{"title":"Censorship or Free Speech: Controversy Over the Broadcasting of The Reagans","authors":"R. Littlefield, Susan A. Bornsen","doi":"10.1080/08997225.2005.10556319","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08997225.2005.10556319","url":null,"abstract":"When Ronald and Nancy Reagan left the White House in 1989, they said goodbye to public life. The images of them leaving Washington and flying off to California were carefully staged as the final shots of what would become a very private existence for the former President and First Lady. Until his death at the age of 93, most news of Ronald and Nancy Reagan focused on his deteriorating condition and her devotion to him. When the policies of the Reagan Administration were attacked, the former President personally did not defend himself; but rather, supporters quickly countered with a ‘‘familiar and wellaccepted story’’ (Lewis 1987 280): ‘‘President Reagan restored America’s confidence, propelled its economy into the longest expansion in history, and, in Mrs. Thatcher’s words, ’won the Cold War without firing a single shot’’’ (Miller 2004). In addition, former Reagan insiders authored several sympathetic books that brought mostly positive media attention to the former president (Elber 2003); and admirers ‘‘launched a campaign to have at least one public building named for Reagan in each of America’s 3,067 counties’’ (Braxton and Baker 2003). The care taken to preserve this larger-than-life image of the former President with the public was not accidental. It remained protected until late in 2003, when the scheduled broadcast of a fictionalized, biographical television mini-series, The Reagans, threatened to show Ronald and Nancy Reagan in what loyalists thought was an unflattering, mean-spirited and unfair light. The Reagan inner circle was concerned about the effect this mini-series would have on the way people viewed the Reagan presidency. They knew the power of the media, and this mini-series had the potential to expose a new generation to the Reagan presidency and tarnish the final heroic image his supporters had hoped would be his legacy (Denton 1988). In the end, Reagan loyalists were successful in pressuring the CBS television network to cancel its prime time showing of the mini-series. Liberals called the cancellation censorship of a mini-series intended to portray Ronald and Nancy Reagan in a realistic manner; Conservatives characterized what happened as the exercise of free speech by the people with the intent of stopping an unjust and immoral act. To address these issues, the theoretical underpinnings of this study will be offered, followed by the context surrounding the controversy and the implications for a free society.","PeriodicalId":439135,"journal":{"name":"Free Speech Yearbook","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129561582","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Free Speech Implications of Internet-Only Radio on Campus","authors":"M. Paxton","doi":"10.1080/08997225.2005.10556322","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08997225.2005.10556322","url":null,"abstract":"Radio stations have been operating as part of college and university campuses for nearly 90 years, and for the past three-quarters of a century over-the-air broadcasters have been regulated by the Federal Communications Commission (Brant). In the past few years, however, wouldbe broadcasters at a number of schools have found a way to get their messages out without federal licensing and FCC content regulations. Internet-only radio, which does not use over-the-air signals, has enabled stations to distribute programming through computer connections without seeking FCC permission. Babson College Radio at Babson College of Massachusetts claims on its web site that it was the first Internetonly radio station (History). The University of Texas at Arlington alumni publication reports that the campus Internet-only radio station, UTA Radio, is available twenty-four hours a day, seven day a week (‘‘No wattage required’’). Other Internet-only college radio stations include The Growl at Southwest Missouri State University, K Beach at California State UniversityLong Beach, and Blazeradio at the University of Alabama at Birmingham. There are, however, no reliable sources for determining how many public college and university campuses have Internet-only radio (also called ‘‘streaming audio’’). Neither SoundExchange, the nonprofit performance rights organization for Internet radio (Simon), nor the College Broadcasters Association (Robodee) has any data on how many Internet-only radio stations exist on college campuses. Likewise, web sites that list college radio stations do not have a separate listing for Internetonly radio on campus, listing instead the web versions of over-the-air stations. The FCC regulates over-the-air broadcasting through the rationale of spectrum scarcity; because radio and television stations use the public airwaves to send out their programming, and because of the limited spectrum for distributing those signals, Congress and the courts have given the FCC the authority to regulate content to ensure that the those broadcasters are serving the public. At the same time, the courts for the past 30 years have prohibited content regulation of print media on public college campuses because those print outlets are protected by the First Amendment. The Communications Decency Act had attempted to prohibit indecent (but not necessarily obscene) content on the Internet, as the FCC has done in broadcasting (FCC v. Pacifica). The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Reno v. ACLU that the Internet cannot be held to the same content standards as broadcasting. But in its decision, the Court wrote, ‘‘As a matter of constitutional tradition, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, we presume that governmental regulation of the content of speech (on the Internet) is more likely to interfere with the free exchange of ideas than to encourage it. The interest in encouraging freedom of expression in a democratic society outweighs any theoretical but unproven benefit o","PeriodicalId":439135,"journal":{"name":"Free Speech Yearbook","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131900808","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Legal Analysis and Policy Implications of a Supreme Court Decision: United States v. American Library Association","authors":"Kristen Moritz, M. Bezanson","doi":"10.1080/08997225.2005.10556321","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08997225.2005.10556321","url":null,"abstract":"(2005). Legal Analysis and Policy Implications of a Supreme Court Decision: United States v. American Library Association. Free Speech Yearbook: Vol. 42, No. 1, pp. 91-103.","PeriodicalId":439135,"journal":{"name":"Free Speech Yearbook","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122050935","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Supreme Court and Freedom of Speech, 2004–2005","authors":"P. Siegel","doi":"10.1080/08997225.2005.10556323","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08997225.2005.10556323","url":null,"abstract":"The 2004-5 U.S. Supreme Court Term did not produce a large number of free speech cases. Indeed, we will only be fully explicating four cases this year, one the much-awaited Grokster decision (some called it ‘‘son of Napster’’), a second involving public employee speech, a third the freedom of association as applied to primary elections, and finally the latest in a handful of cases dealing with compelled payments in support of generic advertising campaigns. Yet, we begin by summarizing a second handful of legal disputes that do not merit detailed treatment. Two of these involved requests to individual justices for relief in pending litigation. A third was a defamation case boasting a now deceased celebrity plaintiff. There were also three cases that dealt more with the Free Exercise and/or Establishment Clauses, one dealing with prisoners’ rights and two with the public display of the Ten Commandments. Early in the term, Chief Justice Rehnquist denied a request for an injunction from Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., which is litigating features of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 that forbid it to use its general funds for such electioneering as placing political ads (Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. v. Federal Election Commission). An injunction pending appeal barring the enforcement of an Act of Congress would be an extraordinary remedy, Rehnquist concluded, particularly when this Court recently held that Act ‘‘facially constitutional’’ (Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. v. Federal Election Commission 1305-6 citing McConnell v. Federal Election Commission). The case is scheduled for the Court’s 2005-6 docket. In another case involving an entreaty to an individual member of the Court, Justice Kennedy denied a stay to a TV station in Florida that was contemplating airing transcripts from a recent grand jury proceeding that the station had received in apparent violation of state law (Multimedia Holdings Corporation v. Circuit Court of Florida 1624). A trial judge had issued two gag orders warning the station that such a broadcast might have legal consequences. The station claimed that the first gag order bore the marks of a prior restraint and warned of a possible criminal contempt of court citation; the follow-up order suggested that the court’s real problem was with the defense attorneys who leaked the transcripts to the station (Multimedia Holdings Corporation v. Circuit Court of Florida 1626). While Kennedy was sympathetic, he doubted that the station would prevail, or even that the full Court would choose to hear the case. Producing a decision by the full Court but not on the merits was Tory v. Cochran, which had the potential for telling us something about the use of such prior restraints as injunctions to silence an ongoing act of defamation (Tory v. Cochran 2108). Attorney and media celebrity Johnnie Cochran had obtained an injunction against a former client who had taken to picketing his offices with signs containing numerous insults and ","PeriodicalId":439135,"journal":{"name":"Free Speech Yearbook","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130883829","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"From Public Forum to Private Plaza: The Selling of Free Speech on Main Street","authors":"R. Rine","doi":"10.1080/08997225.2005.10556318","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08997225.2005.10556318","url":null,"abstract":"No American story better illuminates the intersection of property and speech rights than the collision of a cohesive religious culture and American civil liberties in a block of Main Street in downtown Salt Lake City, Utah. In fact, it was on Main Street that many Utahans believe their First Amendment Freedoms were run off the road. The initially quiet agreement between Salt Lake City and the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (Church, LDS, or Mormons) to sell to the Church a block of historic Main Street (with its public forum rights) was ill-advised and provocative. A proposal to withdraw a segment of Main Street in any city center from First Amendment protection should proceed only under the bright lights of public scrutiny and be predicated on definable public need and demonstrable public support. This deal was different, and because it benefited the powerful church to which more than 70 percent of Utahans belong, the consequent exacerbation of the long-standing acrimony between Mormons and non-Mormons is a tragic, but predictable outcome. Insulating a religion from lawful First Amendment expression is not the work of government.","PeriodicalId":439135,"journal":{"name":"Free Speech Yearbook","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128031305","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Casual Conversation or Constitutional Conspiracy: Controverting the Origins of New York Times v. Sullivan","authors":"Susan Smith","doi":"10.1080/08997225.2005.10556314","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08997225.2005.10556314","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":439135,"journal":{"name":"Free Speech Yearbook","volume":"60 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127233687","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Race Science, Academic Freedom, and the Limits of Scientific Self-Correction","authors":"David Droge","doi":"10.1080/08997225.2005.10556316","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08997225.2005.10556316","url":null,"abstract":"Ten years ago Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray’s The Bell Curve disconcerted both the arena of social science and the theater of public discourse. Described by its authors as a discussion of topics that were ‘‘among the most sensitive in contemporary America’’ (xxi), this thick book with 93 graphs, 44 tables, seven technical appendices, 110 pages of endnotes, and a 58-page bibliography soared to the top of nonfiction best-seller lists across the country. The Bell Curve was a polarizing book, generating scores of both highly favorable and harshly critical responses, in both popular periodicals and academic journals. In communication studies, for example, Stephanie Grey claimed that the book’s use of the bell curve graphic served as a synecdoche for the imposition of ‘‘the normal’’ as a moral imperative in modern societies. The impetus for both the widespread success and the polarized reaction to Herrnstein and Murray’s hefty tome was, of course, their claim that genetic racial differences in intellectual ability, rather than social inequality, were primarily responsible for the differential life outcomes for Caucasians and African-Americans. Numerous critics of Herrnstein and Murray charged that the book was based on discredited scientific methods and theories; critics also noted that these ideas had been used in the past to promote racist public policies. Responding to the mountain of criticism, Murray defended the scientific value of the research underlying his book (Richard Herrnstein had passed away shortly after the publication of The Bell Curve). Originally appearing in Commentary in May 1995, his defense was reprinted in the paperback edition of The Bell Curve in 1996. Murray’s main claim was that the critics, motivated by their political objections to the topic, unleashed a series of weak and inaccurate attacks on the scientific value of the book. He noted that ‘‘mainstream’’ scientists were rebutting these politically-motivated attacks and affirming the validity of The Bell Curve’s scientific work. Murray pointed to a statement published in The Wall Street Journal on Dec. 13, 1994 called ‘‘Mainstream Science on Intelligence.’’ This statement, signed by 52 scholars, confirmed ‘‘all of the main scientific findings’’ of the original book (Murray 25). In addition, Murray claimed that the case for genetic differences in intelligence in The Bell Curve was not as ‘‘aggressive’’ as the findings would support. He specifically identified the research of Canadian psychologist J. Philippe Rushton as ‘‘a serious scholar who has identified serious data’’ in support of genetic differences among ‘‘Negroid, Caucasoid, and Mongoloid’’ races (26). By citing Rushton’s case in his defense, Murray indirectly introduced the question of academic freedom into the public controversy over race and intelligence. Rushton’s role in this controversy began with a 1989 talk before the American Association for the Advancement of Science. Following that lecture, which","PeriodicalId":439135,"journal":{"name":"Free Speech Yearbook","volume":"70 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134482421","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"In the Line of Fire: Reconsidering the Holmes of Schenck and the Holmes of Abrams","authors":"David R. Dewberry","doi":"10.1080/08997225.2005.10556315","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08997225.2005.10556315","url":null,"abstract":"In August 1917, Charles Schenck and his fellow ‘‘comrades’’ were indicted under the Espionage Act of 1917 for printing around 15,000 leaflets and mailing them to ‘‘drafted men’’ (Schenck v. United States). Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote the opinion for the Court sustaining a conviction. The Schenck decision was handed down on March 3, 1919. In August 1918, Jacob Abrams and his fellow ‘‘’rebels,’ ’revolutionists,’ [and] ’anarchists,’’’ were indicted under the Espionage Act of 1917 for printing 10,000 leaflets and were ‘‘distributed, some by throwing them from a window of a building where one of the defendants was employed and others secretly, in New York City’’ (Abrams v. United States). Justice Holmes now dissented against conviction. The Abrams decision was handed down on November 10, 1919, eight months after Schenck. Strangely, in nearly similar circumstances, Holmes affirmed the conviction in Schenck and in Abrams he dissented. The Abrams dissent would become the great dissent that served as a catalyst for the contemporary understanding of free speech within the First Amendment. The question that puzzled legal and historical scholars has been: What happened to change the Holmes of Schenck into the Holmes of Abrams? What was the ‘‘wonderful mystery’’ of 1919 (Stone 208)? Opinions regarding the two cases have varied. Thomas Emerson called the Schenck opinion ‘‘abrupt and begrudging’’ (64). Geoffrey Stone called Schenck a ‘‘halfhearted analysis of a rather pedestrian issue’’ (194). Pohlman called Schenck ‘‘very easy and very difficult at the same time’’ (65). Karl Llewellyn claimed ‘‘his opinion [in Abrams] remains a landmark of the law’’ (340). Stephen Smith remarked that the Abrams dissent provided a ‘‘much more sophisticated analysis of the First Amendment’’ (28). Gerald Gunther praised Holmes for Abrams calling the dissent ‘‘his best known view of the first amendment’’ (166). These opinions indicate that the opinions are from two different Justices; on the other hand, Holmes himself did not see a difference between the two. Specifically, Holmes explained in Abrams that he did not have ‘‘any reason to doubt’’ Schenck was ‘‘rightly decided.’’ Zechariah Chafee believed Holmes was committed to a pure view of the First Amendment and was ‘‘biding his time until the court should have before it a conviction so clearly wrong as to let him speak his deepest thoughts about the First Amendment’’ (qtd. in Gunther 165). The discussion of Holmes’ ‘‘detour’’ or ‘‘transformation’’ from Schenck to Abrams is a debate not unlike that of Copernicus’ heliocentric system (Smith 26; Stone 198). Was it Holmes, as he claimed, who held a consistent interpretation of the First Amendment and the Supreme Court save Brandeis, who had concurred with Holmes’ dissent in Abrams, who shifted? On the other hand, was it the majority of the Court, as scholars have presented, who held a consistent interpretation of the First Amendment and Holmes who shifted? In short, was Holm","PeriodicalId":439135,"journal":{"name":"Free Speech Yearbook","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130404725","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Media and Modernity in the United Arab Emirates: Searching for the Beat of a Different Drummer","authors":"T. Walters, Jack A. Barwind","doi":"10.1080/08997225.2004.10556311","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08997225.2004.10556311","url":null,"abstract":"As H.H. Sheikh Mohammed Rashid Bin Al Maktoum manned a booth at Comdex 2000 in Las Vegas designed to attract techies and their businesses to Dubai Internet City, one glib observer noted that the royal was trying to ‘‘pull a Bugsy Siegel in the middle of the Dubai desert’’ building a technological city instead of casinos (Gartner 2000). The stakes might be higher for the United Arab Emirates than they were for Bugsy. Roughly the size of Maine, the UAE has undergone a profound transformation from an impoverished region of small desert principalities to a modern state with a high standard of living in a little more than 30 years. But only about 15% of the reported 4.3 million population in 2005 were nationals; the other 85% were the expatriates who actually drive the economy, serving in capacities ranging from service and construction workers to managers to silent partners for ex-pat entrepreneurs. Less than 11% of the native local population is actually involved in this economy. Today, the UAE has an estimated 2003 GDP per capita of approximately $23,000 (in purchasing power parity) and Human Development Indicators ranking it in the top portion of the Human Development Index (CIA 2005; United Arab Emirates Yearbook, 2004; Human Development Indicators 2004). Despite such gaudy numbers, a hidden secret is that the actual standard of living has been in decline for about the last decade. Such factors as hidden taxation, high birth rates, and large paternalistic subsidizes are responsible, and government leaders who can read between the lines are concerned. In addition, today’s current generation lacks the hard, competitive edge that their grandparents had. Born to a high standard of living, these children are either unwilling or unable to compete in an economy with a level playing field. Whatever else, they certainly would not work at low-paying, face threatening entry-level jobs. Therein lies the challenge for the nation’s political leaders. Seven absolute monarchs exercise political power over a federation established in 1971. None of the emirates has any democratically elected institutions and their rule has been both traditionbound and patriarchal (U.S. Department of State 2001). Because political parties and elections are prohibited, the citizens of the UAE cannot change their government democratically. Citizens may express concerns directly to their rulers by traditional means including the open majlis (International Press Review, 2000; see also U.S. Department of State 2001). However, the role of the majlis as a mechanism connecting rulers with people has diminished in recent years for several reasons. One is because increased societal complexity (a derivative of modernity) has led to a burgeoning bureaucracy; another is life is more hectic, fast paced, and chaotic than before. One ruler from each Emirate serves as a member of the Federal Supreme Council, the highest legislative and executive body. The council selects a president and a vice pres","PeriodicalId":439135,"journal":{"name":"Free Speech Yearbook","volume":"85 ","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133425713","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Freedom of Speech in Occupied Nations: What should be the Obligations of an Occupying Power?","authors":"D. Fraleigh","doi":"10.1080/08997225.2004.10556307","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08997225.2004.10556307","url":null,"abstract":"Freedom of expression issues came to the forefront in Iraq shortly after the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime. On April 9, 2003, a crowd of Iraqis danced in Baghdad’s Firdos Square after U.S. Marines used an armored recovery vehicle to topple a large statue of Saddam Hussein (Cable News Network 2003). This spontaneous celebration did not herald a new era of freedom of speech in Iraq. After seizing control of the only TV station in the city of Mosul, Major General David Petraeus said that ‘‘we have every right as an occupying power to stop the broadcast of something that will incite violence.’’ The U.S. civilian administrator in Iraq, Paul Bremer, promulgated a list of prohibited categories of expression (Jayasekera 2003a). Restrictions on expression imposed by occupying powers are not limited to the United States’ policies in Iraq. After a NATO force entered Bosnia to enforce the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords, an Independent Media Commission was established to regulate the Bosnian media. The UN administration in Kosovo promulgated restrictions on the print and broadcast media there after UN troops moved in to enforce the peace settlement between NATO and Yugoslavia in 1999. The twenty-first century is likely to be characterized by an increase in military occupations led by the United States or international organizations that include the United States. In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, the U.S. has announced a new National Security Strategy that includes preemptive war as a means to prevent terrorist attacks (National Security Strategy 2002 6) and also a determination to promote ‘‘free and open societies on every continent’’ (p. 1). Furthermore, the historical constraints on military intervention by the UN or NATO have diminished. The international regulation of Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War ‘‘was seen as a legal precedent for universal human rights-based intervention,’’ leading to UN-authorized actions in Somalia and Bosnia (Chandler 2002, 8-9). The Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (2000) stated that during the Cold War United Nations peacekeeping operations usually focused on monitoring cease-fires, rather than actively building the peace. However, ‘‘since the end of the Cold War, United Nations peacekeeping has often combined with peacebuilding in complex peace operations . . . ’’ (p. 3). Peace building includes reintegrating former combatants into civilian society, improving respect for human rights, and technical assistance for democratic development, including electoral assistance and support for free media (p. 3). This propensity for military intervention and subsequent occupation makes increasingly salient the question of whether freedom of expression rights ought to be guaranteed to the citizens of an occupied nation. This article will defend the position that freedom of expression should be guaranteed by an occupying power, particularly when the motivation for occupation includes the protection of human rights ","PeriodicalId":439135,"journal":{"name":"Free Speech Yearbook","volume":"86 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126344014","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}