2023 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)最新文献

{"title":"Red Team vs. Blue Team: A Real-World Hardware Trojan Detection Case Study Across Four Modern CMOS Technology Generations","authors":"Endres Puschner, Thorben Moos, Steffen Becker, Christian Kison, A. Moradi, C. Paar","doi":"10.1109/SP46215.2023.10179341","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP46215.2023.10179341","url":null,"abstract":"Verifying the absence of maliciously inserted Trojans in Integrated Circuits (ICs) is a crucial task – especially for security-enabled products. Depending on the concrete threat model, different techniques can be applied for this purpose. Assuming that the original IC layout is benign and free of backdoors, the primary security threats are usually identified as the outsourced manufacturing and transportation. To ensure the absence of Trojans in commissioned chips, one straightforward solution is to compare the received semiconductor devices to the design files that were initially submitted to the foundry. Clearly, conducting such a comparison requires advanced laboratory equipment and qualified experts. Nevertheless, the fundamental techniques to detect Trojans which require evident changes to the silicon layout are nowadays well-understood. Despite this, there is a glaring lack of public case studies describing the process in its entirety while making the underlying datasets publicly available. In this work, we aim to improve upon this state of the art by presenting a public and open hardware Trojan detection case study based on four different digital ICs using a Red Team vs. Blue Team approach. Hereby, the Red Team creates small changes acting as surrogates for inserted Trojans in the layouts of 90 nm, 65 nm, 40 nm, and 28 nm ICs. The quest of the Blue Team is to detect all differences between digital layout and manufactured device by means of a GDSII–vs–SEM-image comparison. Can the Blue Team perform this task efficiently? Our results spark optimism for the Trojan seekers and answer common questions about the efficiency of such techniques for relevant IC sizes. Further, they allow to draw conclusions about the impact of technology scaling on the detection performance.","PeriodicalId":439989,"journal":{"name":"2023 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115338653","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"GraphSPD: Graph-Based Security Patch Detection with Enriched Code Semantics","authors":"Shu Wang, Xinda Wang, Kun Sun, S. Jajodia, Haining Wang, Qi Li","doi":"10.1109/SP46215.2023.10179479","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP46215.2023.10179479","url":null,"abstract":"With the increasing popularity of open-source software, embedded vulnerabilities have been widely propagating to downstream software. Due to different maintenance policies, software vendors may silently release security patches without providing sufficient advisories (e.g., CVE). This leaves users unaware of security patches and provides attackers good chances to exploit unpatched vulnerabilities. Thus, detecting those silent security patches becomes imperative for secure software maintenance. In this paper, we propose a graph neural network based security patch detection system named GraphSPD, which represents patches as graphs with richer semantics and utilizes a patch-tailored graph model for detection. We first develop a novel graph structure called PatchCPG to represent software patches by merging two code property graphs (CPGs) for the pre-patch and post-patch source code as well as retaining the context, deleted, and added components for the patch. By applying a slicing technique, we retain the most relevant context and reduce the size of PatchCPG. Then, we develop the first end-to-end deep learning model called PatchGNN to determine if a patch is security-related directly from its graph-structured PatchCPG. PatchGNN includes a new embedding process to convert PatchCPG into a numeric format and a new multi-attributed graph convolution mechanism to adapt diverse relationships in PatchCPG. The experimental results show GraphSPD can significantly outperform the state-of-the-art approaches on security patch detection.","PeriodicalId":439989,"journal":{"name":"2023 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115683494","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"SecureCells: A Secure Compartmentalized Architecture","authors":"Atri Bhattacharyya, Florian Hofhammer, Yuan-Fang Li, Siddharth Gupta, Andrés Sánchez, B. Falsafi, Mathias Payer","doi":"10.1109/SP46215.2023.10179472","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP46215.2023.10179472","url":null,"abstract":"Modern programs are monolithic, combining code of varied provenance without isolation, all the while running on network-connected devices. A vulnerability in any component may compromise code and data of all other components. Compartmentalization separates programs into fault domains with limited policy-defined permissions, following the Principle of Least Privilege, preventing arbitrary interactions between components. Unfortunately, existing compartmentalization mechanisms target weak attacker models, incur high overheads, or overfit to specific use cases, precluding their general adoption. The need of the hour is a secure, performant, and flexible mechanism on which developers can reliably implement an arsenal of compartmentalized software.We present SecureCells, a novel architecture for intra-address space compartmentalization. SecureCells enforces per-Virtual Memory Area (VMA) permissions for secure and scalable access control, and introduces new userspace instructions for secure and fast compartment switching with hardware-enforced call gates and zero-copy permission transfers. SecureCells enables novel software mechanisms for call stack maintenance and register context isolation. In microbenchmarks, SecureCells switches compartments in only 8 cycles on a 5-stage in-order processor, reducing cost by an order of magnitude compared to state-of-the-art. Consequently, SecureCells helps secure high-performance software such as an in-memory key-value store with negligible overhead of less than 3%.","PeriodicalId":439989,"journal":{"name":"2023 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)","volume":"78 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124808541","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Control Flow and Pointer Integrity Enforcement in a Secure Tagged Architecture","authors":"Ravi Theja Gollapudi, Gokturk Yuksek, David Demicco, Matthew Cole, Gaurav Kothari, Rohit S. Kulkarni, Xin Zhang, K. Ghose, Aravind Prakash, Zerksis D. Umrigar","doi":"10.1109/SP46215.2023.10179416","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP46215.2023.10179416","url":null,"abstract":"Control flow attacks exploit software vulnerabilities to divert the flow of control into unintended paths to ultimately execute attack code. This paper explores the use of instruction and data tagging as a general means of thwarting such control flow attacks, including attacks that rely on violating pointer integrity. Using specific types of narrow-width data tags along with narrow-width instruction tags embedded within the binary facilitates the security policies required to protect against such attacks, leading to a practically viable solution. Co-locating instruction tags close to their corresponding instructions within cache lines eliminates the need for separate mechanisms for instruction tag accesses. Information gleaned from the analysis phase of a compiler is augmented and used to generate the instruction and data tags. A full-stack implementation that consists of a modified LLVM compiler, modified Linux OS support for tags and a FPGA-implemented CPU hardware prototype for enforcing CFI, data pointer and code pointer integrity is demonstrated. With a modest hardware enhancement, the execution time of benchmark applications on the prototype system is shown to be limited to low, single-digit percentages of a baseline system without tagging.","PeriodicalId":439989,"journal":{"name":"2023 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125376666","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"From Grim Reality to Practical Solution: Malware Classification in Real-World Noise","authors":"Xian Wu, Wenbo Guo, Jia Yan, Baris Coskun, Xinyu Xing","doi":"10.1109/SP46215.2023.10179453","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP46215.2023.10179453","url":null,"abstract":"Malware datasets inevitably contain incorrect labels due to the shortage of expertise and experience needed for sample labeling. Previous research demonstrated that a training dataset with incorrectly labeled samples would result in inaccurate model learning. To address this problem, researchers have proposed various noise learning methods to offset the impact of incorrectly labeled samples, and in image recognition and text mining applications, these methods demonstrated great success. In this work, we apply both representative and state-of-the-art noise learning methods to real-world malware classification tasks. We surprisingly observe that none of the existing methods could minimize incorrect labels’ impact. Through a carefully designed experiment, we discover that the inefficacy mainly results from extreme data imbalance and the high percentage of incorrectly labeled data samples. As such, we further propose a new noise learning method and name it after MORSE. Unlike existing methods, MORSE customizes and extends a state-of-the-art semi-supervised learning technique. It takes possibly incorrectly labeled data as unlabeled data and thus avoids their potential negative impact on model learning. In MORSE, we also integrate a sample re-weighting method that balances the training data usage in the model learning and thus handles the data imbalance challenge. We evaluate MORSE on both our synthesized and real-world datasets. We show that MORSE could significantly outperform existing noise learning methods and minimize the impact of incorrectly labeled data.","PeriodicalId":439989,"journal":{"name":"2023 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126949421","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"TEEzz: Fuzzing Trusted Applications on COTS Android Devices","authors":"Marcel Busch, Aravind Machiry, Chad Spensky, G. Vigna, Christopher Kruegel, Mathias Payer","doi":"10.1109/SP46215.2023.10179302","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP46215.2023.10179302","url":null,"abstract":"Security and privacy-sensitive smartphone applications use trusted execution environments (TEEs) to protect sensitive operations from malicious code. By design, TEEs have privileged access to the entire system but expose little to no insight into their inner workings. Moreover, real-world TEEs enforce strict format and protocol interactions when communicating with trusted applications (TAs), which prohibits effective automated testing.TEEzz is the first TEE-aware fuzzing framework capable of effectively fuzzing TAs in situ on production smartphones, i.e., the TA runs in the encrypted and protected TEE and the fuzzer may only observe interactions with the TA but has no control over the TA’s code or data. Unlike traditional fuzzing techniques, which monitor the execution of a program being fuzzed and view its memory after a crash, TEEzz only requires a limited view of the target. TEEzz overcomes key limitations of TEE fuzzing (e.g., lack of visibility into the executed TAs, proprietary exchange formats, and value dependencies of interactions) by automatically attempting to infer the field types and message dependencies of the TA API through its interactions, designing state- and type-aware fuzzing mutators, and creating an in situ, on-device fuzzer.Due to the limited availability of systematic fuzzing research for TAs on commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) Android devices, we extensively examine existing solutions, explore their limitations, and demonstrate how TEEzz improves the state-of-the-art. First, we show that general-purpose kernel driver fuzzers are ineffective for fuzzing TAs. Then, we establish a baseline for fuzzing TAs using a ground-truth experiment. We show that TEEzz outperforms other blackbox fuzzers, can improve greybox approaches (if TAs source code is available), and even outperforms greybox approaches for stateful targets. We found 13 previously unknown bugs in the latest versions of OPTEE TAs in total, out of which TEEzz is the only fuzzer to trigger three. We also ran TEEzz on popular phones and found 40 unique bugs for which one CVE was assigned so far.","PeriodicalId":439989,"journal":{"name":"2023 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127013759","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"AUC: Accountable Universal Composability","authors":"M. Graf, Ralf Küsters, Daniel Rausch","doi":"10.1109/SP46215.2023.10179384","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP46215.2023.10179384","url":null,"abstract":"Accountability is a well-established and widely used security concept that allows for obtaining undeniable cryptographic proof of misbehavior, thereby incentivizing honest behavior. There already exist several general purpose account-ability frameworks for formal game-based security analyses. Unfortunately, such game-based frameworks do not support modular security analyses, which is an important tool to handle the complexity of modern protocols.Universal composability (UC) models provide native support for modular analyses, including re-use and composition of security results. So far, accountability has mainly been modeled and analyzed in UC models for the special case of MPC protocols, with a general purpose accountability framework for UC still missing. That is, a framework that among others supports arbitrary protocols, a wide range of accountability properties, handling and mixing of accountable and non-accountable security properties, and modular analysis of accountable protocols.To close this gap, we propose AUC, the first general purpose accountability framework for UC models, which supports all of the above, based on several new concepts. We exemplify AUC in three case studies not covered by existing works. In particular, AUC unifies existing UC accountability approaches within a single framework.","PeriodicalId":439989,"journal":{"name":"2023 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)","volume":"448 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116493697","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Low-effort VR Headset User Authentication Using Head-reverberated Sounds with Replay Resistance","authors":"Ruxin Wang, Long Huang, Chen Wang","doi":"10.1109/SP46215.2023.10179367","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP46215.2023.10179367","url":null,"abstract":"While Virtual Reality (VR) applications are becoming increasingly common, efficiently verifying a VR device user before granting personal access is still a challenge. Existing VR authentication methods require users to enter PINs or draw graphical passwords using controllers. Though the entry is in the virtual space, it can be observed by others in proximity and is subject to critical security issues. Furthermore, the in-air hand movements or handheld controller-based authentications require active user participation and are not time-efficient. This work proposes a low-effort VR device authentication system based on the unique skull-reverberated sounds, which can be acquired when the user wears the VR device. Specifically, when the user puts on the VR device or is wearing it to log into an online account, the proposed system actively emits an ultrasonic signal to initiate the authentication session. The signal returning to the VR device’s microphone has been reverberated by the user’s head, which is unique in size, skull shape and mass. We thus extract head biometric information from the received signal for unobtrusive VR device authentication.Though active acoustic sensing has been broadly used on mobile devices, no prior work has ever successfully applied such techniques to commodity VR devices. Because VR devices are designed to provide users with virtual reality immersion, the echo sounds used for active sensing are unwanted and severely suppressed. The raw audio before this process is also not accessible without kernel/hardware modifications. Thus, our work further solves the challenge of active acoustic sensing under echo cancellation to enable deploying our system on off-the-shelf VR devices. Additionally, we show that the echo cancellation mechanism is naturally good to prevent acoustic replay attacks. The proposed system is developed based on an autoencoder and a convolutional neural network for biometric data extraction and recognition. Experiments with a standalone and a mobile phone VR headset show that our system efficiently verifies a user and is also replay-resistant.","PeriodicalId":439989,"journal":{"name":"2023 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122702075","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Attitudes towards Client-Side Scanning for CSAM, Terrorism, Drug Trafficking, Drug Use and Tax Evasion in Germany","authors":"Lisa Geierhaas, Fabian Otto, Maximilian Häring, Matthew Smith","doi":"10.1109/SP46215.2023.10179417","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP46215.2023.10179417","url":null,"abstract":"In recent years, there have been a rising number of legislative efforts and proposed technical measures to weaken privacy-preserving technology, with the stated goal of countering serious crimes like child abuse. One of these proposed measures is Client-Side Scanning (CSS). CSS has been hotly debated both in the context of Apple stating their intention to deploy it in 2021 as well as EU legislation being proposed in 2022. Both sides of the argument state that they are working in the best interests of the people. To shed some light on this, we conducted a survey with a representative sample of German citizens. We investigated the general acceptance of CSS vs cloud-based scanning for different types of crimes and analyzed how trust in the German government and companies such as Google and Apple influenced our participants’ views. We found that, by and large, the majority of participants were willing to accept CSS measures to combat serious crimes such as child abuse or terrorism, but support dropped significantly for other illegal activities. However, the majority of participants who supported CSS were also worried about potential abuse, with only 20% stating that they were not concerned. These results suggest that many of our participants would be willing to have their devices scanned and accept some risks in the hope of aiding law enforcement. In our analysis, we argue that there are good reasons to not see this as a carte blanche for the introduction of CSS but as a call to action for the S&P community. More research is needed into how a population’s desire to prevent serious crime online can be achieved while mitigating the risks to privacy and society.","PeriodicalId":439989,"journal":{"name":"2023 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)","volume":"72 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129761991","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Design and Evaluation of Inclusive Email Security Indicators for People with Visual Impairments","authors":"Yaman Yu, Saidivya Ashok, Smirity Kaushik, Yang Wang, G. Wang","doi":"10.1109/SP46215.2023.10179407","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP46215.2023.10179407","url":null,"abstract":"Due to the challenges to detect and filter phishing emails, it is inevitable that some phishing emails can still reach a user’s inbox. As a result, email providers such as Gmail have implemented phishing warnings to help users to better recognize phishing attempts. Existing research has primarily focused on phishing warnings for sighted users and yet it is not well understood how people with visual impairments interact with phishing emails and warnings. In this paper, we worked with a group of users (N=41) with visual impairments to study the effectiveness of existing warnings and explore more inclusive designs (using Gmail warning designs as a baseline for comparison). We took a multipronged approach including an exploratory study (to understand the challenges faced by users), user-in-the-loop design and prototyping, and the main study (to assess the impact of design choices). Our results show that users with visual impairments often miss existing Gmail warnings because the current design (e.g., warning position, HTML tags used) does not match well with screen reader users’ reading habits. The inconsistencies of the warnings (e.g., across the Standard and HTML view) also create obstacles to users. We show that an inclusive design (combining audio warning, shortcut key, and warning page overlay) can effectively increase the warning noticeability. Based on our results, we make a number of recommendations to email providers.","PeriodicalId":439989,"journal":{"name":"2023 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129439304","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}