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Expressive Law and Escalating Penalties: Accounting for the Educational Function of Punishment 表达法与惩罚的递进:对惩罚教育功能的解释
Review of Law & Economics Pub Date : 2023-06-12 DOI: 10.1515/rle-2023-0015
Thomas J. Miceli
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引用次数: 0
Expressive Law and Escalating Penalties: Accounting for the Educational Function of Punishment 表达法与惩罚的递进:对惩罚教育功能的解释
IF 0.3
Review of Law & Economics Pub Date : 2023-06-12 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.4246534
Thomas J. Miceli
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引用次数: 1
Stricter Community Supervision, More Recidivism? An Ego-Depletion Theory 社区监督更严，累犯率更高?自我损耗理论
IF 0.3
Review of Law & Economics Pub Date : 2023-05-30 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.4404989
Murat C. Mungan
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引用次数: 0
Collusive Bidding, Competition Law, and Welfare 串通投标、竞争法与福利
Review of Law & Economics Pub Date : 2023-05-30 DOI: 10.1515/rle-2022-0042
Shubhashis Gangopadhyay, Aineas Mallios, Stefan Sjögren
{"title":"Collusive Bidding, Competition Law, and Welfare","authors":"Shubhashis Gangopadhyay, Aineas Mallios, Stefan Sjögren","doi":"10.1515/rle-2022-0042","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2022-0042","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We explain why competing firms form collective entities to buy patents from other entities, particularly from non-practicing entities (NPEs), and follow a catch and release patent strategy. We show why having competitors bid as a single unit is better than having competitors bid against each other. More important, we show that collusive bidding on patents held by NPEs, even when the patents are not essential for a standard (SEPs), may increase consumer surplus, particularly when technological innovation is drastic, and improve social welfare. This provides a theoretical foundation that explains why competition authorities often allow collusive bidding for patents and why courts employ the “rule of reason” to analyze agreements under competition law. We also show that a cartel of incumbents will always outbid a potential entrant, or a patent assertion entity, over a technology that can destroy the value of the incumbents’ existing assets.","PeriodicalId":44795,"journal":{"name":"Review of Law & Economics","volume":"80 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135478401","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Stricter Community Supervision, More Recidivism? An Ego-Depletion Theory 社区监督更严，累犯率更高?自我损耗理论
Review of Law & Economics Pub Date : 2023-05-30 DOI: 10.1515/rle-2022-0088
Murat C. Mungan
{"title":"Stricter Community Supervision, More Recidivism? An Ego-Depletion Theory","authors":"Murat C. Mungan","doi":"10.1515/rle-2022-0088","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2022-0088","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Can stricter community supervision (i.e., parole and probation) requirements lead to an increase in recidivism? I investigate this question by constructing a law enforcement model in which individuals can incur costs to increase their degree of self-control. The analysis reveals that stricter community supervision can, in fact, increase recidivism if these investments lead to ego-depletion. This possibility therefore warrants empirical investigation, and policy makers ought to be mindful of it when determining the strictness of community supervision conditions.","PeriodicalId":44795,"journal":{"name":"Review of Law & Economics","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135478402","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Collusive Bidding, Competition Law, and Welfare 串通投标、竞争法与福利
IF 0.3
Review of Law & Economics Pub Date : 2023-05-30 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.4251868
S. Gangopadhyay, Aineas Mallios, Stefan Sjögren
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引用次数: 0
On the Preservation of Illegal Street Art 论非法街头艺术的保护
IF 0.3
Review of Law & Economics Pub Date : 2023-03-30 DOI: 10.1515/rle-2022-0078
B. Crettez, Régis Deloche
{"title":"On the Preservation of Illegal Street Art","authors":"B. Crettez, Régis Deloche","doi":"10.1515/rle-2022-0078","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2022-0078","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Protecting street art faces significant hurdles. To overcome them, Salib, P.N. (2015. The law of Banksy: Who owns street art? The University of Chicago Law Review, pp. 2293–2328) proposes to unbundle the various rights that art ownership usually implies. Specifically, he proposes to treat the finder of a street art piece as a minority shareholder in this piece, granting him some percentage of its value. We provide an economic analysis of this proposal by refining a simple discovery process model involving street art finders and the owners of the premises where street art is found. We consider both the optimal number of researchers and the share of the street art value that should accrue to a finder. We also pay attention to the co-determination of the numbers of seekers and street artists. We find that a change in the share of the value of discovered street art has an ambiguous effect on the numbers of seekers and street artists. Moreover, relying on this share alone cannot guarantee that the equilibrium values of the numbers of seekers and street artists are equal to their socially optimal values.","PeriodicalId":44795,"journal":{"name":"Review of Law & Economics","volume":"93 1","pages":"185 - 199"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-03-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87646322","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Legal Regulation of Taxation of Transnational Corporations in the European Union 欧盟跨国公司税收的法律规制
IF 0.3
Review of Law & Economics Pub Date : 2023-03-29 DOI: 10.1515/rle-2022-0077
K. Smyrnova, Mykhailo Mykievych, A. Fedorova, Ivan Bratsuk, Zoryana Makarukha
{"title":"Legal Regulation of Taxation of Transnational Corporations in the European Union","authors":"K. Smyrnova, Mykhailo Mykievych, A. Fedorova, Ivan Bratsuk, Zoryana Makarukha","doi":"10.1515/rle-2022-0077","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2022-0077","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The purpose of this study is to identify the principles of taxation of transnational corporations in the European Union (EU), as well as the effectiveness of legal norms in this area based on the analysis of Ukrainian and world studies. The leading approach to the study of this problem is the method of review and critical analysis of the scientific literature on the subject of the study, as well as methods of logical deduction, scientific abstractions and a systematic approach that allows a comprehensive examination of the differences in the taxation procedures of transnational corporations in the EU Member States. The study presents topical issues of tax harmonisation in the field of taxation of transnational corporations in the European Union. The paper notes that the priorities of the EU Member States are aimed to a greater extent at combating the erosion of the tax base and tax evasion by transnational corporations than at eliminating tax obstacles in the internal market.","PeriodicalId":44795,"journal":{"name":"Review of Law & Economics","volume":"23 1","pages":"233 - 244"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83265067","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Frontmatter 头版头条
Review of Law & Economics Pub Date : 2023-03-01 DOI: 10.1515/rle-2023-frontmatter1
{"title":"Frontmatter","authors":"","doi":"10.1515/rle-2023-frontmatter1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2023-frontmatter1","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44795,"journal":{"name":"Review of Law & Economics","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135238822","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Legal Problems and Solutions in Stablecoins: A Multi-Disciplinary Approach Applied to Euro Stablecoins 稳定币的法律问题和解决方案:适用于欧元稳定币的多学科方法
IF 0.3
Review of Law & Economics Pub Date : 2023-03-01 DOI: 10.1515/rle-2022-0053
B. Sheehy, John Hawkins, Juan Diaz-Granados
{"title":"Legal Problems and Solutions in Stablecoins: A Multi-Disciplinary Approach Applied to Euro Stablecoins","authors":"B. Sheehy, John Hawkins, Juan Diaz-Granados","doi":"10.1515/rle-2022-0053","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2022-0053","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract An increasingly important form of electronic currency is the ‘stablecoin’. Unlike other high-profile ‘cryptocurrencies’, such as Bitcoin, stablecoins claim to be matched by a corresponding amount of secure assets in a national currency to which the stablecoin can be converted at par. These crypto-assets, however, create significant legal and economic problems. Notably, issues about trust in both issuers and backing assets, the risk of runs, and particular challenges associated with public and private law regimes resist the adoption of stablecoin both in Europe and beyond. This article draws from previous experiences to analyse these issues and propose solutions. Taking a multi-disciplinary approach, the article argues that the legal and economic issues surrounding today’s stablecoins could be addressed using the lessons from prior centuries.","PeriodicalId":44795,"journal":{"name":"Review of Law & Economics","volume":"54 1","pages":"85 - 98"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88884110","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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