{"title":"Ownership Structure and Risk-Taking: Comparative Evidence from Private and State-Controlled Banks in China","authors":"Yizhe Dong, Chao Meng, M. Firth, W. Hou","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2089979","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2089979","url":null,"abstract":"This study examines the impact of ownership structure on Chinese banks' risk-taking behaviours. We classify the Chinese commercial banks into three categories based on the types of controlling shareholder, and find that banks controlled by the government (GCBs) tend to take more risks than those controlled by state-owned enterprises (SOECBs) or private investors (PCBs). This is attributed to the severe political intervention and weak incentives to follow prudent bank management practices for GCBs. We also find that the results are more pronounced among banks with concentrated ownership presumably because the large controlling power helps to enhance the monitoring of the management and promotes prudent operating procedures. Our findings have important implications for the ongoing reform in the Chinese banking sector.","PeriodicalId":445596,"journal":{"name":"Capital Markets 2","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121368367","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"What Lies behind the 'Too-Small-To-Survive' Banks?","authors":"Theoharry Grammatikos, Nikolaos I. Papanikolaou","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2201705","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2201705","url":null,"abstract":"It is a common place that during financial crises, like the one started in 2007, authorities provide substantial financial support to some problem banks, whilst at the same time let several others to go bankrupt. Is this happening because some particular banks are considered important and big enough to save, whereas some others are perceived as being ‘Too-Small-To-Survive’? Is the size of banks the fundamental factor that makes authorities to treat them differently, or it is also that some banks perform poorly and are not capable of withstanding some considerable shocks whatsoever? Our study provides concrete answers to these questions thus filling part of the void in the existing literature. A short- and a long-run positive relationship between size and performance is documented regardless of the level of bank soundness (healthy vs. failed and assisted banks) under scrutiny. Importantly, we pose and lend support to the ‘Too-Small-To-Survive’ hypothesis according to which the impact of bank performance on failure probability strongly depends on size. Evidence shows that authorities tend not to save banks whose size is below some specific threshold.","PeriodicalId":445596,"journal":{"name":"Capital Markets 2","volume":"67 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124729091","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Soft Information in the Subprime Mortgage Market","authors":"Kanis Saengchote","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2169592","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2169592","url":null,"abstract":"Mortgage brokers play an important role in residential subprime mortgage market. In connecting borrowers to lenders, mortgage brokers obtain borrowers’ soft information, such as the likelihood of receiving future income/wealth shock, in the process. The geographical distance between broker and borrower can represent the ease of which soft information can be acquired and utilized. Using a dataset from a large subprime lender, I document two facts: first, low-documentation loans are more likely to default when brokers are located away from properties, even after controlling for hard underwriting characteristics. Second, there is little evidence that the incremental default risk is priced. These two findings suggest that soft information is not fully-internalized. I also show that relevant soft information is more about borrower characteristics than local knowledge, which supports the view that interpersonal interaction is important for retail banking.","PeriodicalId":445596,"journal":{"name":"Capital Markets 2","volume":"69 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127337047","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Where and When Does It Pay to Be Good? A Global Long-Term Analysis of ESG Investing","authors":"G. Dorfleitner, Sebastian Utz, M. Wimmer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2311281","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2311281","url":null,"abstract":"This paper explores the long-term performance of stocks with high corporate social performance (CSP), measured by so-called ESG scores depicting the environmental (E), social (S), and governance (G) dimension. We investigate the buy-and-hold abnormal returns of a long/short investment strategy including the top and low 20% stocks with respect to each of the ESG dimensions. The results of the bootstrap tests in a world-wide perspective indicate that financial markets are not capable to price different levels of CSP in the short run and in particular in the long run properly. The zero investment strategy produces significantly positive abnormal returns up to 20% in North America and Europe in a five year period. We also identify regional differences, for instance, a high social score does not pay in Japan and strong corporate governance yields significantly negative abnormal returns in Asia Pacific.","PeriodicalId":445596,"journal":{"name":"Capital Markets 2","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-10-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123780753","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Edward H. Chow, Chung-Wen Hung, Christine Shu-Hua Liu, Cheng-Yi Shiu
{"title":"Expiration Day Effects and Futures Trading Profits: Evidence from Taiwan","authors":"Edward H. Chow, Chung-Wen Hung, Christine Shu-Hua Liu, Cheng-Yi Shiu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1662243","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1662243","url":null,"abstract":"We set out in this study to analyze the expiration effects of index futures on the cash market in Taiwan, and find that both volatility and trading volume are higher on the final settlement days as compared to normal trading days. We also calculate the volume of open interest for final settlement relating to different classes of traders, as well as the profits from the open interest positions of these traders in index futures contracts. We find that proprietary traders exhibit superior performance whereas foreign investors achieve the worst returns. Our empirical results provide strong evidence in support of the view that the expiration effects in the Taiwan futures market are partially attributable to attempts at ‘marking the close’.","PeriodicalId":445596,"journal":{"name":"Capital Markets 2","volume":"121 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-07-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122476009","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}