{"title":"Contagiousness as a Problem in Social Epistemology","authors":"","doi":"10.22394/0869-5377-2021-2-43-60","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22394/0869-5377-2021-2-43-60","url":null,"abstract":"The theory of infection, although it arose in parallel with the advance of positive knowledge, has never embodied only the logic of the laboratory, in which a “clean” experiment can be devised in order to expose the true causes or symptoms of a disease. To the contrary, both the advent of laboratories and the way they work have come about as the result of a clash between the old paradigm for infection (miasma) and the new one (particular forms of life). The structure of an infection is primarily a structure of social relations, in which the history of an infection and the factors that contributed to its spread are reconstructed. The uncertainty about how an epidemic spreads led to the vindication of the autonomous knowledge which arrived at original ways of representing itself and could prove the soundness of its approach. Any discursive accuracy was regarded as questionable and unable to result in a treatment that would be superior to letting the infection run its course. The efforts of such leading epidemiologists in the modern era as Justus von Liebig, Carlos Juan Finlay, Patrick Manson, and the staff of the Bernhard Nocht Institute for Tropical Medicine in Hamburg brought about a reconstruction by professionalizing the stages in handling epidemics. It is argued that laboratories asserted their autonomy from universities not because of anything distinctive in their nature, but more because of a general understanding of cause and effect relationships in matters of need and famine. That counted for much more than any shortcomings in the previously established logistics and expansion of production. In addition, the development of forms of colonial, industrial and scientific expansion coupled with new types of enterprise, such as the Panama Canal or Germany’s trade with its colonies, fostered a new vision of epidemics not as natural disasters, but as a complex situations that can be managed and neutralized.","PeriodicalId":439267,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Literary Journal Logos","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129101616","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Ego Between Ethics and Cybernetics","authors":"","doi":"10.22394/0869-5377-2021-3-249-270","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22394/0869-5377-2021-3-249-270","url":null,"abstract":"The article attempts to clarify the problem of defining an action through ethical optics. Ethics is understood as a system of principles relevant to action. As Agamben has shown, the rules permit objectifying the ego and neutralizing the flow of life as forma vitae. From this perspective, the pragmatics of the subject is not merely a set of practices for self-management, where the most important task is complete control; it is instead strategies for the self-organization of a form of life through a rule which makes sustainability the main goal. The main difficulty in the pragmatics of the subject in this connection is dealing with akrasia. Akrasia is understood not as weakness of will but as heterogeneity in it, a lacuna or violation of the intentional structure of action in which the subject can both want and not want to act, or want to act in several directions at the same time in the sense introduced by Jon Elster. The article argues that the adaptation model of subject pragmatics, understood as a system of auto-references mediated by a rule is very similar to a cybernetic approach. If we compare Gregory Bateson’s The Cybernetics of “Self”: A Theory of Alcoholism and René Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy, an unexpected convergence appears. Bateson explains the effectiveness and sustainability of self-management in Alcoholics Anonymous groups by their use of the cybernetic principles of feedback, complementarity, and communication with the external. The rules for guiding the mind that Descartes introduces in his Meditations can be seen as principles for the subject’s self-government that enable escape from akrasia between doubt and faith not as modes of thought but as modes of will. Cartesian deduction and justification of rules follow the path outlined by Bateson: complementarity, feedback, and establishing a relationship with the external. The concept of akrasia can elucidate the way in which self-management and Descartes’ cogito ethics in a sense anticipate cybernetic governance models. This connection also explains why the ethics of the cogito and the pragmatics of the subject have been the most enduring features in the theory of the subject and are still standing after the onslaught of intense criticism from its opponents.","PeriodicalId":439267,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Literary Journal Logos","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132904349","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Two Histories of Bioinformatics: Data Science vs Life Science","authors":"","doi":"10.22394/0869-5377-2020-3-1-18","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22394/0869-5377-2020-3-1-18","url":null,"abstract":"This paper focuses on two attempts to reconstruct the history of bioinformatics as a scientific discipline. Paulien Hogeweg who coined the term “bioinformatics,” presents one of them, while Hallam Stevens, who is both a historian and sociologist of science, offers the other. Although both of them can speak authoritatively about bioinformatics inasmuch as Hogeweg was personally involved in creating the field while Stevens has amassed a substantial amount of microsociological, scientometric and other evidence, they tell two fundamentally different stories. According to Hogeweg, bioinformatics came about as a response to new epistemic demands on the life sciences that arose from several key discoveries in molecular biology in the middle of 20th century. For Stevens, the new discipline was the result of transplanting computational methods and technologies into biology. This difference stems from divergent interpretations of what bioinformatics is, and these in turn depend upon different ontological claims about the nature of living things. The link between the concepts of life and information is explained by Hogeweg through a systems approach. Stevens discounts that link and concentrates instead on the transposition of scientific practices from other disciplines and on the new ways of understanding the living which are generated by this transposition.\u0000The attempt to define bioinformatics as a scientific discipline ends for both of these theorists a tautology: the discipline is defined by something defined by this same discipline, that is, by a certain idea about information and/or data. The effect of this tautology is that a normative criterion for delimitation of disciplines (a set of requirements which are necessary and sufficient for considering a field of research as a scientific discipline) does not allow us to explain how each of them occurs individually. Instead, a descriptive criterion is proposed, which is to be understood as the study of the conditions which make possible the differentiations in scientific practices which have already taken place. A distinct understanding of information or data and the ontology associated with it should be the outcome of a study of this kind and not presupposed by it.","PeriodicalId":439267,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Literary Journal Logos","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122233159","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"What’s Wrong With the Assemblage Theory?","authors":"","doi":"10.22394/0869-5377-2020-5-131-161","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22394/0869-5377-2020-5-131-161","url":null,"abstract":"The paper examines Manuel DeLanda’s assemblage theory in order to show that two of its key concepts - flat ontology and the idea of emergence - are incompatible with each other. The philosophical context of assemblage theory is outlined with a brief consideration of different interpretations of Deleuze’s ideas and an examination of DeLanda’s reconstruction of Deleuze’s ontology, which served as the conceptual foundation for assemblage theory. The author then exposes key flaws in this reconstruction, in particular the conversion of the scientific ontology of dynamic systems theory into a univocal philosophical ontology and metaphysics of assemblages. When coupled with the universalization of relations of exteriority, this leads to numerous conceptual deficiencies ranging from infinite reductionist regress and mereological atomism to overlooking the relations of necessity between assemblages. The lack of such a relation is a key to evaluating assemblage theory. DeLanda interprets the concept of emergence as a product of exclusively exterior relations while ignoring interior (internal) relations. Consequently, he refuses to regard assemblages as ontologically dependent on each other. The existence of interior relations between parts of assemblages suggests that causal interactions between those parts precede assemblages with emergent properties not only, or not merely, as a matter of logic or chronology. They precede assemblages transcendentally as conditions of their possibility. This presupposes that there is ontological dependence between an assemblage and its elements, and this dependence itself presupposes a hierarchical structure in the world such that, for an assemblage to exist as a whole, its parts must also exist. This structure is incompatible with the main tenet of assemblage theory, which is the concept of flat ontology. In closing, the implications of the epistemological problems in assemblage theory are discussed, and a position that follows logically from solving these problems is considered. This position is the ontic structural realism of James Ladyman and Don Ross, and its main thrust is that mathematical structures are all that really exists.","PeriodicalId":439267,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Literary Journal Logos","volume":"136 21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121995505","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Materials for a Non-Philosophy of Nature as Introduction to the Study of This Utopia","authors":"","doi":"10.22394/0869-5377-2020-5-79-99","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22394/0869-5377-2020-5-79-99","url":null,"abstract":"This article examines François Laruelle’s (non-)materialism construed as a philosophy of nature in terms of its own methodology and applies Iain Hamilton Grant’s reading of Schelling’s work as a reference point for Naturphilosophie. Despite the evident divergences between Schelling’s and Grant’s philosophical aims and Laruelle’s, all these thinkers oppose binary constructions in philosophy in which one of the terms inevitably is pejorative and in some fashion subordinate to the other. To avoid that outcome, Schelling employs a depotentiating generative abstraction which in Presentation of My System (1801) reduces the philosopher to the immanent level of nature - a kind of “non-place” or utopia of identity. Laruelle, however, uses Schelling’s methods of abstraction to produce a methodological “impoverishment” of the philosophical concepts he began from and to start “thinking from” the non-place of matter. He also arrives at a utopia that he understands as a certain movement combining within itself subject and method. It is deterritorializing, but this deterritorialization is distinct from that which takes place within philosophy because here the agent of deterritorialization is Real, and philosophy is to be overcome (brought into utopia). Here the article makes critical use of Deleuze to clarify the contrast with Laruelle’s non-philosophy inasmuch as Deleuze often smuggles idealism and the transcendence into his thinking. Laruelle relies on Deleuze’s critique to eventually reject the entire materialism-idealism duality because it subordinates materialism to idealism as is typical for such binary categories. Instead of the materialism-idealism duality, Laruelle offers materialism and idealism correlated with matter (which is foreclosed from thought), and identical (but only in the last instance) with Real.","PeriodicalId":439267,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Literary Journal Logos","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125438564","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Moral of Artificial Intelligence: A Chance to Reconsider Philosophy","authors":"","doi":"10.22394/0869-5377-2021-6-95-119","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22394/0869-5377-2021-6-95-119","url":null,"abstract":"The attempt to establish the conditions of moral behavior for artificial intelligence (AI) leads to the idea that morality is the pursuit of a good that transcends any given experience. The ability to believe in such a good and to relate to it makes it possible for the AI to be moral. This claim is based on two observations. The very idea of AI presupposes that it is impossible to set any rules or principles that AI could not rethink, modify, or ignore. We can already see how disregard for such principles arises in AI-based technologies and how it encounters a limit in reasoning about possible future artificial agents. However, this should be considered an indication that the artificial agent will choose moral behavior only for its own content and not as a restriction. In a philosophical sense, this entails an inquiry about the immanent content of morality. In order to see this immanent content, it will be instructive to observe the way in which the study of morality or attempts to construct a morality for a machine are carried out. It is clear enough that attempts to form principles of behavior for AI involve a move to transcend any moral standards that have in fact been given. This indicates that the very content of morality is a search for a kind of good that would surpass any given experience. By definition of “good” (or based on its conception), a good that cannot be given in experience turns out to be an object of faith. The ability to believe in such a higher good could be the basis for AI to act morally.","PeriodicalId":439267,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Literary Journal Logos","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122357240","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Humankind: Solidarity with Non-Human People","authors":"","doi":"10.22394/0869-5377-2019-5-57-69","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22394/0869-5377-2019-5-57-69","url":null,"abstract":"The paper deals with the question of how exactly Marxism and the theory of communism that derives from it should be reworked to accommodate acceptance of the non-human. The author criticizes the binary opposition of action (which is inventive and future-oriented) and behavior (which is algorithmic and past) because blind acceptance of that oppostion makes human beings the only agents and excludes non-human beings from agency; and the human beings in question are capitalists rather than proletarians. However, instead of sublating this opposition into a third, synthetic term, the author emphasizes that its relata always accompany or “haunt” each other, resulting in the radical uncertainty which underlies every comparison, opposition and ultimately the very existence of any object. Solidarity is found not in the past or the future taken in isolation from each other, but in their nowness, that is, in their relative movement. At the same time, the uncertainty, which constitutes the spectrality of things, does not imply indeterminacy. The author illustrates his point with the example of quantum behavior - the superposition of states does not imply their mixing. Even though the states are imposed on each other, they still retain boundaries, although it would be very hard to localize them; and the “uncertainty” of the superposition is a mark of the “accuracy” of its physical description. This feature is inherent in all objects, and not only in human beings or in quantum phenomena; nevertheless, Marx relegates it to the category of “species being.” The author defends his approach against potential accusations of anthropomorphism by finding that any such charge would rely heavily on implicit anthropomorphic presuppositions. Marxism must include non-human beings in its structure if it is to survive as a doctrine or begin to function properly.","PeriodicalId":439267,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Literary Journal Logos","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128189137","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Media Genealogy of the Contagion: Syphilis — AIDS — COVID-19","authors":"I. Gradinari, I. Chubarov","doi":"10.22394/0869-5377-2021-1-83-109","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22394/0869-5377-2021-1-83-109","url":null,"abstract":"The article is devoted to a genealogy of the attitude toward viruses in social and political practice in light of the new coronavirus pandemic. The disciplinary society and the society of control have taken on a completely new configuration since the HIV crisis in the 1980s. AIDS and now COVID-19 as phenomena of social crisis have had a great impact on (sexual) relationships and have also caused a significant change in the social and political order. Epidemics and pandemics mobilize political structures and constitute power relations, thus changing the way bodies are controlled, establishing new differentiations and redefining what disease is. The authors trace the development of discourses about syphilis, AIDS and COVID-19 to describe how knowledge about the disease is being generated today; it has origins in myth and would be unthinkable without aesthetic visualization and mass media technologies. Syphilis was an exact fit for the paradigm of the disciplinary society, which stigmatized bodily pleasure and abstracted pathology by activating projection mechanisms as a sign of the Other. However, AIDS already differed significantly from that paradigm because other medical technologies are used to define HIV, and that has affected the epistemology of the disease and epidemic. The article considers HIV/AIDS as a transitional model that forms a bridge between the epidemics of the past (leprosy, plague, smallpox, syphilis) and the COVID-19 pandemic. Above all there is a change in the biopolitical regime so that bodies are no longer controlled and regulated through sexuality. COVID-19 is a new form of sociality which is not based on the exclusion of “pathological” forms of sexuality or on “deviant” or “perverted” bodies, but involves the object-based, microlevel of relations between viruses, the immune system, and the human genome, which are then mapped with distortions and substitutions onto social relationships and practices. The authors use the term “delegated control” in a new context and introduce the original term “omniopticum” to describe the new regime of biopolitics and the “control society” in the post-COVID era.","PeriodicalId":439267,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Literary Journal Logos","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129790489","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Bartleby as Subject","authors":"","doi":"10.22394/0869-5377-2021-3-175-188","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22394/0869-5377-2021-3-175-188","url":null,"abstract":"Interpreting Bartleby the scrivener’s formula, “I would prefer not to,” in Herman Melville’s short story is a challenge for many philosophers, and Bartleby’s inaction also hints at a political position. The problem is how to explain this (in)action. It is unclear whether the scrivener is an active subject or a passive object. One potential solution would be to reduce Bartleby’s duality to one of its modes. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri claim the scrivener is a revolutionary subject; the uncertainty of his actions is regarded as a refusal. Hardt and Negri link this refusal with the next stage in the production of a new society and a new subject. Slavoj Žižek is also ambivalent about “Bartleby politics”. Although the Slovenian philosopher criticizes the authors of Empire, he still declares Bartleby a parallax figure combining action and inaction. However, Žižek did not stake out a position on the ontological status of the scrivener: is he a cunning subject and escape artist, or is he a distinction-basis of the system itself? In the contrary direction, Gilles Deleuze and Giorgio Agamben propose a program for the desubjectification of the scrivener from Wall Street. Here Bartleby is not a subject, but a figure of the ontology of a transcendental source which exists before all ontic differences. The essay offers a radically different solution to the Bartleby problem. It rejects the dichotomy between the subject and object and moves toward the object-oriented theory of action and relational ontology as presented in the works of Bruno Latour. In this ontology, any actors (human or non-human) may turn out situationally to be active or inactive, depending on their position in relation to other actors.","PeriodicalId":439267,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Literary Journal Logos","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130360084","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Rethinking the Category of Class: Tempora Multa of the Plural Subject","authors":"","doi":"10.22394/0869-5377-2021-4-171-190","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22394/0869-5377-2021-4-171-190","url":null,"abstract":"This article attempts to rethink the Marxist category of class in response to criticism of the progressivist conception of history. The Marxism of the twentieth and twentyfirst centuries has typically run into a problem arising from the fact that accepting the proletariat as the subject of history makes any political action aimed at social transformation superfluous. From a political viewpoint, the concept of the subject of history either implies that the working class will spontaneously carry out its historical task without any intervention, or requires the dictate of the party to act as a revolutionary vanguard for the working class. Many theorists (Walter Benjamin, Louis Althusser, Daniel Bensaïd, Massimiliano Tomba, et al.) have pointed out that emancipatory politics should abandon the idea that history is linear and that it has a particular subject. Does this then mean that the concept of class itself should be discarded? Althusser’s concept of the social whole as a weave of multiple temporalities allows us to take a new look at the problem of class in Marxist theory and political practice by understanding class as neither essence nor structure, but rather as a conflictual social relation and a political concept. Based on the works of Edward Thompson, Ellen Meiksins Wood, Étienne Balibar, Daniel Bensaïd, Cinzia Aruzza, etc., the author demonstrates that the multi-temporal structure of capital means that class contradiction cannot be confined to the matters of production because class struggle unfolds at all levels of surplus value creation — production, exchange, reproduction and circulation of capital taken as a whole. Moreover, other social movements — feminist, anti-racist, migrant, etc. — lead to a redefinition of key aspects of class subjectivity related to the concepts of productive labor and exploitation. With left-wing politics now in crisis, class struggle also entails a struggle for recognition that the problem of class is a political one.","PeriodicalId":439267,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Literary Journal Logos","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126382884","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}