{"title":"Jeffrey Koperski, Divine Action, Determinism, and the Laws of Nature","authors":"Robert A. Larmer","doi":"10.5840/PC202022231","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/PC202022231","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:p />","PeriodicalId":434758,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia Christi","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133625076","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Do Divine Conceptualist Accounts Fail?","authors":"Greg Welty","doi":"10.5840/pc201921226","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/pc201921226","url":null,"abstract":"William Lane Craig’s God over All argues against the kind of “divine conceptualism” about abstract objects which I defend. In this conference presentation I note several points of agreement with and appreciation for Craig’s important work. I then turn to five points of critique and response pertaining to: the sovereignty-aseity intuition, the reality of false propositions, God’s having “inappropriate” thoughts, propositions being purely private and incommunicable, and a consistent view of God’s own ontological commitments. I conclude by summarizing our two key differences, indicating that we may have much more in common than first appears (both theologically and metaphysically).","PeriodicalId":434758,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia Christi","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123662347","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Benjamin H. Arbour, ed., Philosophical Essays against Open Theism","authors":"Thomas W. Duttweiler","doi":"10.5840/pc202325111","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/pc202325111","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:p />","PeriodicalId":434758,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia Christi","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114862649","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Paul Copan and William Lane Craig, eds., The Kalām Cosmological Argument","authors":"G. Oppy","doi":"10.5840/pc201921239","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/pc201921239","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:p />","PeriodicalId":434758,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia Christi","volume":"61 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129381486","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Response to Van Inwagen and Welty","authors":"W. Craig","doi":"10.5840/pc201921228","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/pc201921228","url":null,"abstract":"In response to my critics, I argue that Peter van Inwagen, despite his protestations, is an advocate of an indispensability argument for Platonism. What remains to be shown by van Inwagen is that his version of the argument overcomes his own presumption against Platonism and survives defeat by besting every anti-Platonist alternative. While acknowledging Greg Welty’s helpful responses to my worries about divine conceptualism as a realist alternative to Platonism, I express ongoing reservations about some of those responses.","PeriodicalId":434758,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia Christi","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128273639","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Koperski’s New (Improved?) Decretalism","authors":"Robert A. Larmer","doi":"10.5840/pc20232518","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/pc20232518","url":null,"abstract":"In “Breaking Laws of Nature” published in this journal in 2017, Jeffrey Koperski defended a position he termed “decretalism” in which he claimed that the laws of nature should be understood as the decrees of God. In “Decretalism and the Laws of Nature” also published in this journal in 2017, I argued that Koperski’s decretalism amounts to occasionalism. In his recent book, Divine Action, Determinism, and the Laws of Nature, Koperski has responded to my criticisms by changing his account of the laws of nature. In this article, I argue that his new account of the laws of nature is more problematic than his first rendition.","PeriodicalId":434758,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia Christi","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125024397","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Matthew A. Benton, John Hawthorne, and Dani Rabinowitz, eds., Knowledge, Belief, and God: New Insights in Religious Epistemology","authors":"Thomas W. Duttweiler","doi":"10.5840/pc201921240","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/pc201921240","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:p />","PeriodicalId":434758,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia Christi","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134435311","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"God, Time, and Creation","authors":"W. Craig","doi":"10.5840/pc202123229","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/pc202123229","url":null,"abstract":"R. T. Mullins has questioned the tenability of a model of divine eternity according to which God exists timelessly sans creation and temporally since the moment of creation. His puzzlement about the model can be largely resolved by recognizing that two different understandings of causation may be applied to the origin of the universe, a medieval understanding of efficient causation by a causal agent and a modern understanding of causation as a relation between two events. Mullins’s more fundamental reservations about a relational theory of time can be resolved by allowing an event to occur at a moment or by defining “change” in such a way that a change need not occur over two moments of time. Finally, Mullins needs to do more to justify his own model involving an undifferentiated, successionless, precreation time.","PeriodicalId":434758,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia Christi","volume":"239 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134284299","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Introduction to a Symposium on Love Divine","authors":"Kevin W. Wong","doi":"10.5840/pc20222412","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/pc20222412","url":null,"abstract":"In this essay, I introduce the symposium on Jordan Wessling’s book, Love Divine: A Systematic Account of God’s Love for Humanity, by discussing its origin as a book panel, providing the context for the significance of Wessling’s contribution, and previewing the essays that follow.","PeriodicalId":434758,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia Christi","volume":"56 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127574454","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Philip Goff’s Cosmopsychism","authors":"S. Parrish","doi":"10.5840/pc202224112","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/pc202224112","url":null,"abstract":"In two books and several articles Philip Goff has developed a panpsychist theory. Recently, he has put forth a version which he calls cosmopsychism. Rejecting both perfect being theism (PBT) and physicalism, according to cosmopsychism, there is a unitary mind that is not only the cause of the universe, but in a sense is the universe. In this essay I critique Goff’s theory, arguing that it is not simpler than PBT, and that it fails to make important issues clear. I conclude that Goff’s theory is a version of theism but fails to be a plausible alternative to PBT.","PeriodicalId":434758,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia Christi","volume":"66 1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123535435","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}