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Philosophical Foundations of Evidence Law最新文献

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Burdens of Proof 举证责任
Philosophical Foundations of Evidence Law Pub Date : 2021-09-30 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198859307.003.0009
M. Spottswood
{"title":"Burdens of Proof","authors":"M. Spottswood","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198859307.003.0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198859307.003.0009","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter provides a brief introduction to the scholarly conversation concerning burdens of persuasion. An adequate account of burdens must first explain what case-related facts the burden draws upon to produce outcomes. I review a variety of answers to this question, including probability threshold, likelihood ratio, belief function, weight-of-evidence, explanatory, and story-based approaches. I then identify several key questions that theories must answer with respect to inputs and show that the best answer on any given question must depend on whether the theory is advanced as a psychological, doctrinal, or normative account. The remainder of the chapter considers varying methods of transforming these inputs into case outcomes, including fixed thresholds, variable thresholds, multi-stepped, and continuous approaches. With respect to these choices, the problem of describing current practices is much easier, but the normative debates are harder to resolve.","PeriodicalId":439238,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Foundations of Evidence Law","volume":"165 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124889814","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Evidence Law and Empirical Psychology 证据法与经验心理学
Philosophical Foundations of Evidence Law Pub Date : 2021-09-30 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198859307.003.0024
J. Sevier
{"title":"Evidence Law and Empirical Psychology","authors":"J. Sevier","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198859307.003.0024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198859307.003.0024","url":null,"abstract":"Empirical psychology is a natural fit for understanding the law of evidence but is also substantially at odds with it. Since the early twentieth century, researchers have begun applying the insights from experimental psychology to various aspects of courtroom adjudication, including the assumptions underlying the Federal Rules of Evidence and the effects of the rules on litigants and the public. At the same time, the law has struggled with whether and how to incorporate insights from an academic discipline that embodies goals and methodologies that are, in many ways, dramatically different from its own. This chapter unfolds a brief historical account of the relationship between empirical psychology and the law of evidence, specifies the major contributions that psychologists have made to our understanding of evidence law, highlights recent, cutting-edge research, and makes several suggestions for how future research can assist in maintaining the relevance of psychology to sound evidentiary policy.","PeriodicalId":439238,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Foundations of Evidence Law","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124913202","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Excluding Evidence for Integrity’s Sake 为了诚信而排除证据
Philosophical Foundations of Evidence Law Pub Date : 2021-09-30 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198859307.003.0007
J. Holroyd, Federico Picinali
{"title":"Excluding Evidence for Integrity’s Sake","authors":"J. Holroyd, Federico Picinali","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198859307.003.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198859307.003.0007","url":null,"abstract":"In recent years, the concept of “integrity” has been frequently discussed by scholars, and deployed by courts, in the domain of criminal procedure. In this chapter, the authors are concerned with how the concept has been employed in relation to the problem of the admissibility of evidence obtained improperly. In conceptualizing and addressing this problem, the advocates of integrity rely on it as a standard of conduct for the criminal justice authorities and as a necessary condition for the state authority to condemn and punish. The authors raise a series of challenges that need answering before integrity can perform these roles. Their aim is not to show that integrity is useless in normative theorizing about the admissibility of evidence, and about the criminal process in general. Rather, it is to give guidance for the elaboration of a theory of integrity that is cogent, coherent, and has useful implications for the process of proof.","PeriodicalId":439238,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Foundations of Evidence Law","volume":"80 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123236191","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Coherence in Legal Evidence 法律证据的连贯性
Philosophical Foundations of Evidence Law Pub Date : 2021-09-30 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198859307.003.0017
Amalia Amaya
{"title":"Coherence in Legal Evidence","authors":"Amalia Amaya","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198859307.003.0017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198859307.003.0017","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter discusses the concept of coherence and its role in evidential reasoning in law. It examines three main approaches to coherence, namely, structural coherence, narrative coherence, and coherence as constraint satisfaction, and argues that coherence as constraint satisfaction provides an account of the kind of coherence that is relevant to legal fact-finding that is both descriptively adequate and normatively appealing. Next, it addresses some problems concerning the relation between coherence and inference, coherence and virtue, and coherence and truth in the context of legal factfinding. More specifically, it examines three main objections facing a coherentist account of inference, i.e., conservatism, circularity and unfeasibility, and conceptualizes it as an explanatory kind of inference. Then, it articulates a problem that has not been traditionally discussed in the coherentist literature, to wit, the coherence bias, and argues that virtue coherentism has the resources to effectively counteract it. Last, it defends the coherentist approach to evidence and legal proof against three objections that put into question the truth-conduciveness of coherence, namely, the isolation or input objection, the alternative coherent systems objection, and the truth objection. The chapter concludes by suggesting some avenues for further research on coherence, evidence, and legal proof.","PeriodicalId":439238,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Foundations of Evidence Law","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131953047","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Argumentation and Evidence 论证与证据
Philosophical Foundations of Evidence Law Pub Date : 2021-09-30 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198859307.003.0014
Floris Bex
{"title":"Argumentation and Evidence","authors":"Floris Bex","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198859307.003.0014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198859307.003.0014","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter underscores the centrality of argumentation to legal and evidential reasoning: the prosecution argues that the suspect committed the crime; attorneys present their arguments; the plaintiff argues his case by citing a relevant precedent; the court presents concurring and dissenting arguments; and so on. The author reviews the different accounts of argumentation developed in the academic literature and then relates those accounts to the context of evidence and proof. Specifically, he focuses on the construction of arguments and counterarguments as involving consecutive reasoning steps, starting with identifying an item of evidence and then reasoning towards some conclusion with the help of general rules of inference and generalizations.","PeriodicalId":439238,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Foundations of Evidence Law","volume":"10 8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129836898","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Linguistic Evidentials and the Law of Hearsay 语言学证据与传闻法
Philosophical Foundations of Evidence Law Pub Date : 2020-12-15 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198859307.003.0012
L. Solan
{"title":"Linguistic Evidentials and the Law of Hearsay","authors":"L. Solan","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198859307.003.0012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198859307.003.0012","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter explores the relationship between how natural language expresses degrees of certainty in the truth of an assertion on the one hand, and how the law handles this issue on the other. This discussion focuses, in particular, on the hearsay doctrine and on the linguistic elements identified as “evidentials:” expressions that include information about how speakers came to know the assertions they make. The hearsay rule bars certain kinds of speech acts from serving as legal evidence, in particular, assertions that report what another person earlier said, and which are offered to express the truth about the events at issue in a case. The author links the law governing hearsay in terms of speech act theory, a connection also drawn by the philosopher John Langshaw Austin, who observed that statements offered to prove the fact of the speech act rather than the truth of the matter asserted are admissible.","PeriodicalId":439238,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Foundations of Evidence Law","volume":"99 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128061061","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
The Role of Rules in the Law of Evidence 规则在证据法中的作用
Philosophical Foundations of Evidence Law Pub Date : 2020-10-19 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198859307.003.0006
F. Schauer
{"title":"The Role of Rules in the Law of Evidence","authors":"F. Schauer","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198859307.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198859307.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter starts out with Bentham’s antinomian thesis that rejected the very idea of setting up rules for selecting and evaluating evidence. Bentham believed that factfinding should be governed by epistemically good reasons as a process unconstrained by artificial legal rules. The author observes that most legal systems took up this approach by softening the hard edges of rules (as in common law jurisdictions) and by following the basically free-proof model of factfinding (as in countries that adopted the continental European approach). Yet, he claims that the law of evidence still remains substantially an affair of rules. Why this is the case and whether it should be the case, is the subject of this chapter.","PeriodicalId":439238,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Foundations of Evidence Law","volume":"70 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126628849","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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