QUEENS LAW JOURNAL最新文献

“Who Gets the Dog?” A Family Law Approach “谁得到了狗?”家庭法方法

IF 2

QUEENS LAW JOURNAL Pub Date : 2020-01-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3514178

Jodi Lazare

引用次数: 0

R V Bingley and the Importance of Scientifically-Guided Legal Analysis 宾利与科学指导法律分析的重要性

IF 2

QUEENS LAW JOURNAL Pub Date : 2017-07-10 DOI: 10.31228/osf.io/4p7eg

J. Chin, Helena Likwornik

{"title":"R V Bingley and the Importance of Scientifically-Guided Legal Analysis","authors":"J. Chin, Helena Likwornik","doi":"10.31228/osf.io/4p7eg","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31228/osf.io/4p7eg","url":null,"abstract":"In R v Bingley, the Supreme Court considered a controversial subjective methodology used by police officers trained as drug recognition experts (DREs) pursuant to the Criminal Code. At issue was the admissibility of these experts’ evidence. A 5-2 majority held that Parliament conclusively established the reliability the DRE program’s methodology and the DRE’s qualifications to perform that methodology, and thus trial judges may not exclude DREs for those reasons. Bingley is problematic on multiple fronts. Most fundamentally, the Majority’s statutory interpretation was insensitive to the science behind the drug recognition program. Their analysis put this subjective methodology on the same footing as objective forms of evidence, like breathalyser analysis, where human judgment and bias play almost no role. More broadly, the Majority’s decision comes in light of recent findings that several forensic scientific disciplines are not as reliable as they purport to be. The Majority’s reasoning seemed largely driven by concerns about judicial economy, and in particular the worry that evaluating DREs would take too much court time. In response, we provide a more scientifically rigorous but less time-consuming way for trial judges to scrutinize DREs.","PeriodicalId":43132,"journal":{"name":"QUEENS LAW JOURNAL","volume":"43 1","pages":"33-52"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2017-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48522251","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2

The regulation of science and the Charter of Rights: would a ban on non-reproductive human cloning unjustifiably violate freedom of expression? 科学管理和《权利宪章》:禁止非生殖性人类克隆是否会无理侵犯言论自由?

IF 2

QUEENS LAW JOURNAL Pub Date : 2004-01-01 DOI: 10.7939/R30863K93

B. Billingsley, T. Caulfield

{"title":"The regulation of science and the Charter of Rights: would a ban on non-reproductive human cloning unjustifiably violate freedom of expression?","authors":"B. Billingsley, T. Caulfield","doi":"10.7939/R30863K93","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7939/R30863K93","url":null,"abstract":"Non-Reproductive Human Cloning (NRHC) allows researchers to develop and clone cells, including non-reproductive cells, and to research the etiology and transmission of disease. The ability to clone specific stem cells may also allow researchers to clone cells with genetic defects and analyze those cells with more precisions. Despite those potential benefits, Parliament has banned such cloning due to a myriad of social and ethical concerns. In May 2002, the Canadian Government introduced Bill C-13 on assisted human reproductive technologies. Bill C-13 deals with both the scientific and the clinical use of human reproductive materials, and it prohibits a number of other activities, including NRHC. Although the Supreme Court of Canada has never ruled on whether scientific experiments area form of expression, academic support exists for this notion. The authors go through the legal analysis that would be required to find that scientific experiments are expression, focusing in part on whether NRHC could be considered violent and thus fall outside the protection of section 2(b). The latter question is complicated by the ongoing policy debate over whether an \"embryonic cell\" is property of human life. The authors then consider whether a ban on NRHC could be justified under section 1 of the Charter. They conclude that both the breadth of the legislative purpose and the proportionality of the measure are problematic. Proportionality is a specific concern because the ban could be viewed as an outright denial of scientific freedom of expression. Although consistent with current jurisprudence on freedom of expression, this paper runs against the flow of government policy in the areas of regulation and prohibition of non-reproductive human cloning. As there has been no Charter litigation to date on whether scientific research is a form of expression, the authors introduce a new way of looking at the legality of the regulation of new reproductive technologies.","PeriodicalId":43132,"journal":{"name":"QUEENS LAW JOURNAL","volume":"29 2 1","pages":"647-79"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2004-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71369650","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 4

The regulation of science and the Charter of Rights: would a ban on non-reproductive human cloning unjustifiably violate freedom of expression? 科学管理和《权利宪章》:禁止非生殖性人类克隆是否会无理侵犯言论自由?

IF 2

QUEENS LAW JOURNAL Pub Date : 2004-01-01

Barbara Billingsley, Timothy Caulfield

{"title":"The regulation of science and the Charter of Rights: would a ban on non-reproductive human cloning unjustifiably violate freedom of expression?","authors":"Barbara Billingsley, Timothy Caulfield","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Non-Reproductive Human Cloning (NRHC) allows researchers to develop and clone cells, including non-reproductive cells, and to research the etiology and transmission of disease. The ability to clone specific stem cells may also allow researchers to clone cells with genetic defects and analyze those cells with more precisions. Despite those potential benefits, Parliament has banned such cloning due to a myriad of social and ethical concerns. In May 2002, the Canadian Government introduced Bill C-13 on assisted human reproductive technologies. Bill C-13 deals with both the scientific and the clinical use of human reproductive materials, and it prohibits a number of other activities, including NRHC. Although the Supreme Court of Canada has never ruled on whether scientific experiments area form of expression, academic support exists for this notion. The authors go through the legal analysis that would be required to find that scientific experiments are expression, focusing in part on whether NRHC could be considered violent and thus fall outside the protection of section 2(b). The latter question is complicated by the ongoing policy debate over whether an \"embryonic cell\" is property of human life. The authors then consider whether a ban on NRHC could be justified under section 1 of the Charter. They conclude that both the breadth of the legislative purpose and the proportionality of the measure are problematic. Proportionality is a specific concern because the ban could be viewed as an outright denial of scientific freedom of expression. Although consistent with current jurisprudence on freedom of expression, this paper runs against the flow of government policy in the areas of regulation and prohibition of non-reproductive human cloning. As there has been no Charter litigation to date on whether scientific research is a form of expression, the authors introduce a new way of looking at the legality of the regulation of new reproductive technologies.</p>","PeriodicalId":43132,"journal":{"name":"QUEENS LAW JOURNAL","volume":"29 2","pages":"647-79"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2004-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"25886169","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

When things go wrong: the duty to disclose medical error. 当事情出错时:披露医疗错误的责任。

IF 2

QUEENS LAW JOURNAL Pub Date : 2002-01-01

Gerald B Robertson

引用次数: 0

IF 2

QUEENS LAW JOURNAL Pub Date : 1993-01-01

W F Flanagan

引用次数: 0

Envisaging Constitutional Space for Aboriginal Governments 设想土著政府的宪法空间

IF 2

QUEENS LAW JOURNAL Pub Date : 1993-01-01 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2259647

Kent McNeil

{"title":"Envisaging Constitutional Space for Aboriginal Governments","authors":"Kent McNeil","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2259647","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2259647","url":null,"abstract":"When the Supreme Court decided Sparrow, it could have interpreted s. 35 of the Constitution to give Aboriginal peoples absolute power over Aboriginal and treaty rights, a power which neither Parliament nor the Provinces could trump. Instead, the Court interpreted s. 35 to mean that Parliament could still infringe Aboriginal rights if the infringement could be justified by a strict test. Professor McNeil suggests that this interpretation does not originate in the constitutional text so much as in the British constitutional concepts of Parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law. He argues that the Court maintained Parliament's power to regulate Aboriginal rights because it combined these constitutional concepts with an assumption that these rights are not effectively regulated by Aboriginal governments and laws. The Court's unarticulated fear was that an intolerable legal vacuum would be created if s. 35 was interpreted as excluding all federal regulatory power. The author argues, however, that to decolonize Canadian constitutional law, we must redefine Parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law to include Aboriginal governments and laws, which could fill the constitutional space that s. 35 provided and avoid the vacuum that the Court feared.","PeriodicalId":43132,"journal":{"name":"QUEENS LAW JOURNAL","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"1993-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68038925","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 13

The Constitutional Guarantee of Aboriginal and Treaty Rights 原住民与条约权利之宪法保障

IF 2

QUEENS LAW JOURNAL Pub Date : 1982-01-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3351443

B. Slattery

引用次数: 18