海德格尔

IF 0.4 3区哲学

SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2021-01-02 DOI: 10.1080/02580136.2020.1871565

Jake Khawaja

引用次数: 0

Active citizenship in contemporary democratic practice in Africa: Challenges and prospects 当代非洲民主实践中的积极公民身份：挑战和前景

IF 0.4 3区哲学

SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2021-01-02 DOI: 10.1080/02580136.2021.1885908

T. Chando

引用次数: 1

Wiredu and Eze on consensual democracy and the question of consensual rationality 魏杜和埃兹论共识民主和共识理性问题

IF 0.4 3区哲学

SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2021-01-02 DOI: 10.1080/02580136.2020.1871567

Husein Inusah

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引用次数: 0

Promoting stability and peace in multi-ethnic African countries by reducing the marginalisation of ethnic minorities 通过减少少数民族边缘化，促进非洲多民族国家的稳定与和平

IF 0.4 3区哲学

SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2021-01-02 DOI: 10.1080/02580136.2021.1885911

K. Kalumba

引用次数: 0

New Conversations on the Problems of Identity, Consciousness and Mind 身份、意识和心灵问题的新对话

IF 0.4 3区哲学

SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2021-01-02 DOI: 10.1080/02580136.2021.1885909

M. Enyimba

引用次数: 1

Here’s not looking at you, kid: A new defence of anti-natalism 这不是在看你，孩子:反生育主义的新辩护

IF 0.4 3区哲学

SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2021-01-02 DOI: 10.1080/02580136.2020.1871566

Blake Hereth, Anthony Ferrucci

{"title":"Here’s not looking at you, kid: A new defence of anti-natalism","authors":"Blake Hereth, Anthony Ferrucci","doi":"10.1080/02580136.2020.1871566","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02580136.2020.1871566","url":null,"abstract":"Anti-natalism is the view that persons ought morally to refrain from procreation. We offer a new argument for a principled version of anti-natalism according to which it is always impermissible to procreate in the actual world since doing so will violate the right to physical security of future, created persons once those persons exist and have the right. First, we argue that procreators can be responsible for non-trivial harms that befall future persons even if they do not cause them and if the harms are temporally delayed, provided the harms are reasonably foreseeable by procreators. For example, consider a case in which we can create a person in a room that is dangerously aflame. It would be wrong to do so since, once the person exists, they have a right that we avoid being morally responsible for unjust harms to them, and the fire in which we created them is one such unjust harm. Second, we argue that procreators are responsible for unjust harms that befall their children, since many non-trivial physical harms (e.g. broken bones, lower respiratory illnesses) are reasonably foreseeable by procreators. Thus, parents wrong their children by creating them. Third, we argue that procreators are also responsible for the unjust harms their children commit against others, since it is reasonably foreseeable that every person will inflict unjust, non-trivial physical harms on someone else. But this is worse since parents thereby share in their child’s future culpable intent. Finally, we consider a number of objections to anti-natalism and argue that none of them succeed against anti-natalism generally or against our argument grounded in the right to physical security.","PeriodicalId":44834,"journal":{"name":"SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"40 1","pages":"14 - 33"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/02580136.2020.1871566","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45106824","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 4

Civil disobedience outside of the liberal democratic framework: The case of Sudan 自由民主框架之外的公民抗命:以苏丹为例

IF 0.4 3区哲学

SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2020-10-01 DOI: 10.1080/02580136.2020.1839834

Yeelen Badona Monteiro

{"title":"Civil disobedience outside of the liberal democratic framework: The case of Sudan","authors":"Yeelen Badona Monteiro","doi":"10.1080/02580136.2020.1839834","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02580136.2020.1839834","url":null,"abstract":"Civil disobedience is a form of protest consisting in an act contrary to law, whose aim is to bring about a change in laws or policies deemed unjust. In the traditional Western philosophical debate, civil disobedience was mainly discussed and justified within the boundaries of a democratic regime. John Rawls’ theory of civil disobedience is explicitly based on this liberal assumption. He conceptualises civil disobedience as a public, nonviolent, conscientious and political breach of the law, only appropriate to nearly just societies, hence to democratic regimes. This article intends to question Rawls’ premise by considering civil disobedience from a different perspective: when it is undertaken outside of a nearly just framework, precisely in not fully democratic contexts, such as the so-called “anocracies”, regimes that mix democratic and autocratic traits. The emblematic case of Sudan’s most recent actions of civil disobedience is examined to argue that, contrary to the liberal conceptualisation, civil disobedience does have a role and appropriateness in frameworks of this kind, where the aim is not only to oppose unjust laws or policies, but also to achieve a broader structural change through rigorously nonviolent forms of political action.","PeriodicalId":44834,"journal":{"name":"SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"39 1","pages":"376 - 386"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/02580136.2020.1839834","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48470797","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0