Corporate Governance: Actors & Players eJournal最新文献_第9页

Banks as Corporate Monitors: Evidence from CEO Turnovers in China 银行作为企业监督者:来自中国CEO更替的证据

Corporate Governance: Actors & Players eJournal Pub Date : 2016-12-19 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2914040

Qing He, Jiyuan Huang, Dongxu Li, Liping Lu

引用次数: 2

Establishing a Multi-Stakeholder Board for Multinational Corporations 建立跨国公司多利益相关者董事会

Corporate Governance: Actors & Players eJournal Pub Date : 2016-12-16 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2906576

Hugo Chu

引用次数: 0

Media Coverage and Management Earnings Guidance 媒体报道和管理层盈余指引

Corporate Governance: Actors & Players eJournal Pub Date : 2016-12-08 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2882405

Jihun Bae, Robin Litjens, Chul W. Park, Yachang Zeng

引用次数: 2

Shareholder Wealth vs. Stakeholder Interests? Evidence from Code Compliance Under the German Corporate Governance Code 股东财富vs利益相关者利益?德国公司治理准则下的符合性证据

Corporate Governance: Actors & Players eJournal Pub Date : 2016-11-24 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2875275

Brigitte Haar

引用次数: 2

Functions of Banks in India 印度银行的职能

Corporate Governance: Actors & Players eJournal Pub Date : 2016-11-16 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2870557

Y. Kolekar

引用次数: 0

Innovation beyond Firm Boundaries: Strategic Alliances and Corporate Innovation 超越企业边界的创新:战略联盟与企业创新

Corporate Governance: Actors & Players eJournal Pub Date : 2016-11-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2668000

Thomas J. Chemmanur, Yaokan Shen, Jing Xie

引用次数: 5

Auditing the Auditors: Evaluating the Methodology of Performance Audits 审计审核员:评价绩效审计方法

Corporate Governance: Actors & Players eJournal Pub Date : 2016-10-15 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2871102

P. Trivedi

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引用次数: 3

Managing Performance Signals Through Delay: Evidence from Venture Capital 通过延迟管理绩效信号:来自风险投资的证据

Corporate Governance: Actors & Players eJournal Pub Date : 2016-09-13 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2494677

Indraneel Chakraborty, M. Ewens

引用次数: 45

Unpacking the CEO-Board Relationship: How Strategy-Making Happens in Entrepreneurial Firms 剖析ceo与董事会的关系:创业型公司的战略制定是如何发生的

Corporate Governance: Actors & Players eJournal Pub Date : 2016-09-10 DOI: 10.5465/AMJ.2014.0599

Sam Garg, K. Eisenhardt

引用次数: 136

Abnormal Audit Fees and Accounting Quality 异常审计费用与会计质量

Corporate Governance: Actors & Players eJournal Pub Date : 2016-08-18 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2826272

J. Coulton, G. Livne, Angela Pettinicchio, Stephen L Taylor

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引用次数: 6