University of St. Thomas Journal of Law and Public Policy最新文献

Relational Privacy: Surveillance, Common Knowledge, and Coordination 关系隐私:监视、常识和协调

University of St. Thomas Journal of Law and Public Policy Pub Date : 2016-11-04 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2864663

R. Sloan, Richard Warner

{"title":"Relational Privacy: Surveillance, Common Knowledge, and Coordination","authors":"R. Sloan, Richard Warner","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2864663","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2864663","url":null,"abstract":"Contemporary surveillance is constant, pervasive, and invasive. Many contend that this creates a current, society-wide threat to the self. However, there are many cases in which surveillance, if appropriately constrained, appears to promote self-realization, at least for a range of social subgroups. So where is the society-wide threat? We contend that surveillance creates such a threat by undermining relational privacy. Relational privacy consists in people voluntarily limiting their knowledge of each other as they interact in a wide variety of social and commercial roles. The group coordination ensures group — and hence “relational” — control over the selective flow of information. Adequate self-realization requires an adequate degree of coordination-enabled control. Surveillance undermines that control. The key to seeing how this happens across society as a whole lies in seeing how group coordination depends on a special form of knowledge — common knowledge, “the recursive belief state in which A knows X, B knows X, A knows that B knows X, B knows that A knows X, ad infinitum.” People succeed in coordinating their efforts at voluntary restraint because they know they will coordinate appropriately, they know they know, know they know they know, and so on. When surveillance undermines such knowledge, it strikes at relational privacy’s foundation and thereby threatens self-realization.","PeriodicalId":436510,"journal":{"name":"University of St. Thomas Journal of Law and Public Policy","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-11-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130200749","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Is Hobby Lobby Worse for Religious Liberty than Smith 业余爱好游说团体比史密斯更不利于宗教自由

University of St. Thomas Journal of Law and Public Policy Pub Date : 2015-03-12 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2578297

A. Koppelman, F. M. Gedicks

{"title":"Is Hobby Lobby Worse for Religious Liberty than Smith","authors":"A. Koppelman, F. M. Gedicks","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2578297","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2578297","url":null,"abstract":"Imagine a world where religious people are a kind of aristocratic elite who are entitled to injure nonadherents with impunity – a world which would “permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.” Employment Division v. Smith held that “courting anarchy” in this manner was a conclusive reason to hold that there is no constitutional right to religious exemptions from laws of general applicability. The Hobby Lobby decision (by some of the same judges!) threatens to bring that world into being.If government refusals to accommodate are viewed with the kind of skepticism that the Court displays in Hobby Lobby, then claims of accommodation will always be supported by some imaginable less restrictive means, even if its enactment is politically impossible. The consequence in practice will be an interpretation of religious liberty in which adherents get to harm nonadherents. Religious liberty here means the right to impose your religion on other people who don’t share your views.One of the principal attractions of the idea of religious liberty has always been that the exercise of one person’s religion doesn’t hurt anyone else. In Thomas Jefferson’s classic formulation: “it does me no injury for my neighbour to say there are twenty gods, or no god. It neither picks my pocket nor breaks my leg.” But paying for contraceptives that should be covered by insurance is exactly like having one’s pocket picked, while involuntary pregnancy is worse than a broken leg. If this is the official meaning of religious liberty, then the broad acceptance of religious liberty will quickly fade.","PeriodicalId":436510,"journal":{"name":"University of St. Thomas Journal of Law and Public Policy","volume":"59 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125944274","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2

Religious Freedom Claims and Defenses Under State Constitutions 州宪法下的宗教自由主张和辩护

University of St. Thomas Journal of Law and Public Policy Pub Date : 2013-06-20 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2282787

Paul Benjamin Linton

{"title":"Religious Freedom Claims and Defenses Under State Constitutions","authors":"Paul Benjamin Linton","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2282787","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2282787","url":null,"abstract":"Do state constitutions accord greater protection to religious freedom than does the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment? The answer to that question has taken on greater significance since the United States Supreme Court decided Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), more than twenty years ago. In Smith, the Supreme Court held that \"the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general application on the ground that the law prescribes (or proscribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).\"To many, both at the time and since, Employment Division v. Smith represented a marked retreat from the Court’s former free exercise jurisprudence. That, in turn, has given the interpretation and application of religious freedom guarantees under state constitutions a new importance. To what extent do state courts follow federal free exercise analysis, including Employment Division v. Smith, in interpreting their own guarantees of religious freedom? That question acquires a particular urgency given the current debate over a variety of controversial state laws, including laws mandating contraceptive coverage in employee group medical plans, laws prohibiting discrimination on account of marital status and sexual orientation and laws regulating parochial schools and home schools. This article attempts to answer that question by reviewing the principal cases decided under each State’s religious freedom guarantee, whether expressed as \"free exercise of religion,\" \"freedom of worship,\" \"liberty of conscience,\" \"rights of conscience\" or some other formulation.","PeriodicalId":436510,"journal":{"name":"University of St. Thomas Journal of Law and Public Policy","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128746387","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2

Citizens United, Corporate Personhood, and Corporate Power: The Tension between Constitutional Law and Corporate Law 公民联合、公司人格与公司权力:宪法与公司法之间的张力

University of St. Thomas Journal of Law and Public Policy Pub Date : 2012-08-22 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2134465

S. K. Ripken

{"title":"Citizens United, Corporate Personhood, and Corporate Power: The Tension between Constitutional Law and Corporate Law","authors":"S. K. Ripken","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2134465","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2134465","url":null,"abstract":"In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, the Supreme Court invalidated strict federal campaign finance laws and upheld the First Amendment right of corporations to use general treasury funds to support or oppose candidates in political elections. Shortly after the case was decided, a grassroots popular movement began calling for an amendment to the Constitution to establish that money is not speech and that human beings, not corporations, are the only “persons” entitled to constitutional rights. The concept of corporate personhood entered the national debate, causing many average Americans to question the legitimacy of corporations’ legal personhood status. Federal and state lawmakers have introduced several bills proposing a constitutional amendment to abolish corporate personhood, and hundreds of cities nationwide have passed municipal resolutions supporting such an amendment. Progressive groups that oppose corporate influence in politics disagree on whether the push for a constitutional amendment is a good idea. This article identifies several problems with the amendment strategy and suggests that the focus on personhood is misplaced. Legal history shows that the personhood label has long been arbitrarily applied in constitutional law cases, and, as a practical matter, personhood is largely indeterminate and sometimes irrelevant. More significantly, corporate personhood and power do not find their origin exclusively in constitutional law, but in long-standing corporate law doctrines and deeply entrenched norms. An attempt to curb corporate power in the political realm through a constitutional amendment does not address the systemic features of corporate law that allow corporate entities to amass great economic and political power. To ignore the tensions that corporate law raises in this regard is to miss the deeper source of corporate ascendance in the modern world.","PeriodicalId":436510,"journal":{"name":"University of St. Thomas Journal of Law and Public Policy","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116718523","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 14