{"title":"Can reason be practical? Narrow and broad conceptions and capacities","authors":"P. Railton","doi":"10.4324/9780429266768-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429266768-5","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":435788,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of Practical Reason","volume":"264 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116606498","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Rationality, regret, and choice over time","authors":"C. Andreou","doi":"10.4324/9780429266768-41","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429266768-41","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":435788,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of Practical Reason","volume":"421 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122796591","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Motivational internalism and externalism","authors":"Connie S. Rosati","doi":"10.4324/9780429266768-20","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429266768-20","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":435788,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of Practical Reason","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122492877","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Hume’s robust theory of practical reason 1","authors":"Geoffrey Sayre-Mccord","doi":"10.4324/9780429266768-12","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429266768-12","url":null,"abstract":"Yet Hume clearly has a great deal to say about practical reason. In light of what he says, Hume is regularly read as either an outright skeptic about practical reason or as an advocate of unadorned instrumentalism. According to the skeptical reading, Hume rejects the idea that reason could be practical at all. According to the instrumental reading, he embraces reason as practical yet sees its role as being entirely a matter of figuring out efficient ways to satisfy one’s desires or achieve one’s ends.2 The instrumentalist interpretation has become so widespread that","PeriodicalId":435788,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of Practical Reason","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116647656","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Practical reason and social science research 1","authors":"V. Tiberius, N. Washington","doi":"10.4324/9780429266768-23","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429266768-23","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":435788,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of Practical Reason","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124346164","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"There is no moral ought and no prudential ought","authors":"E. Harman","doi":"10.4324/9780429266768-36","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429266768-36","url":null,"abstract":"s of Presented Papers Title: Wondering about What You Know Author: Avery Archer Abstract: According to Jane Friedman, attitudes like wondering, inquiring, and suspending judgement are question-directed. Call such attitudes interrogative attitudes (IAs). Friedman insists that all IAs are governed by an Ignorance Norm: Necessarily, if one knows Q at t, then one ought not have an IA towards Q at t. However, I argue that a central premise Friedman relies on in her argument actually undermines (rather than supports) the claim that IAs are not governed by the Ignorance Norm. I conclude that Friedman’s conception of IAs should be rejected. Title: Samuel Bennett Author: Akrasia’s Scope: The Sufficiency of Aristotelian Moral States to Combat Socratic Denial Abstract: Aristotle and Plato report that Socrates denies the moral state of akrasia’s possibility—that is, Socrates denies that moral agents make mistakes willingly, but rather asserts that they do so as a result of ignorance. Aristotle’s account of akrasia in Nicomachean Ethics seems to refute Socrates’ stance. However, Aristotle presents akrasia with a limited scope or reach, as a moral state concerned only with the objects of sophrosune. Thus we might conclude that Aristotle does not refute Socrates’ position entirely, affirming akrasia as an actual moral state, but only when the objects of sophrosune are concerned. This conclusion is wrong, for Aristotle provides space for moral states distinct from akrasiaproper within the domains of virtues other than sophrosune. These moral states are distinguished from akrasia-proper in that they have different objects alongside their respective virtues, but similar in that they share a psychological explanation. Title: Phenomenal Concepts and the Science of Consciousness Author: Dylan Black Abstract: Scientifically literate physicalists in the philosophy of mind often endorse the phenomenal concept strategy in response to the explanatory gap. Although defenders of the phenomenal concept strategy believe that phenomenal states are identical to physical/functional states, they generally deny the possibility that science can reveal the physical/functional identity of phenomenal states. In this paper I defend the consistency of the phenomenal concept strategy with the possibility that science will discover the physical/functional identity of phenomenal states. I argue that correct applications of phenomenal concepts imply that certain functional concepts apply, placing functional constraints on what might count as the neural correlates of consciousness. Specifically I propose that a cognitive process is a mental representation only if, under the right circumstances, it makes its content available to the cognitive systems to which it belongs. Title: A Pragmatic Methodology for the (Queer) Self Author: Elaine M. Blum IPA Fall 2017 Meeting 10-11 November 2017 4 Abstract: The purpose of this project is to articulate an account of the self that recognizes the full ran","PeriodicalId":435788,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of Practical Reason","volume":"216 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133402431","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The guise of the good","authors":"Sergio Tenenbaum","doi":"10.1002/9781444367072.WBIEE659","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/9781444367072.WBIEE659","url":null,"abstract":"The “guise of the good” (GG) thesis concerns the nature of human motivation and intentional action (see Action; Intention). It is generally understood as the view that everything that an agent desires (see Desire; Pro-attitudes) or pursues is in some way thought to be good. In its most sweeping version, the thesis applies to any mental state capable of motivating the agent; that is, every state that can motivate the agent must involve some kind of thought of its object as good. An even more radical version of GG also accepts the converse claim: namely, that all evaluative judgments motivate. \u0000 \u0000 \u0000Keywords: \u0000 \u0000metaethics; \u0000philosophy","PeriodicalId":435788,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of Practical Reason","volume":"124 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128142035","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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