ERN: Asymmetric & Private Information (Topic)最新文献

Serial Vickrey Mechanism 系列维克里机构

ERN: Asymmetric & Private Information (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-07-30 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3667371

Yu Zhou, Shigehiro Serizawa

引用次数: 1

First to 'Read' the News: News Analytics and High Frequency Trading 首先“阅读”新闻:新闻分析和高频交易

ERN: Asymmetric & Private Information (Topic) Pub Date : 2015-10-23 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2356547

Bastian von Beschwitz, Donald B. Keim, M. Massa

引用次数: 16

Essays on Financial Intermediation - Dissertation Executive Summary 金融中介论文-论文执行摘要

ERN: Asymmetric & Private Information (Topic) Pub Date : 2012-04-10 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2037981

Javed Ahmed

引用次数: 0

Incidence and Structure of European Buyout Syndicates: Empirical Results from an Integrated Study 欧洲收购财团的发生率与结构:一项综合研究的实证结果

ERN: Asymmetric & Private Information (Topic) Pub Date : 2012-03-14 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2021728

Randy Priem, N. Huyghebaert, Linda M. Van De Gucht

{"title":"Incidence and Structure of European Buyout Syndicates: Empirical Results from an Integrated Study","authors":"Randy Priem, N. Huyghebaert, Linda M. Van De Gucht","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2021728","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2021728","url":null,"abstract":"We empirically examine under what conditions lead financiers decide to finance a buyout through a syndicate of multiple investors and how these syndicates are structured, using a unique dataset of 865 European buyouts during 1999-2009. We rely on a theoretical framework that integrates the benefits of syndication, based on risk-diversification, resource-based, and deal-flow motives, and the costs of syndication, such as potential information and incentive problems within the syndicate. We find evidence that lead financiers syndicate to diversify target default and legal risk, and to learn about the institutions of the target country. Lead financiers subsequently decide on the fraction of the deal to retain and on the number of syndicate participants so as to minimize syndication costs while further maximizing syndication benefits. Interestingly, and after accounting for the endogeneity of syndication decisions, we find that the post-buyout profitability and growth of target firms are superior when buyouts are syndicated and when these syndicates are structured to maximize investor involvement while limiting conflicts of interest.","PeriodicalId":440574,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Asymmetric & Private Information (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-03-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128658300","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 3

The Optimal Choice of Pre-Launch Reviewer 发行前审稿人的最佳选择

ERN: Asymmetric & Private Information (Topic) Pub Date : 2011-12-16 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1422641

D. Gill, D. Sgroi

引用次数: 91

Securitization, Competition and Efficiency 证券化、竞争与效率

ERN: Asymmetric & Private Information (Topic) Pub Date : 2010-07-05 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1361792

Jung-Hyun Ahn, Régis Breton

引用次数: 3

The First-Order Approach to Moral Hazard Problems with Hidden Saving 具有隐性储蓄的道德风险问题的一阶方法

ERN: Asymmetric & Private Information (Topic) Pub Date : 2010-01-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1444780

S. Koehne

{"title":"The First-Order Approach to Moral Hazard Problems with Hidden Saving","authors":"S. Koehne","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1444780","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1444780","url":null,"abstract":"Moral hazard models with hidden saving decisions are useful to study such diverse problems as unemployment insurance, income taxation, executive compensation, or human capital policies. How can we solve such models? In general, this is very difficult. Under the conditions derived in this paper, however, we can replace the incentive constraint with the associated first-order condition. This allows the application of simple Lagrangian methods and yields a precise characterization of optimal contracts. To obtain tractable conditions for the validity of this approach, the paper draws on the concept of log-convexity. Since logconvexity, unlike convexity, is preserved under multiplication, the paper is able to separate the assumptions on the output distribution from the assumptions on the agent’s preferences in a sense, even though the interaction between these two is important for the agent’s incentives. The first-order approach is valid if the following conditions hold: a) the agent has nonincreasing absolute risk aversion (NIARA) utility, b) the output technology has monotone likelihood ratios (MLR), and c) the distribution function of output is log-convex in effort (LCDF). Finally, the paper shows how the curvature of optimal wage schemes can be used to relax the above conditions.","PeriodicalId":440574,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Asymmetric & Private Information (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121083047","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 8

On the Informational Properties of Trading Networks 论交易网络的信息属性

ERN: Asymmetric & Private Information (Topic) Pub Date : 2009-09-09 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1361184

Lada A. Adamic, Celso Brunetti, J. Harris, A. Kirilenko

引用次数: 20

The Incentive and Signaling Effects of Annual Bonus Schemes: Evidence from Firm Innovation 年度奖金制度的激励和信号效应:来自企业创新的证据

ERN: Asymmetric & Private Information (Topic) Pub Date : 2009-08-17 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1269444

F. Hoppe

引用次数: 1

Second-Generation Prediction Markets for Information Aggregation: A Comparison of Payoff Mechanisms 信息聚集的第二代预测市场:报酬机制的比较

ERN: Asymmetric & Private Information (Topic) Pub Date : 2009-07-17 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1435316

C. Slamka, Wolfgang Jank, B. Skiera

{"title":"Second-Generation Prediction Markets for Information Aggregation: A Comparison of Payoff Mechanisms","authors":"C. Slamka, Wolfgang Jank, B. Skiera","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1435316","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1435316","url":null,"abstract":"Initial applications of prediction markets (PMs) indicate they provide good forecasting instruments in many settings, such as elections, the box office, or product sales. One particular characteristic of these “first-generation” (G1) PMs is that they link the payoff value of a stock’s share to the outcome of an event. Recently, “second-generation” (G2) PMs have introduced alternative mechanisms to determine payoff values which allow them to be used as preference markets for determining preferences for product concepts or as idea markets for generating and evaluating new product ideas. Three different G2 payoff mechanisms appear in existing literature, but they have never been compared. This study conceptually and empirically compares the forecasting accuracy of the three G2 payoff mechanisms and investigates their influence on participants’ trading behavior. We find that G2 payoff mechanisms perform almost as well as their G1 counterpart, and trading behavior is very similar in both markets (i.e., trading prices and trading volume), except during the very last trading hours of the market. These results indicate that G2 PMs are valid instruments and support their applicability shown in previous studies for developing new product ideas or evaluating new product concepts.","PeriodicalId":440574,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Asymmetric & Private Information (Topic)","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-07-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131883068","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 28