{"title":"MemTri: A Memory Forensics Triage Tool Using Bayesian Network and Volatility","authors":"A. Michalas, R. Murray","doi":"10.1145/3139923.3139926","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3139923.3139926","url":null,"abstract":"This work explores the development of MemTri. A memory forensics triage tool that can assess the likelihood of criminal activity in a memory image, based on evidence data artefacts generated by several applications. Fictitious illegal suspect activity scenarios were performed on virtual machines to generate 60 test memory images for input into MemTri. Four categories of applications (i.e. Internet Browsers, Instant Messengers, FTP Client and Document Processors) are examined for data artefacts located through the use of regular expressions. These identified data artefacts are then analysed using a Bayesian Network, to assess the likelihood that a seized memory image contained evidence of illegal firearms trading activity. MemTri's normal mode of operation achieved a high artefact identification accuracy performance of 95.7% when the applications' processes were running. However, this fell significantly to 60% as applications processes' were terminated. To explore improving MemTri's accuracy performance, a second mode was developed, which achieved more stable results of around 80% accuracy, even after applications processes' were terminated.","PeriodicalId":441128,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2017 International Workshop on Managing Insider Security Threats","volume":"80 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123128400","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Research Challenges and Opportunities in Big Forensic Data","authors":"Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo","doi":"10.1145/3139923.3139931","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3139923.3139931","url":null,"abstract":"The growth in the data volume and number of evidential data sources, including from heterogeneous distributed systems such as cloud and fog computing systems and Internet-of-Things devices (e.g. drones), has led to increased collection, processing and analysis times, potentially resulting in vulnerable individuals and organizations (e.g. in the event of an insider breach) being at risk. In this presentation, we will describe the potential of data reduction and management approaches, such as methodologies for data reduction, quick analysis, in-depth analysis, semi-automated information and entity extraction, and link charting in conjunction with link analysis. We will also examine how our data reduction approach can be realistically implemented to reduce collection and processing times, as well as reducing the time to undertake analysis, and providing investigators with evidence or actionable intelligence in a timely manner. The importance of integrating (big) digital forensics principles and concepts into future system design and development (i.e. forensic-by-design) is also explained. While a forensically friendly / reader system will not stop a security incident (e.g. insider breach) from occurring, it can assist investigators in the examination of such incidents, such as the preservation of evidential data, the analysis of an incident to determine root causes, and accelerate the restoration of devices and services affected with an incident. Potential research questions will also be discussed.","PeriodicalId":441128,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2017 International Workshop on Managing Insider Security Threats","volume":"67 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129860198","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Session details: Short Papers","authors":"K. Choo","doi":"10.1145/3258495","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3258495","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":441128,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2017 International Workshop on Managing Insider Security Threats","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116561706","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Yassir Hashem, Hassan Takabi, R. Dantu, Rodney D. Nielsen
{"title":"A Multi-Modal Neuro-Physiological Study of Malicious Insider Threats","authors":"Yassir Hashem, Hassan Takabi, R. Dantu, Rodney D. Nielsen","doi":"10.1145/3139923.3139930","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3139923.3139930","url":null,"abstract":"It has long been recognized that solutions to insider threat are mainly user-centric and several psychological and psychosocial models have been proposed. However, user behavior underlying these malicious acts is still not fully understood, motivating further investigation at the neuro-physiological level. In this work, we conduct a multi-modal study of how users-brain processes malicious and benign activities. In particular, we focus on using Electroencephalogram (EEG) signals that arise from the user's brain activities and eye tracking which can capture spontaneous responses that are unfiltered by the conscious mind. We conduct human study experiments to capture the Electroencephalogram (EEG) signals for a group of 25 participants while performing several computer-based activities in different scenarios. We analyze the EEG signals and the eye tracking data and extract features and evaluate our approach using several classifiers. The results show that our approach achieved an average accuracy of 99.77% in detecting the malicious insider using the EEG data of 256 channels (sensors) and average detection accuracy up to 95.64% using only five channels (sensors). The results show an average detection accuracy up to 83% using the eye movements and pupil behaviors data. In general, our results indicates that human Electroencephalogram (EEG) signals and eye tracking data can reveal valuable knowledge about user's malicious intent and can be used as an effective indicator in designing real-time insider threats monitoring and detection frameworks.","PeriodicalId":441128,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2017 International Workshop on Managing Insider Security Threats","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131830223","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A. Harilal, Flavio Toffalini, I. Homoliak, J. H. Castellanos, J. Guarnizo, Soumik Mondal, Martín Ochoa
{"title":"TWOS: A Dataset of Malicious Insider Threat Behavior Based on a Gamified Competition","authors":"A. Harilal, Flavio Toffalini, I. Homoliak, J. H. Castellanos, J. Guarnizo, Soumik Mondal, Martín Ochoa","doi":"10.1145/3139923.3139929","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3139923.3139929","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we present the design and outcome of a gamified competition that was devised in order to obtain a dataset containing realistic instances of insider threats. The competition simulated user interactions in/among competing companies, where two types of behaviors (normal and malicious) were incentivized. For the case of malicious behavior, we designed sessions for two types of insider threats (masqueraders and traitors). The game involved the participation of 6 teams consisting of 4 students who competed with each other for a period of 5 days, while their activities were monitored considering several heterogeneous sources (mouse, keyboard, process and file-system monitor, network traffic, emails and login/logout). In sum, we obtained 320 hours of active participation that included 18 hours of masquerader data and at least two instances of traitor data. Additionally to malicious behaviors, the students explored various defensive and offensive strategies, such as denial of service attacks and obfuscation techniques, in an effort to get ahead in the competition. The TWOS dataset is publicly accessible for further research purposes.","PeriodicalId":441128,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2017 International Workshop on Managing Insider Security Threats","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132928458","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Session details: Insider Threat Technologies 2","authors":"W. M. Petullo","doi":"10.1145/3258493","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3258493","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":441128,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2017 International Workshop on Managing Insider Security Threats","volume":"2015 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128076078","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Combining Homomorphic Encryption with Trusted Execution Environment: A Demonstration with Paillier Encryption and SGX","authors":"Nir Drucker, S. Gueron","doi":"10.1145/3139923.3139933","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3139923.3139933","url":null,"abstract":"Cloud database services offer performance and storage advantages that local client platforms do not have, and become very appealing solutions. We list three approaches that address data privacy concerns that are associated with depositing sensitive data on remote platforms. Users can protect their data privacy by locally encrypting it before uploading to remote cloud servers. This prevents the servers from carrying out operations on the data, and also increases the networking overheads. Another approach uses a Trusted Execution Environments (TEE) to protect the data. Examples include OS containers, Virtual Machines or Intel's Software Guard Extension (SGX). This approach relies on the trustworthiness of the TEE for privacy and integrity of operations. The third approach is using Homomorhpic Encryption (HE) schemes. They can allow a remote platform to carry out computations on encrypted data, but are malleable. Adding authentication tags to database entries could solve this problem only if the server is in the user's trust domain. We present here a new combined model. It uses a TEE to guarantee the integrity and correctness of the database code and data, while the data itself is encrypted with some HE scheme. In this way, the malleability protection, achieved through the TEE, is decoupled from the privacy protection that is achieved through the HE. Of course, this comes at some performance costs, but the results of our demonstration, that uses SGX as the TEE and Paillier cryptosystem as the HE, indicate that the proposed combined solution is practical.","PeriodicalId":441128,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2017 International Workshop on Managing Insider Security Threats","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122828304","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Mookyu Park, Junwoo Seo, Kyoungmin Kim, Moosung Park, Kyungho Lee
{"title":"Criminal Minds: Reasoning Prime Suspect in Russian Hacking Scandal by Perspective of Insiders","authors":"Mookyu Park, Junwoo Seo, Kyoungmin Kim, Moosung Park, Kyungho Lee","doi":"10.1145/3139923.3139936","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3139923.3139936","url":null,"abstract":"Recent cyber attacks are affecting the cyberspace as well as the real world, causing social confusion. Russia Scandal in the US presidential election in 2016 is a representative example. This case is being discussed up to the impeachment of the president. Cyber influence attacks are attacks that affect cyberspace to real space. An effectiveness of such attacks boosts when insiders execute. This study analyzed the keywords related to cyber attacks of Russia during the US presidential election in 2016. Based on this, the paper used sentiment analysis for analyzing the psychology of the current Russian Scandal suspect.","PeriodicalId":441128,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2017 International Workshop on Managing Insider Security Threats","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116675990","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Insider Threat Event Detection in User-System Interactions","authors":"P. Moriano, J. Pendleton, Steven Rich, L. Camp","doi":"10.1145/3139923.3139928","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3139923.3139928","url":null,"abstract":"Detection of insider threats relies on monitoring individuals and their interactions with organizational resources. Identification of anomalous insiders typically relies on supervised learning models that use labeled data. However, such labeled data is not easily obtainable. The labeled data that does exist is also limited by current insider threat detection methods and undetected insiders would not be included. These models also inherently assume that the insider threat is not rapidly evolving between model generation and use of the model in detection. Yet there is a large body of research that illustrates that the insider threat changes significantly after some types of precipitating events, such as layoffs, significant restructuring, and plant or facility closure. To capture this temporal evolution of user-system interactions, we use an unsupervised learning framework to evaluate whether potential insider threat events are triggered following precipitating events. The analysis leverages a bipartite graph of user and system interactions. The approach shows a clear correlation between precipitating events and the number of apparent anomalies. The results of our empirical analysis show a clear shift in behaviors after events which have previously been shown to increase insider activity, specifically precipitating events. We argue that this metadata about the level of insider threat behaviors validates the potential of the approach. We apply our method to a dataset that comprises interactions between engineers and software components in an enterprise version control system spanning more than 22 years. We use this unlabeled dataset and automatically detect statistically significant events. We show that there is statistically significant evidence that a subset of users diversify their committing behavior after precipitating events have been announced. Although these findings do not constitute detection of insider threat events per se, they do identify patterns of potentially malicious high-risk insider behavior. They reinforce the idea that insider operations can be motivated by the insiders' environment. Our proposed framework outperforms algorithms based on naive random approaches and algorithms using volume dependent statistics. This graph mining technique has potential for early detection of insider threat behavior in user-system interactions independent of the volume of interactions. The proposed method also enables organizations without a corpus of identified insider threats to train its own anomaly detection system.","PeriodicalId":441128,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2017 International Workshop on Managing Insider Security Threats","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115004038","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Subliminal Channel in EdDSA: Information Leakage with High-Speed Signatures","authors":"Alexander Hartl, Robert Annessi, T. Zseby","doi":"10.1145/3139923.3139925","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3139923.3139925","url":null,"abstract":"Subliminal channels in digital signatures provide a very effective method to clandestinely leak information from inside a system to a third party outside. Information can be hidden in signature parameters in a way that both network operators and legitimate receivers would not notice any suspicious traces. Subliminal channels have previously been discovered in other signatures, such as ElGamal and ECDSA. Those signatures are usually just sparsely exchanged in network protocols, e.g. during authentication, and their usability for leaking information is therefore limited. With the advent of high-speed signatures such as EdDSA, however, scenarios become feasible where numerous packets with individual signatures are transferred between communicating parties. This significantly increases the bandwidth for transmitting subliminal information. Examples are broadcast clock synchronization or signed sensor data export. A subliminal channel in signatures appended to numerous packets allows the transmission of a high amount of hidden information, suitable for large scale data exfiltration or even the operation of command and control structures. In this paper, we show the existence of a broadband subliminal channel in the EdDSA signature scheme. We then discuss the implications of the subliminal channel in practice using thee different scenarios: broadcast clock synchronization, signed sensor data export, and classic TLS. We perform several experiments to show the use of the subliminal channel and measure the actual bandwidth of the subliminal information that can be leaked. We then discuss the applicability of different countermeasures against subliminal channels from other signature schemes to EdDSA but conclude that none of the existing solutions can sufficiently protect against data exfiltration in network protocols secured by EdDSA.","PeriodicalId":441128,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2017 International Workshop on Managing Insider Security Threats","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122649606","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}