Political Economy - Development: Political Institutions eJournal最新文献

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Financial Capability: A Conceptual Review, Extension, and Synthesis 财务能力:概念回顾、延伸与综合
Political Economy - Development: Political Institutions eJournal Pub Date : 2021-07-26 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3943629
J. Xiao, Jin Huang
{"title":"Financial Capability: A Conceptual Review, Extension, and Synthesis","authors":"J. Xiao, Jin Huang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3943629","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3943629","url":null,"abstract":"Financial capability is an important factor that contributes to consumer financial wellbeing. In the research literature, financial capability has multiple meanings that could refer to financial literacy, financial behavior, financial access, and/or financial outcome, depending on different research purposes and conceptualizations. The purpose of this review is to examine the literature on consumer financial capability with a focus on conceptual definitions. After reviewing 250 research papers on financial capability published in 2007-June 2021 and retrieved from Scopus, five conceptual definitions of financial capability are identified and discussed. Based on the discussion, in this review, financial capability is defined as an individual ability to apply appropriate financial knowledge, perform desirable financial behaviors, and take available financial opportunities for achieving financial wellbeing. A conceptual framework on the antecedents, construct, and outcomes of financial capability is then presented and propositions based on this framework and relevant literatures are proposed. Finally, implications for future research are discussed.","PeriodicalId":443031,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy - Development: Political Institutions eJournal","volume":"225 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124475065","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
Information Disclosure and Financial Fragility 信息披露与金融脆弱性
Political Economy - Development: Political Institutions eJournal Pub Date : 2021-07-11 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3884384
Xuesong Huang
{"title":"Information Disclosure and Financial Fragility","authors":"Xuesong Huang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3884384","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3884384","url":null,"abstract":"I study how banks and other financial intermediaries can use information disclosure to prevent self-fulfilling bank runs. I begin with a finite-agent version of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) with correlated liquidity shocks and sequential service. I allow the intermediary to inform each investor about the withdrawal decisions of previous investors. Adding information disclosure creates a withdrawal game with sequential signaling, and I argue using examples that it is natural to introduce an equilibrium concept placing restrictions on agents’ off equilibrium beliefs. I use the concept of forward induction equilibrium (Cho, 1987) that generalizes the “intuitive” criterion. I provide conditions under which the induced withdrawal game has a unique forward induction equilibrium and no bank run occurs. In other words, disclosing withdrawal information can promote financial stability.","PeriodicalId":443031,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy - Development: Political Institutions eJournal","volume":"92 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128365791","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Bank Branching Applications and Window Dressing: Evidence on Banks’ Strategic Use of Loan Loss Provisions 银行分支应用与粉饰:银行策略性使用贷款损失准备金的证据
Political Economy - Development: Political Institutions eJournal Pub Date : 2021-07-08 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3882259
Di Gong, H. Huizinga, Tianshi Li, Jigao Zhu
{"title":"Bank Branching Applications and Window Dressing: Evidence on Banks’ Strategic Use of Loan Loss Provisions","authors":"Di Gong, H. Huizinga, Tianshi Li, Jigao Zhu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3882259","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3882259","url":null,"abstract":"After the removal of geographic restrictions on branching in 2006, China’s city commercial banks (CCBs) can apply for permission to branch outside their province. This paper shows that CCBs report higher loan loss provisions before filing an application, thereby increasing the provision coverage ratio of nonperforming loans and making the bank look safer to regulators.Our finding is robust to controlling for possible endogeneity of the branching application decision by employing propensity score matching estimators, and it is confirmed when we consider a quasi-natural experiment of deregulation reversal.","PeriodicalId":443031,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy - Development: Political Institutions eJournal","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121042637","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Demographic Composition of the Board and the Managerial Efficiency of Credit Unions 董事会的人口组成和信用合作社的管理效率
Political Economy - Development: Political Institutions eJournal Pub Date : 2021-06-25 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3874079
C. Goenner
{"title":"Demographic Composition of the Board and the Managerial Efficiency of Credit Unions","authors":"C. Goenner","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3874079","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3874079","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we use non-parametric envelopment methods to determine whether the demographic composition of the board of directors effects the efficiency in which credit unions offer loans and savings products to their members. We find strong evidence credit unions with boards where the majority of directors are either women or racial and ethnic minorities improves the provision of financial services among the largest and most complex credit unions. We also observe strong evidence that credit unions with minority governed boards operate more efficiently than their counterparts in communities that are more racially diverse, while female governed boards are more efficient in communities where there is greater parity of economic opportunity across genders. These findings suggest greater inclusion of minorities and women on boards of credit unions is not only of importance to these firms’ survival, but is also important to the efficient provision of financial services to their members.","PeriodicalId":443031,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy - Development: Political Institutions eJournal","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128637708","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Problems at Poland’s Banks are Threatening the Economy (Problemy banków zagrażają rozwojowi polskiej gospodarki) 波兰银行的问题正在威胁经济(Problemy banków zagrażają rozwojowi polskiej gospodarki)
Political Economy - Development: Political Institutions eJournal Pub Date : 2021-06-22 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3873981
Stefan Kawalec
{"title":"Problems at Poland’s Banks are Threatening the Economy (Problemy banków zagrażają rozwojowi polskiej gospodarki)","authors":"Stefan Kawalec","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3873981","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3873981","url":null,"abstract":"<b>English Abstract:</b> Until now, the banking sector has been one of the strong points of Poland’s economy. In contrast to banks in the U.S. and leading Western European economies, lenders in Poland came through the 2008 global financial crisis without a scratch, without needing state financial support. But in recent years the industry’s problems have been growing, creating a threat to economic growth and gains in living standards.<br><br>For an economy’s productivity to increase, funds can’t go to all companies evenly, and definitely shouldn’t go to those that are most lacking in funds, but to those that will use them most efficiently. This is true of total external financing, and thus funding both from the banking sector and from parabanks, the capital market and funds from public institutions. In Poland, in light of the relatively modest scale of the capital market, banks play a clearly dominant role in external financing of companies. This is why the author of this text focuses on the bank credit allocation efficiency.<br><br>The author points out that in the very near future, conditions will emerge in Poland which – as the experience of other countries shows – create a risk of reduced efficiency of credit allocation to business. Additionally, in Poland today, bank lending to companies is to a high degree being replaced by funds from state aid, which reduces the efficiency of allocation of external funds to companies (both loans and subsidies), as allocation of government subsidies is not usually based on efficiency. This decline in external financing allocation efficiency may slow, halt or even reverse the process, that has been uninterrupted for 28 years, of Poland’s convergence, i.e. the narrowing of the gap in living standards between Poland and the West.<br><br><b>Polish Abstract:</b> Sektor bankowy był dotychczas silną stroną polskiej gospodarki. W przeciwieństwie do banków w USA i czołowych gospodarkach Europy Zachodniej, banki w Polsce przeszły „suchą nogą” światowy kryzys finansowy po roku 2008 i nie potrzebowały wówczas wsparcia finansowego państwa. Jednakże w ostatnich latach w sektorze bankowym narastają problemy, które stwarzają zagrożenie dla rozwoju gospodarki i wzrostu poziomu życia obywateli.<br><br>Po to, by rosła produktywność gospodarki, środki finansowe powinny trafiać nie do wszystkich firm po równo i wcale nie do tych, którym najbardziej ich brakuje, lecz do tych, które wykorzystują je bardziej efektywnie. Dotyczy to łącznego finansowania zewnętrznego firm, a więc zarówno z sektora bankowego i parabankowego, rynku kapitałowego, jak i środków z instytucji publicznych. W Polsce ze względu na relatywnie nieduże rozmiary rynku kapitałowego, zdecydowanie dominującą rolę w zewnętrznym finansowaniu przedsiębiorstw pełnią banki. Dlatego Stefan Kawalec, autor niniejszej publikacji, skupia się na efektywności alokacji kredytu bankowego.<br><br>Autor zwraca uwagę, że w najbliższym czasie występować będą w Polsce okoliczności, kt","PeriodicalId":443031,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy - Development: Political Institutions eJournal","volume":"74 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134591338","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The City of London Post-Brexit: Can Dual-Class Shares Be a Game-Changer? 英国脱欧后的伦敦金融城:双重股权结构能改变游戏规则吗?
Political Economy - Development: Political Institutions eJournal Pub Date : 2021-05-20 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3850072
Vincenzo Bavoso
{"title":"The City of London Post-Brexit: Can Dual-Class Shares Be a Game-Changer?","authors":"Vincenzo Bavoso","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3850072","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3850072","url":null,"abstract":"The status of the City of London as a global financial center has been at the heart of much speculation over the past five years, following the outcome of the Brexit referendum. One of the key questions that has been debated in both media and academic outlets is related to the capacity of the City to attract business, especially once the rights flowing from the EU Passport system cease to be in place (1st January 2021). Effectively, the new regulatory scenario emerging from the post-Brexit world is likely to put the City of London in more direct competition vis-à-vis other European markets.<br><br>Questions of competition have come to the fore more recently, in March 2021, with the Review of the UK listing regime, produced by Lord Hill. This deals with aspects of UK financial regulation, and more specifically with the UK listing process and its effectiveness in attracting companies, both domestic and overseas. It is fair to say that, together with investor protection concerns, the Review has a distinctive competitive objective, which transpires from its focus. It is also evident that the implementation of this Review would cause a departure of the UK from a number of EU legal and regulatory standards.","PeriodicalId":443031,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy - Development: Political Institutions eJournal","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126102385","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
When Trust is Not Enough: Bank Resolution, SPE, Ring-fencing and Group Support 当信任是不够的:银行决议,SPE,围栏和团体支持
Political Economy - Development: Political Institutions eJournal Pub Date : 2021-05-20 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3850103
M. Dewatripont, Marie Montigny, G. Nguyen
{"title":"When Trust is Not Enough: Bank Resolution, SPE, Ring-fencing and Group Support","authors":"M. Dewatripont, Marie Montigny, G. Nguyen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3850103","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3850103","url":null,"abstract":"This discussion paper investigates the differences existing between the Single Point of Entry and the Multiple Point of Entry resolution models and links this question to the issue of support that bank subsidiaries can expect from their parent companies both in resolution and in normal insolvency proceedings. Given that parental support remains imperfect in these two resolution models, the paper concludes that existing safeguards aiming at preserving the corporate interests of subsidiaries remain needed and justified. The paper then identifies potential avenues that could be further explored to reinforce the support model and thereby reduce incentives to adopt ring-fencing measures.","PeriodicalId":443031,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy - Development: Political Institutions eJournal","volume":"56 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121674220","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Determinants of Nonperforming Loans: A Review of Empirical Evidence 不良贷款的决定因素:经验证据的回顾
Political Economy - Development: Political Institutions eJournal Pub Date : 2021-05-11 DOI: 10.1108/978-1-80043-968-920211015
A. Syed
{"title":"Determinants of Nonperforming Loans: A Review of Empirical Evidence","authors":"A. Syed","doi":"10.1108/978-1-80043-968-920211015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1108/978-1-80043-968-920211015","url":null,"abstract":"Originality/Value: As there are very few studies that provide a detailed viewpoint on NPLs and its determinants in this area, this research will provide a concise and detailed framework for the researchers to analyses the diverse literature on NPLs and its determinates.","PeriodicalId":443031,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy - Development: Political Institutions eJournal","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117207736","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
On Trade, Distributional Conflict, and Endogenous Regime Change 贸易、分配冲突与内生制度变迁
Political Economy - Development: Political Institutions eJournal Pub Date : 2021-05-10 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3848964
Biagio Rosso
{"title":"On Trade, Distributional Conflict, and Endogenous Regime Change","authors":"Biagio Rosso","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3848964","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3848964","url":null,"abstract":"Can we expect shocks in trade openness to affect the quality of the domestic political process, and in what way? Isolating cross-country heterogeneity in the distributional effects of trade shocks for different relative factor endowments as a critical element for theory development, the paper tackles the puzzle by formally developing and solving a new probabilistic model to link the distributional effects of shocks to endogenous institutional change via induced conflict between a capital-intensive and a labour-intensive coalition. The model of distributional conflict combines a political selection stage to select the rate of income redistribution by majority voting and a constitutional conflict stage among factor-intensive coalitions whose steady state outcome determines the level of institutional inequality assigning the “rules“ of political selection. The former is modelled via a canonical weighted median voter setup with the (infinitely many) weights-distributions induced by the value of the steady state outcome of the constitutional conflict stage, while the latter is modelled as a Tullock contest with an endogenous contest success function and the heterogeneous coalition prizes equalling the expected value of the contest to each coalition as a function of the coalitions' efforts. Closed form solutions are derived for (i) the expected outcome of distributional conflict in terms of institutional quality and (ii) the intensity of conflict. Via comparative static analysis based on the Stolper Samuelson theorem in Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory, it is formally shown that positive shocks in trade openness always induce higher institutional inequality irrespective of heterogeneity in the underlying distributional effects, but that the expected mechanisms driving the drop in quality differ across capital-abundant and labour-abundant countries.","PeriodicalId":443031,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy - Development: Political Institutions eJournal","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128093702","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Subjective Supervisory Assessment of Management Performance And Decision Making in Banking 银行经营绩效与决策的主观监督评价
Political Economy - Development: Political Institutions eJournal Pub Date : 2021-05-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3915796
D. Dahl, D. Coster
{"title":"Subjective Supervisory Assessment of Management Performance And Decision Making in Banking","authors":"D. Dahl, D. Coster","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3915796","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3915796","url":null,"abstract":"We examine subjective supervisory assessments of performance in the banking industry. Results of empirical tests show that better assessments are: 1) positively associated with decisions made by supervisors to upgrade objective performance ratings; 2) negatively associated with decisions made by supervisors to downgrade objective performance ratings; and 3) positively associated with decisions made by bank holding company managers to allocate capital among subsidiary banks. These findings are consistent with a production of soft information in the examination process whose usefulness is validated in decisions about banks that are made both internally (by bankers) and externally (by supervisors).","PeriodicalId":443031,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy - Development: Political Institutions eJournal","volume":"70 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132615507","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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