{"title":"Multiplex semantics for deontic logic","authors":"L. Goble","doi":"10.1080/08066200050505788","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08066200050505788","url":null,"abstract":"This multiplex semantics incorporates multiple relations of deontic accessibility or multiple preference rankings on alternative worlds to represent distinct normative standards. This provides a convenient framework for deontic logic that allows conflicts of obligation, due either to conflicts between normative standards or to incoherence within a single standard. With the multiplex structures, two general senses of \"ought\" may be distinguished, an indefinite sense under which something is obligatory when it is enjoined by some normative standard and a core sense for when something is enjoined by all normative standards. Multiple normative standards may themselves be given a preferential order; this leads to a concept of ranked obligation. This paper presents the foundations of this multiplex semantics and the propositional deontic logics they define.","PeriodicalId":430352,"journal":{"name":"Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121295729","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Towards an analysis of the progressive","authors":"J. Cantwell","doi":"10.1080/08066200050217986","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08066200050217986","url":null,"abstract":"1.PreliminariesIn an attempt to understand the philosophical, linguistic and logicalproblems of the progressive tense, it may be valuable to start with a detailedanalysis of actions, and the verbs relating to them. The loss of generality ofsuch an analysis may perhaps be excused if it helps shed some light on themain issues, even if it does not provide answers to all questions on thesubject. The issues that are approached in this paper are: (i) to define aformal language suitable for analysing certain aspects of action sentences,(ii) to outline a theory of action with sufficient precision to formulateplausible truth-conditions for action sentences in the progressive tense, and(iii) to provide a partial analysis of tenses that satisfy basic inferentialpatterns for action sentences.The main work of this paper is to formulate a theory of actions preciselyenough to enable us to construct a simple formal language in which simpleassertions about actions can be given precise truth-conditions. This meansthat a number of issues relating mainly to action theory will have to beaddressed. Despite this, many, if not most, issues relating to problems inthe theory of actions will have to be ignored, and so the theory, aspresented, will have to be viewed as a rough sketch.The sentences discussed here are primarily of the form: a is v-ing. Thefocus is on defeasible progressives such as:(A) Anne was walking to the store when she was run over.In particular, the truth-conditions for such sentences and their logicalrelation to other sentences, such as ‘‘Anne walked to the store’’, arediscussed.2. Speaking of ActionsThe infinitive form of action verbs is the most basic means available inEnglish for speaking of actions. The verb phrase (to) walk to the store can besaid to designate an action-type (as opposed to an action token). Theinfinitive form is not normally manifested in actual utterances of English;rather, different aspects of the performance of actions are manifested: an","PeriodicalId":430352,"journal":{"name":"Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127555658","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Russell's paradox of the totality of propositions","authors":"N. Cocchiarella","doi":"10.1080/08066200050217977","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08066200050217977","url":null,"abstract":"Russell's \"new contradiction\" about \"the totality of propositions\" has been connected with a number of modal paradoxes. M. Oksanen has recently shown how these modal paradoxes are resolved in the set theory NFU. Russell's paradox of the totality of propositions was left unexplained, however. We reconstruct Russell's argument and explain how it is resolved in two intensional logics that are equiconsistent with NFU. We also show how different notions of possible worlds are represented in these intensional logics.","PeriodicalId":430352,"journal":{"name":"Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic","volume":"121 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134090866","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Too simple solutions of hard problems","authors":"P. Schuster","doi":"10.1080/080662001753275945","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/080662001753275945","url":null,"abstract":"Even after yet another grand conjecture has been proved or refuted, any omniscience principle that had trivially settled this question is just as little acceptable as before. The significance of the constructive enterprise is therefore not affected by any gain of knowledge. In particular, there is no need to adapt weak counterexamples to mathematical progress.","PeriodicalId":430352,"journal":{"name":"Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123374089","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"You just can't tell: An analysis of the non-specific use of indexicals","authors":"S. Elli","doi":"10.1080/080662001753275927","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/080662001753275927","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper I provide a semantic analysis of non-specific uses of indexical expressions, such as \"you\" in typical utterances of \"you just can't tell\". My treatment employs independently motivated conceptual tools, such as the treatment of generics within Discourse Representation Theory, and the distinction between context of utterance and context of interpretation.","PeriodicalId":430352,"journal":{"name":"Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic","volume":"84 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126204062","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Russell and Maccoll : Reply to Grattan-Guinness, WoleŃski, and Read","authors":"J. Dejnozka","doi":"10.1080/080662001316865837","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/080662001316865837","url":null,"abstract":"In the December 1999 special edition of Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic on Hugh MacColl, Ivor Grattan-Guinness and Jan Wolenski describe my discussions of Russell and MacColl in superficially true but unfortunately misleading ways. After replying to them, I proceed to my main topic, whether we can impute S5 to MacColl in light of Stephen Read's paper in the same special edition denying that MacColl has S4 or even S3. I argue that MacColl has an S5 formal modal logic with invariant formal certainties and impossibilities, and following Read, a T material modal logic with material certainties and impossibilities which can vary relative to fresh data, and that MacColl writes these logics using the same generic notation.","PeriodicalId":430352,"journal":{"name":"Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123172168","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Normative systems represented by boolean quasi-orderings","authors":"Jan Odelstad, L. Lindahl","doi":"10.1080/08066200050505805","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08066200050505805","url":null,"abstract":"Analyse des liens entre les structures conceptuelles d'un systeme normatif, a travers l'exemple des quasi-classements de Boole. Examinant les structures d'implication, ainsi que les relations de congruence et l'homomorphisme, l'A. etudie l'ensemble des fragments, connexions et intermediaires qui permettent de reconstruire le systeme normatif represente.","PeriodicalId":430352,"journal":{"name":"Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125472415","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Logic after Wittgenstein","authors":"P. Tomassi","doi":"10.1080/080662001316865846","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/080662001316865846","url":null,"abstract":"Wittgenstein's later rejection of the externalist Tractarian picture of logic according to which all rationally analysable discourse is properly understood as truth-functional rules out any conception of logic as the study of universal features of discourse. Given later references to 'the logic of our language', some conception of logic appears to survive even on Wittgenstein's later view. However, given his rejection of any conception of philosophical theory as explanatory or hypothetical, Wittgenstein seems to be forced into descriptivism. Despite these constraints, I attempt to show that a valuable account of logic consistent with Wittgenstein's critique can be identified. That possibility raises the question: can any conception of formal logic as valuable modulo natural language survive Wittgenstein's later change of heart? Taking Wittgenstein's rejection of Tractarian conceptions seriously, logic is relativised to language-games in general and, perhaps, localised to particular language-games. Looking...","PeriodicalId":430352,"journal":{"name":"Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic","volume":"83 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114730512","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Conditional obligation and positive permission for agents in time","authors":"Mark A. Brown","doi":"10.1080/08066200050505779","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08066200050505779","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates the semantic treatment of conditional obligation, explicit permission (often called positive permission), and prohibition based on models with agents and branched time. In such models branches (rather than moments) are taken as basic, and the branching provides a way to represent the indeterminism which is normally presupposed by talk of free will, responsibility, action and ability. Careful treatment of the relation between ability and responsibility avoids many common problems with accounts of conditional obligation. Recognition of the generality often involved in conditional obligations makes possible a sensitive way of expressing some kinds of general prohibitions, which in turn makes it possible to account for the special role of explicit permission.","PeriodicalId":430352,"journal":{"name":"Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic","volume":"64 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127582996","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Game theory and conventiont","authors":"N. Tennant","doi":"10.1080/080662001316865828","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/080662001316865828","url":null,"abstract":"This paper rebuts criticisms by Hintikka of the author's account of game-theoretic semantics for classical logic. At issue are (i) the role of the axiom of choice in proving the equivalence of the game-theoretic account with the standard truth-theoretic account; (ii) the alleged need for quantification over strategies when providing a game-theoretic semantics; and (iii) the role of Tarski's Convention T. As a result of the ideas marshalled in response to Hintikka, the author puts forward a new conjecture concerning the relationship among truth, meaning and translation.","PeriodicalId":430352,"journal":{"name":"Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic","volume":"66 1-2","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120997914","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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