{"title":"Religious Freedom Claims and Defenses Under State Constitutions","authors":"Paul Benjamin Linton","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2282787","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Do state constitutions accord greater protection to religious freedom than does the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment? The answer to that question has taken on greater significance since the United States Supreme Court decided Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), more than twenty years ago. In Smith, the Supreme Court held that \"the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general application on the ground that the law prescribes (or proscribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).\"To many, both at the time and since, Employment Division v. Smith represented a marked retreat from the Court’s former free exercise jurisprudence. That, in turn, has given the interpretation and application of religious freedom guarantees under state constitutions a new importance. To what extent do state courts follow federal free exercise analysis, including Employment Division v. Smith, in interpreting their own guarantees of religious freedom? That question acquires a particular urgency given the current debate over a variety of controversial state laws, including laws mandating contraceptive coverage in employee group medical plans, laws prohibiting discrimination on account of marital status and sexual orientation and laws regulating parochial schools and home schools. This article attempts to answer that question by reviewing the principal cases decided under each State’s religious freedom guarantee, whether expressed as \"free exercise of religion,\" \"freedom of worship,\" \"liberty of conscience,\" \"rights of conscience\" or some other formulation.","PeriodicalId":436510,"journal":{"name":"University of St. Thomas Journal of Law and Public Policy","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2013-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"University of St. Thomas Journal of Law and Public Policy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2282787","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Abstract
Do state constitutions accord greater protection to religious freedom than does the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment? The answer to that question has taken on greater significance since the United States Supreme Court decided Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), more than twenty years ago. In Smith, the Supreme Court held that "the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general application on the ground that the law prescribes (or proscribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes)."To many, both at the time and since, Employment Division v. Smith represented a marked retreat from the Court’s former free exercise jurisprudence. That, in turn, has given the interpretation and application of religious freedom guarantees under state constitutions a new importance. To what extent do state courts follow federal free exercise analysis, including Employment Division v. Smith, in interpreting their own guarantees of religious freedom? That question acquires a particular urgency given the current debate over a variety of controversial state laws, including laws mandating contraceptive coverage in employee group medical plans, laws prohibiting discrimination on account of marital status and sexual orientation and laws regulating parochial schools and home schools. This article attempts to answer that question by reviewing the principal cases decided under each State’s religious freedom guarantee, whether expressed as "free exercise of religion," "freedom of worship," "liberty of conscience," "rights of conscience" or some other formulation.
各州宪法是否比第一修正案的自由行使条款更能保护宗教自由?自从二十多年前美国最高法院对俄勒冈州人力资源部就业部诉史密斯案(494 U.S. 872(1990))作出裁决以来,这个问题的答案就具有了更大的意义。在史密斯一案中,最高法院认为,“自由行使的权利并不能免除个人遵守有效和中立的普遍适用法律的义务,因为法律规定(或禁止)他的宗教规定(或禁止)的行为。”对许多人来说,无论是在当时还是之后,就业司诉史密斯案都代表着对最高法院以前的自由行使法理学的明显退步。这反过来又使各州宪法对宗教自由保障的解释和适用具有了新的重要性。州法院在解释自己对宗教自由的保障时,在多大程度上遵循联邦对宗教自由的分析,包括就业部门诉史密斯案?鉴于目前对各种有争议的州法律的辩论,这个问题显得尤为紧迫,这些法律包括强制将避孕纳入雇员团体医疗计划的法律、禁止因婚姻状况和性取向而歧视的法律以及规范教区学校和家庭学校的法律。本文试图通过审查根据每个国家的宗教自由保障作出裁决的主要案件来回答这个问题,不论是以“宗教自由”、“崇拜自由”、“信仰自由”、“信仰权利”或其他形式表达。