Res Philosophica最新文献

{"title":"Scientific Epistemology: Exploring the Primacy of Science in the Writing of Gaston Bachelard","authors":"Michael Granado","doi":"10.11612/resphil.2060","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.11612/resphil.2060","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44475,"journal":{"name":"Res Philosophica","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-06-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49593963","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"In Pursuit of the World's Creator: Fakhr al-Din al-Razi on the Origins of the\u0000Universe in emph{al-Matalib al-`Aliya}","authors":"Laura Hassan","doi":"10.11612/RESPHIL.2042","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.11612/RESPHIL.2042","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44475,"journal":{"name":"Res Philosophica","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45175212","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Ontological Pluralism and Divine Naming: Insights from Avicenna","authors":"Joshua Harris","doi":"10.11612/RESPHIL.2040","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.11612/RESPHIL.2040","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44475,"journal":{"name":"Res Philosophica","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45266623","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Nominalism and Material Plenitude","authors":"Uriah Kriegel","doi":"10.11612/resphil.2046","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.11612/resphil.2046","url":null,"abstract":":: The idea of “material plenitude” has been gaining traction in recent discussions of the metaphysics of material objects. My main goal here is to show that this idea may have important dialectical implications for the metaphysics of properties – more specifically, that it provides nominalists with new resources in their attempt to reject an ontology of universals. I will recapitulate one of the main arguments against nominalism – due to David Armstrong – and show how plenitude helps the nominalist overcome the argument.","PeriodicalId":44475,"journal":{"name":"Res Philosophica","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-01-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48424147","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Reflections on McGowan's Just Words","authors":"Luvell Anderson","doi":"10.11612/resphil.2044","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.11612/resphil.2044","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44475,"journal":{"name":"Res Philosophica","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"64516595","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Why Future-Bias Isn’t Rationally Evaluable","authors":"Callie K. Phillips","doi":"10.11612/resphil.2143","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.11612/resphil.2143","url":null,"abstract":"Future-bias is preferring some lesser future good to a greater past good because it is in the future, or preferring some greater past pain to some lesser future pain because it is in the past. Most of us think that this bias is rational. I argue that no agents have futurebiased preferences that are rationally evaluable—that is, evaluable as rational or irrational. Given certain plausible assumptions about rational evaluability, either we must find a new conception of future-bias that avoids the difficulties I raise, or we must conclude that future-biased preferences are not subject to rational evaluation. Future-bias is typically thought to be rational, often obviously rational.1 Parfit (1984) offers this now familiar example. I am in some hospital to have some kind of surgery. Since this is completely safe, and always successful, I have no fears about the effects. The surgery may be brief, or it may instead take a long time. Because I have to cooperate with the surgeon, I cannot have anesthetics. I have had this surgery once before, and I can remember how painful it is. Under a new policy, because the operation is so painful, patients are now afterwards made to forget it. Some drug removes their memories of the last few hours. I have just woken up. I cannot remember going to sleep. I ask my nurse if it has been decided when my operation is to be, and how long it must take. She says that she knows the facts about both me and another patient, but that she cannot remember which facts apply to whom. She can tell me only that the following is true. I may be the patient who had his operation yesterday. In that case, my operation was the longest ever performed, lasting ten hours. I may instead be the patient who is to have a short operation later today. It is either true that I did suffer for ten hours, or true that I shall suffer for one hour. 1 Others have called this ‘bias against the past’ or ‘past discounting.’ Res Philosophica, Vol. 98, No. 4, October 2021, pp. 573–596 https://doi.org/10.11612/resphil.2143 © 2021 Callie K. Phillips • © 2021 Res Philosophica 574 Callie K. Phillips I ask the nurse to find out which is true. While she is away, it is clear to me which I prefer to be true. If I learn that the first is true, I shall be greatly relieved. (165–166) It seems rational to prefer to be in the first situation in such cases despite the fact that this preference involves preferring to be in a situation that has a greater total amount of pain for you in the overall course of your life. In fact, many philosophers take it to be obvious that this preference is rational and without need of defense. Prior (1959), Craig (1999), Zimmerman (2005), Heathwood (2008), Hare (2007, 2009), and Kauppinen (2018) all claim that this bias is at least rationally permissible, if not rationally required. However, a handful of philosophers—including Moller (2002), Brink (2011), Sullivan and Greene (2015), Dougherty (2015)—raise difficulties for defending the rational","PeriodicalId":44475,"journal":{"name":"Res Philosophica","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"64516824","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"McPherson on Virtue and Meaning","authors":"Christian B. Miller","doi":"10.11612/resphil.2100","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.11612/resphil.2100","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44475,"journal":{"name":"Res Philosophica","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"64517081","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Recovering a Role for Moral Character and Ascetic Practice in Religious Epistemology","authors":"T. Byerly","doi":"10.11612/RESPHIL.2039","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.11612/RESPHIL.2039","url":null,"abstract":": Moral character and ascetic practice have not been major themes in contemporary analytic religious epistemology. But they have been major themes in the religious epistemologies of several influential historical figures, including the medieval Islamic philosopher al-Ghazâlî. This paper will be concerned with the place of moral character and ascetic practice in both al-Ghazâlî’s religious epistemology and in contemporary analytic religious epistemology. By reading al-Ghazâlî alongside contemporary work, I aim to highlight some fruitful ideas about how moral character and ascetic practice could play important roles in religious epistemology. I argue that the exploration of these ideas may be enriched via engagement with recent developments in mainstream epistemology and virtue theory, pointing toward future avenues for such work.","PeriodicalId":44475,"journal":{"name":"Res Philosophica","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"64516544","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"New Applications, Hepeating, and Discrimination: Response to Anderson, Horisk, and Watson","authors":"M. Mcgowan","doi":"10.11612/resphil.2071","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.11612/resphil.2071","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44475,"journal":{"name":"Res Philosophica","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"64516753","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Précis of Virtue and Meaning","authors":"David Mcpherson","doi":"10.11612/resphil.2128","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.11612/resphil.2128","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44475,"journal":{"name":"Res Philosophica","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"64517102","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}