城市是说客

Julia Payson
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在美国,州与地方关系的特点是城乡两极分化加剧,几个州最近高调采取先发制人的行动,试图限制地方权力。但当涉及到塑造其运作的政治环境时,城市并非无能为力。事实上,地方政府是州政治中最活跃的说客之一。什么时候,为什么一些地方官员选择雇佣游说者在其他级别的政府中代表他们?这种支付代表的能力如何影响政治和政策制定?政府间代表权的更广泛含义是什么?本章概述了一种强调政治地理的市政游说理论,并概述了本书的结构和组织。它还介绍了数十个来源的定性和定量数据,这些数据将贯穿全书,包括新汇编的所有50个州游说披露的纵向数据。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Cities as Lobbyists
In the United States, state-local relations are characterized by increasing urban-rural polarization, and several states have recently engaged in high-profile preemption efforts that seek to limit local power. But cities aren’t powerless when it comes to shaping the political environment in which they operate. In fact, local governments are among the most active lobbyists in state politics. When and why do some local officials choose to hire lobbyists to represent them in other levels of government? How does this ability to pay for representation influence politics and policymaking? And what are the broader implications for intergovernmental representation? This chapter previews a theory of municipal lobbying that emphasizes political geography and outlines the structure and organization of the book. It also introduces the qualitative and quantitative data from dozens of sources that will be used throughout the book—including newly compiled longitudinal data on lobbying disclosures in all fifty states.
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