When Cities LobbyPub Date : 2021-12-23DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197615263.003.0007
Julia Payson
{"title":"Conclusion","authors":"Julia Payson","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197615263.003.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197615263.003.0007","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter concludes by considering the broader welfare implications of city lobbying. The ability to pay for professional advocacy represents a double-edged sword for cities. Lobbying provides an essential tool for local leaders seeking to amplify their voices in the complicated and often hostile world of state politics. This is true for progressive urban areas—but also for high-income suburbs. However, while some states have recently debated measures to restrict local government lobbying, this chapter concludes that these efforts would likely do more harm than good in the absence of reform to the lobbying industry more generally. Otherwise, the influence of corporations and PACs will continue to grow, while local officials would unfairly lose one of the key channels through which they are able to advocate for local interests in state politics.","PeriodicalId":444018,"journal":{"name":"When Cities Lobby","volume":"299 1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114272688","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
When Cities LobbyPub Date : 2021-12-23DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197615263.003.0002
Julia Payson
{"title":"The State of Local Lobbying","authors":"Julia Payson","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197615263.003.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197615263.003.0002","url":null,"abstract":"Cities are some of the oldest lobbying organizations in the United States. Because states enjoy such high levels of fiscal and administrative authority over their local units, the vast majority of these advocacy efforts are aimed at state governments rather than at the federal level. This chapter draws from original lobbying disclosure data, interviews, city council documents, and other sources to paint a detailed descriptive picture of the current municipal lobbying landscape in the United States. How did city lobbying emerge in its current form? What are local officials hoping to achieve when they lobby, and how do they allocate their efforts? When do cities lobby as individuals as opposed to coalitions? This chapter introduces expansive new data to provide initial answers to these questions.","PeriodicalId":444018,"journal":{"name":"When Cities Lobby","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132717620","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
When Cities LobbyPub Date : 2021-12-23DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197615263.003.0006
Julia Payson
{"title":"City vs. State","authors":"Julia Payson","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197615263.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197615263.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter considers how city lobbying affects the overall policy environment from the perspective of the state. While results at the city level suggest that there are individual winners and losers from the lobbying process, this chapter shows how aggregate lobbying trends can systematically bias state transfers toward the interests of high-income cities, making them less progressive on average. At the same time, local officials don’t lobby for funding alone. Through a series of short case studies, this chapter also examines how the lobbying efforts of cities are shaping current policy debates in state legislatures, including preemption battles over minimum wage laws. While difficult to quantify the effects of these activities, taking a more holistic view of city lobbying paints a more nuanced and positive picture about its policy consequences.","PeriodicalId":444018,"journal":{"name":"When Cities Lobby","volume":"150 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133888271","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
When Cities LobbyPub Date : 2021-12-23DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197615263.003.0005
Julia Payson
{"title":"Who Gets What? City Lobbying and State Transfers","authors":"Julia Payson","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197615263.003.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197615263.003.0005","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter uses a variety of panel data methods to estimate the returns to lobbying for individual municipalities. When cities start lobbying, they receive significantly more revenue from the state in the following year compared to other cities. But not all localities benefit equally. In particular, wealthy communities with higher median incomes tend to receive substantially more revenue after lobbying than less affluent municipalities. The chapter concludes by discussing some of the mechanisms that might be driving these results. While higher-income cities don’t spend more money on lobbying, they do spread their efforts across a greater number of bills, and they appear to be particularly savvy at using their lobbyists to advocate for shovel-ready projects that make attractive funding targets for state officials.","PeriodicalId":444018,"journal":{"name":"When Cities Lobby","volume":"75 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127285668","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
When Cities LobbyPub Date : 2021-12-23DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197615263.003.0003
Julia Payson
{"title":"How City Lobbyists Bridge Representational Gaps","authors":"Julia Payson","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197615263.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197615263.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter develops a simple theory of intergovernmental lobbying that emphasizes the relationship between cities and their elected delegations. Compared to most interest groups, cities are uniquely dependent on the state and federal officials who are elected to represent them by virtue of their political geography. The quality of this representation should therefore influence the demand for the lobbying. This chapter tests several observable implications of this theory using original panel data on annual city lobbying activity in all fifty states. A series of difference-in-differences designs reveal that municipal officials hire lobbyists in response to a wide array of representational challenges, such as hostile redistricting efforts and flips in the partisan composition of their delegations. The results are broadly consistent with a model of intergovernmental lobbying in which cities use lobbyists to compensate for the representational gaps that sometimes emerge in federal systems.","PeriodicalId":444018,"journal":{"name":"When Cities Lobby","volume":"72 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129154905","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
When Cities LobbyPub Date : 2021-12-23DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197615263.003.0001
Julia Payson
{"title":"Cities as Lobbyists","authors":"Julia Payson","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197615263.003.0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197615263.003.0001","url":null,"abstract":"In the United States, state-local relations are characterized by increasing urban-rural polarization, and several states have recently engaged in high-profile preemption efforts that seek to limit local power. But cities aren’t powerless when it comes to shaping the political environment in which they operate. In fact, local governments are among the most active lobbyists in state politics. When and why do some local officials choose to hire lobbyists to represent them in other levels of government? How does this ability to pay for representation influence politics and policymaking? And what are the broader implications for intergovernmental representation? This chapter previews a theory of municipal lobbying that emphasizes political geography and outlines the structure and organization of the book. It also introduces the qualitative and quantitative data from dozens of sources that will be used throughout the book—including newly compiled longitudinal data on lobbying disclosures in all fifty states.","PeriodicalId":444018,"journal":{"name":"When Cities Lobby","volume":"184 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123262133","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
When Cities LobbyPub Date : 2021-12-23DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197615263.003.0004
Julia Payson
{"title":"Exploring Municipal Mobilization across States","authors":"Julia Payson","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197615263.003.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197615263.003.0004","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter zooms out to examine the state-level features that are associated with differences in the intensity of local government lobbying. Several state characteristics correlate with municipal lobbying, such as local property tax limitations, but two of the most striking are the combination of term limits and the level of professionalization in the state legislature. Cities are also more likely to mobilize as state transfers comprise a greater share of municipal budgets. These findings suggest that lobbyists might be particularly useful at facilitating representation in complex legislative environments with high turnover among elected officials—especially when cities depend on the state for revenue.","PeriodicalId":444018,"journal":{"name":"When Cities Lobby","volume":"76 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127338302","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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