{"title":"Capital of a Company - Shares and Debentures","authors":"Sankalp Jain","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3894781","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3894781","url":null,"abstract":"The capital played important role during the early development of company law during the industrial evolution. The capital includes share capital which is received when a company issues shares to shareholders as well as the loan capital which the company obtains from issuing debentures to creditors. Capital of a company means cash or goods used to generate income either by investing in a business or a different income property. In other words the money, property and other valuables which collectively represent the wealth of an individual or business are called capital of a company. By shares, we mean units of ownership interest in a corporation or financial asset. Owning shares in a business does not mean that the shareholder has direct control over the business's day-to-day operations. However, being a shareholder does entitle the possessor to an equal distribution in any profits, if any are declared in the form of dividends. Debenture means a type of debt instrument that is not secured by physical asset or security.","PeriodicalId":439319,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Corporate Borrowing","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125227613","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Yiping Huang, Yang Ji, Xiaoran Ni, Yuyan Tan, Xu Wang
{"title":"Economic Policy Uncertainty, State Ownership, and Credit Allocation","authors":"Yiping Huang, Yang Ji, Xiaoran Ni, Yuyan Tan, Xu Wang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3177982","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3177982","url":null,"abstract":"Employing the news-based economic policy uncertainty (EPU) Index of Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016) and quarterly data of Chinese listed companies, we find that an increase in EPU raises the average debt-to-asset ratio of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) but lowers that of private-owned enterprises (POEs). Further evidence supports the view that in reaction to a heightened EPU, banks tend to allocate credit resources toward firms with implicit guarantees against default. Our findings highlight that EPU can reduce real efficiency through worsening credit misallocation.","PeriodicalId":439319,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Corporate Borrowing","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129112999","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Debt Covenants and Accounting Manipulation","authors":"V. Laux","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2915311","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2915311","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies the effects of allocating control rights to lenders via debt covenants when managers can sometimes misreport the accounting information on which the covenants are based. When contract renegotiation is exogenously prohibited, including a covenant in the contract is ex ante optimal because it increases both the probability that poor projects are liquidated and the manager's effort incentive. When the parties can renegotiate the contract, the results can flip: Granting the lender more control can lead to less frequent liquidations of low-quality projects and lower managerial effort incentives and thereby reduce the manager's ex ante payoff. The key behind these results is not the manager's incentive to misreport per se but her desire to take subsequent actions that conceal the misreporting. The model generates predictions regarding the determinants of accounting-based covenants, and the effects of covenants on misreporting, managerial effort, the frequency of liquidations, and firm value.","PeriodicalId":439319,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Corporate Borrowing","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124801661","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Bank Monitoring: Evidence from Syndicated Loans","authors":"M. Gustafson, Ivan T. Ivanov, Ralf R. Meisenzahl","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2831455","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2831455","url":null,"abstract":"The rise in popularity of syndicated lending raises questions about the incentives of banks to actively monitor borrowers. We empirically investigate these incentives using a novel dataset that includes the frequency with which banks monitor borrowers' financial condition and the collateral underlying syndicated bank loans. We find that banks monitor frequently with approximately 50% of loans being monitored at least on a monthly basis. Monitoring frequency is increasing in the lead arranger's loan share for private borrowers and the lead bank's reputation for public borrowers. These results are consistent with lender reputation mitigating moral hazard only to the extent that monitoring effort is verifiable. Lead banks also monitor more when monitoring is likely to produce new information and when information is more valuable, such as when borrower financial health deteriorates. Overall, our results suggest that banks actively monitor the average syndicated loan in a manner consistent with theoretical predictions in the literature.","PeriodicalId":439319,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Corporate Borrowing","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127311238","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Debt Contracting When Borrowers Face Transitory Uncertainty: Evidence from U.S. Gubernatorial Elections","authors":"Kirak Kim, Trang Nguyen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3427141","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3427141","url":null,"abstract":"We study debt-contracting implications of uncertainty surrounding U.S. gubernatorial elections. In election years, loan contracts are more likely to include performance-pricing provisions, whereas loan spreads are mostly unaffected. Additionally, we find, only among those loans without performance-pricing provisions, a marginal increase in loan spreads in election years and a significant increase in loan-spread amendments postelection. The results suggest that under transitory uncertainty, performance pricing curbs an explicit rise in loan spreads and reduces ex-post renegotiations, yielding efficiency gains in contracting. Our further analysis uncovers a veiled pricing effect manifested through interest-rate contingencies: the likelihood of using rate-increasing pricing grids rises in election years for borrowers with a high exposure to uncertainty, thereby ensuring compensation to lenders for uncertainty. Overall, our findings suggest that loan contracting attempts to mitigate the problem of election uncertainty and renegotiation costs through state-contingent pricing, with which borrowers weigh initial loan spreads against the potential for loan-spread variability in the future. This paper was accepted by Victoria Ivashina, finance. Supplemental Material: The data is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.03106 .","PeriodicalId":439319,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Corporate Borrowing","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115756437","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Capital Structure Adjustments and Asymmetric Information","authors":"A. Ripamonti","doi":"10.5539/ijef.v11n12p1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5539/ijef.v11n12p1","url":null,"abstract":"The findings of this paper suggest another reason for capital structure adjustments besides the Trade-Off and Pecking Order theories propositions because asymmetric information impacts capital structure changes and deviations only for a quarter whilst stationarity impacts them for 4 quarters, even when controlled. Asymmetric information has been measured by Corwin-Schultz bid ask spread estimator and capital structure target as the mean of debt-to-equity ratio of 262 Nyse non-financial and non-regulated companies and their industries during 91 quarters. The data were analyzed with Johansen-Fisher panel cointegration. The capital structure deviations last from 2 to 4 quarters and move toward a target.","PeriodicalId":439319,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Corporate Borrowing","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122206712","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Testimony before the House Financial Services Committee; Hearing on 'Examining Corporate Priorities: The Impact of Stock Buybacks on Workers, Communities, and Investors'","authors":"Lenore M. Palladino","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3472036","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3472036","url":null,"abstract":"In this testimony I discuss the causes and consequences of the rise of stock buybacks. Stock buybacks may sound like a technical matter of corporate finance: Why should it matter whether or not corporations repurchase their own stock? When a company executes a stock buyback, they raise the price of that company’s shares for a period of time, but the funds spent on buybacks are then unavailable to be spent on the types of corporate activities that could make the company more productive over the long term: investments in future productivity and in the workforce. Stock buybacks are one of the drivers of our imbalanced economy, in which corporate profits and shareholder payments continue to grow while wages for typical workers stay flat.<br><br>Stock buybacks are virtually unregulated, even though Congress has recognized their potential for market manipulation. Importantly, there are currently no meaningful limits to stop executives from using corporate money on stock buybacks to raise share prices for their own short-term gain. Executives are not required to disclose that they have conducted a buyback until the next quarter’s filing; meanwhile, there are no substantive limits to stop them from selling their own personal shares in the same quarter as they are conducting buybacks. <br>","PeriodicalId":439319,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Corporate Borrowing","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114901714","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Fintech and Banking","authors":"A. Thakor","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3332550","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3332550","url":null,"abstract":"This paper is a review of fintech and its interaction with banking. Included in fintech are innovations in payment systems (including cryptocurrencies), credit markets (including P2P lending), and insurance, with blockchain-assisted smart contract playing a role. The paper provides a definition of fintech, examines some statistics and stylized facts, and then reviews the theoretical and empirical literature. The review is organized around four main research questions. That paper summarizes our knowledge on these questions and concludes with questions for future research.","PeriodicalId":439319,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Corporate Borrowing","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134112149","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Implications of Reverse Convertible Bonds for Bank Runs and Risk Shifting","authors":"Pierre Chaigneau","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3251484","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3251484","url":null,"abstract":"We describe a new type of bank liability, reverse convertible bonds, that help prevent bank runs that lead to bank failures (ex-post), and inefficient risk-taking (ex-ante). These bonds are short-term debt that automatically convert into equity following a missed debt repayment. They can be designed to eliminate strategic complementarities among bank creditors that give rise to bank runs, thus allowing a bank to fully play its maturity transformation role and avoid bankruptcy. Since bank shareholders are then residual claimants in all states of the world, they do not engage in risk shifting. We discuss similarities and differences with contingent capital.","PeriodicalId":439319,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Corporate Borrowing","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125633153","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Managerial Entrenchment and Debt Specialization","authors":"Daniel Tut","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3386229","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3386229","url":null,"abstract":"Why do some firms borrow from multiple creditors and employ multiple debt types? This paper shows that entrenched managers exploit the coordination failure and free riding problem amongst multiple creditors. We find that firms with entrenched management have a higher proclivity to employ multiple debt types and have a dispersed debt structure. On the other hand, firms that are well-managed have a tendency to concentrate debt and borrow predominantly from a few creditors. We also find that while bank debt is negatively related to debt specialization, market debt is positively related to debt specialization. Overall, the findings suggest that creditors can discipline managers through debt specialization.","PeriodicalId":439319,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Corporate Borrowing","volume":"131 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122624687","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}